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RICHLAND DRUG CO. v. MOORMAN
Case Summary: Richland Drug Co. v. Moorman, Supreme Court of South Carolina (March 23, 1905)
Factual and Procedural Background
On September 26, 1903, Richland Drug Company (the relator) applied to Magistrate Robert Moorman under section 2972 of the Civil Code to have a notice served on Green Washington to quit possession of certain premises, proceeding by summary ejectment for trespassers. The notice did not fix a hearing date. The day after service, Washington and his attorney, J.Q. Marshall, appeared before the magistrate and submitted a deed purporting to show title. The magistrate did not at that time examine the deed because the deed had previously been shown him in a related, discontinued proceeding.
Washington requested that a day be set for him to substantiate his claim to possession; the magistrate agreed to set a hearing day and asked the relator's attorneys to fix a date. The relator's attorneys insisted the proceeding was summary and that if Washington did not give bond the magistrate's duty was limited to issuing an ejectment warrant. The magistrate, believing Washington might have rights and that the matter required investigation, declined to summarily eject without a hearing.
The proceeding remained pending before the magistrate because relator's attorneys did not agree on a hearing date. The Richland Drug Company then petitioned the Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the magistrate to issue his warrant of ejectment. The Circuit Court granted the writ, and the magistrate appealed to the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether mandamus will lie to compel a magistrate to issue a warrant of ejectment under section 2972 of the Civil Code — in other words, whether the magistrate's duty to issue such a warrant under the statute is a plain, peremptory ministerial duty.
- Whether, under the facts of this case (including the defendant's appearance and claim of title and the magistrate's decision to hear the matter), the magistrate was required as a matter of law to issue the warrant after the five-day period provided by statute.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant / Relator (Richland Drug Company) — as shown in the opinion
- Relator sought a mandamus to compel the magistrate to issue his warrant of ejectment under section 2972 after more than five days had elapsed without the defendant giving bond.
- Relator's attorneys asserted that the proceeding was summary and that, unless the person in possession gave the statutory bond, the magistrate's duty was limited to ejecting the alleged trespasser (i.e., issuing the warrant).
Respondent (Magistrate Robert Moorman) — as shown in the opinion
- The magistrate declined to summarily eject because the defendant appeared and produced a deed (a claim of title); he conceived the defendant might have rights requiring investigation and a hearing rather than immediate ejectment.
- The magistrate agreed to set a hearing day and remains ready to proceed and determine the matter according to the parties' rights whenever the relator agrees upon a time for the hearing.
Note: The opinion records these positions and the procedural posture; it does not provide a detailed adversary brief of each party beyond the acts and statements summarized above.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Lord v. Bates, 48 S.C. 109, 26 S.E. 213 | Mandamus lies only to enforce a plain ministerial duty of a public officer, as distinguished from duties involving discretion. | The Court invoked this principle to frame the threshold question whether issuance of the warrant was a ministerial duty the magistrate was required to perform. |
| State v. Morris, 67 S.C. 167, 26 S.E. 213 | Mandamus may compel a judicial officer to move or take action in performance of a duty, but it cannot direct a court what to decide on matters submitted to it or interfere with judicial discretion in deciding a case. | The Court applied this principle to explain that mandamus cannot be used to control a judicial determination and to justify allowing the magistrate to hear and decide questions presented. |
| 48 S.C. 183 | Not specified in the opinion; cited by counsel for appellant. | Cited in the record by appellant's counsel; the opinion does not state the rule from this citation or how the Court applied it. |
| 10 S.C. 303 | Not specified in the opinion; cited by counsel for appellant. | Cited in the record by appellant's counsel; the opinion does not state the rule from this citation or how the Court applied it. |
| 24 S.C. 519 | Not specified in the opinion; cited by counsel for appellant. | Cited in the record by appellant's counsel; the opinion does not state the rule from this citation or how the Court applied it. |
| 34 S.C. 107 | Not specified in the opinion; cited by counsel for appellant. | Cited in the record by appellant's counsel; the opinion does not state the rule from this citation or how the Court applied it. |
| 24 S.C. 507 | Not specified in the opinion; cited by counsel for respondent (contra). | Cited in the record by respondent's counsel; the opinion does not state the rule from this citation or how the Court applied it. |
| 60 S.C. 504 | Not specified in the opinion; cited by counsel for respondent (contra). | Cited in the record by respondent's counsel; the opinion does not state the rule from this citation or how the Court applied it. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the governing limitation on mandamus: it is available only to enforce a plain ministerial duty, not to control judicial discretion (citing Lord v. Bates and State v. Morris). The central question was whether, under the statute (Code 1902, §2972) and the facts, Magistrate Moorman had a peremptory duty to issue the warrant of ejectment.
The Court summarized the statutory scheme of §2972: an owner may apply to a magistrate to serve notice on a trespasser to quit; if after five days the trespasser refuses to quit, the magistrate shall issue a warrant of ejectment — provided that if the person in possession, before the five days expire, appears and satisfies the magistrate he has a bona fide color of claim and enters into bond (approved by the magistrate) conditioned to pay costs if the claimant later successfully establishes title, then the magistrate shall not issue the warrant.
The Court interpreted that statute as intended to give a real owner a speedy remedy against mere trespassers, but not to give an unfair advantage to merely asserted claimants over those in rightful possession. Therefore, a plaintiff seeking summary ejectment must at least make a prima facie showing before the magistrate that he is the owner and that the defendant is a trespasser. Merely stating the claim in the notice is insufficient if the defendant appears and challenges it; the plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to satisfy the magistrate that the case falls within the statute.
Applying those principles to the facts, the Court observed that the defendant (Washington) had appeared and asserted title by producing a deed and had requested a hearing to make good his claim. The magistrate agreed to set a hearing and declined to summarily eject without investigation. The Court held that the magistrate's duty to issue a warrant does not arise merely because five days have passed without the defendant executing the bond; rather, if the defendant appears and challenges the plaintiff's claim and demands a hearing, the magistrate must accord such a hearing. At that hearing the plaintiff must show at least a prima facie title and that the defendant is a trespasser.
The Court also relied on the cross-reference to §2974, which provides that either party may appeal and that the magistrate shall not issue his warrant until five days after he announces his decision, and that the defendant may seek an injunction pending appeal. The Court read §2974 to mean the magistrate cannot issue the warrant until he has made a decision on the question presented and the party in possession has the right to appeal from that decision.
On this combined statutory and factual basis, the Court concluded that mandamus was not appropriate because the magistrate had not been shown to have a plain ministerial duty to issue the warrant under the circumstances; instead, the magistrate properly exercised his duty to investigate and determine the matter before issuing a warrant.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court and dismissed the petition for mandamus. The Court's core ruling is emphasized as follows:
DISMISSED — The petition for mandamus is denied; the Circuit Court's order granting the writ is reversed.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The magistrate is not compelled by mandamus to issue the warrant of ejectment under the facts presented. The summary ejectment proceeding remains subject to the magistrate's determination after hearing the evidence; the magistrate may require the relator to make a prima facie showing of ownership and that the defendant is a trespasser before issuing a warrant.
- Procedural consequence: The statute (Code 1902, §2972), as interpreted by the Court, affords a defendant who appears and asserts a bona fide color of claim the opportunity for a hearing; mandamus will not be used to short-circuit that process where the magistrate has not been shown to have a ministerial duty to issue the warrant.
- Broader precedent: The Court applied established principles limiting mandamus to ministerial duties and refusing to use it to control judicial decisionmaking. The opinion reverses the Circuit Court without announcing a novel rule beyond the statutory interpretation and the application of those principles.
Opinion delivered by MR. JUSTICE JONES, March 23, 1905.
March 23, 1905. The opinion of the Court was delivered by
MR. JUSTICE JONES.
This is an appeal from an order granting a mandamus to compel a magistrate to issue his warrant of ejectment, against an alleged trespasser, as provided in section 2972, Civil Code. Mandamus will only lie against a public officer to enforce a plain ministerial duty required by law, as distinguished from a duty involving discretion in its exercise. Lord v. Bates, 48 S.C. 109, 26 S.E., 213. With respect to a judicial officer, while mandamus may be used to compel him to move, proceed, take action in the performance of a duty under the law, it cannot be used to interfere with the Court's power and discretion to decide in a particular way or to direct a court what it shall do in matters submitted to it for decision. State v. Morris, 67 S.C. 167, 26 S.E., 213. The question, then, is whether it was the plain, peremptory, ministerial duty of Magistrate Robert Moorman, under the law and facts in this case, to issue the warrant of ejectment which the Circuit Court has commanded him to do.
It appears that on the 26th day of September, 1903, on the application of the Richland Drug Company, Magistrate Moorman caused a notice to be served upon Green Washington to quit the premises described in the notice, proceeding under sec. 2972 providing for summary ejectment of trespassers. The notice to quit fixed no time for a hearing; but in response thereto, on the next day after its service, Green Washington, with his attorney, J.Q. Marshall, appeared before the magistrate and submitted evidence of his title — a deed of the premises, which the magistrate did not then examine, as the same deed had been exhibited to the magistrate in a summary ejectment proceeding involving the same premises begun three days previously by F.D. Kendall against Green Washington, but it had been discontinued. At his appearance, Green Washington requested of the magistrate that a day be appointed upon which he could make good his claim to the premises; and upon request of Washington's counsel, the magistrate agreed to set a day for the hearing. The magistrate saw the attorneys for the relator and asked them to fix a day for said hearing, whereupon they asserted that the proceeding was summary, and that unless Green Washington gave a bond the duty of the magistrate was limited to ejecting him from the property. The magistrate conceiving that Green Washington had rights as well as the Richland Drug Company and that the matter required investigation and consideration, declined to summarily eject without hearing. The proceeding is still pending before the magistrate, uninvestigated and undetermined judicially, owing to the failure of relator's attorneys to agree upon a day for that purpose, and the magistrate stands ready to proceed with the hearing and determination of the matter according to the rights of the parties, whenever relator shall agree upon the time for the hearing. These are substantially the facts as shown by the magistrate's return to the rule to show cause, issued upon the petition of the Richland Drug Company, filed November 6th, 1903, for a mandamus to compel the magistrate to issue his warrant of ejectment.
The statute on the subject is as follows, Code 1902, 2972: "If any person shall have gone into or shall hereafter go into possession of any lands or tenements of another without his consent or without warrant of law, it shall be lawful for the owner of the land so trespassed upon to apply to any magistrate to serve notice on such trespasser to quit the premises; and if after the expiration of five days from the personal service of such notice such trespasser refuses or neglects to quit, it shall then be the duty of such magistrate to issue his warrant to any sheriff or constable, requiring him forthwith to eject such trespasser, using such force as may be necessary: Provided, however, That if the person in possession shall, before the expiration of the said five days, appear before such magistrate and satisfy him that he has a bona fide color of claim to the possession of such premises, and enter into bond to the person claiming the land, with good and sufficient surety, to be approved by the magistrate, conditioned for the payment of all such costs and expenses as the person claiming to be the owner of the lands may incur in the successful establishment of his claim by any of the modes of proceeding now provided by law, the said magistrate shall not issue his warrant as aforesaid."
This statute was designed to give the real owner of land an expeditious method of ejecting trespassers, but it was not intended to give a mere claimant of land any advantage over one in rightful possession. The plaintiff claiming right of summary ejectment must bring himself within the statute by at least making before the magistrate a prima facie showing that he is the owner of the premises and that defendant is a trespasser. The mere statement of his claim in the notice is not sufficient if the defendant appears and challenges the claim, but he must make such proof as should satisfy the magistrate that the case is one falling within the statute. This, it appears, the relator has so far declined or failed to do. The duty of the magistrate to issue his warrant of ejectment does not arise until after the expiration of five days from service of notice to quit, and upon its appearing that the defendant, being a trespasser, refuses or neglects to quit after such notice. The statute has no application when it appears clearly that the party in possession is the owner or in rightful possession and for that reason refuses to quit, and the summary proceedings should be dismissed and the claimant left to the ordinary remedy for recovery of possession of land.
The Circuit Court held, "That the alleged trespasser must not only, within five days, satisfy the magistrate that he has a bona fide color of claim to the possession of the premises, but must also enter into a bond to the person claiming the premises, with good and sufficient surety, as provided in section 2972, supra. The statute contemplates that after the alleged trespasser has complied with these conditions, the person claiming possession of the premises should be relegated to his action of law, in which action the question of trespass should be determined. It, therefore, appearing from the magistrate's return that more than five days had elapsed since the institution of the proceedings before him and that the alleged trespasser within that time had failed to enter into the bond required by sec. 2972, supra, he should have issued his warrant as required therein."
We do not think this is a correct view of the statute. The proviso of the section quoted has no application to the owner or tenant in rightful possession but to a trespasser who, nevertheless, has a bona fide color of claim to the possession, and the statute gives the latter the privilege within five days of making such showing and executing the bond which shall operate to prevent the issuing of the warrant. But it does not follow from this that it is the imperative duty of a magistrate to issue his warrant of ejectment in all cases where the party in possession fails within five days to satisfy him that he has a bona fide color of claim and to execute the bond. If the defendant in possession does not see fit to avail himself of the privilege of executing the bond within five days after notice to quit, and thereby preventing the warrant of ejectment, but should appear and demand a hearing as to whether the case is one falling within the statute, it is the duty of the magistrate to accord such hearing. and it would then be encumbent on plaintiff to show at least prima facie that he is owner of the premises and that defendant is a trespasser, otherwise we see very little use or meaning in the provisions of sec. 2974, which is as follows: "Either party to these proceedings shall have the right to appeal. The magistrate shall not issue his warrant until the expiration of five days after he announces his decision, and in the meantime the defendant may apply for an injunction, as in other cases, restraining the execution of such warrant pending the determination of his appeal by the Circuit Court." This shows that the magistrate cannot issue his warrant of ejectment until after he has made his decision on the question presented, and that the party in possession has the right of appeal from such decision. Under this view of the law and the undisputed facts, the application for mandamus should have been refused.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the petition dismissed.
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