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MATTER OF APPLICATION OF SCOTT
Case Summary: In the Matter of the Application of C. A. Scott and Jennie E. Scott
Supreme Court of California, L. A. No. 3518, Department Two — March 20, 1916 — Opinion by Henshaw, J.; Melvin, J., and Lorigan, J., concurred.
Factual and Procedural Background
This action was brought by C. A. Scott and his wife under the Torrens Land Act seeking a decree establishing their title to school section 36, township 13 south, range 13 east, S. B. M., in Imperial County. The petition alleged that, under the resurvey ordered by Congress (Act of July 1, 1902), the original section 36 had been identified as tract (plot) 57 of the resurvey. Notice was served on occupants of tract 57 and adjoining lands.
The petition described parties in possession: John J. Miller (south half), Josiah W. Edwards (north one-half of the northwest quarter and the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter), W. A. Patterson and his wife (parts of the northeast quarter), and Paulina McElfresh (south half of the northwest quarter). McElfresh filed a disclaimer. Miller, Edwards and the Pattersons filed a joint answer, and the Pattersons later filed a separate answer.
Respondents admitted that Scott was the state's grantee of original section 36 but contended that tract 57 of the resurvey was not identical with original section 36; they asserted tract 57 was in fact section 33 of township 13 and claimed ownership under desert-land entries made after the resurvey. The answers attacked the original United States survey of 1856 (approved 1857) as fraudulent and alleged the township was not effectively surveyed until the resurvey (asserted to be in 1908), and that the resurvey did not attempt to locate the school section in accordance with the old survey.
Procedurally: upon approval of the 1856 survey in 1857, title to section 36 vested in the State of California; that title passed to Scott by certificate of purchase dated January 3, 1901 (before the resurvey was ordered). Defendants' rights were founded on entries made after the congressional order for resurvey. The trial court refused to accept as final the land department's declaration that original section 36 was identical with plot 57; this refusal is the principal ground of the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the land department's determination, effected by the federal resurvey, that original section 36 is identical with plot (tract) 57 of the resurvey is controlling on the parties and the state grantee (Scott).
- Whether respondents who initiated rights (desert-land entries) after the congressional resurvey may dispute the land department's determination identifying original section 36 with plot 57.
- Whether the trial court erred in refusing to accept the land department's declaration that original section 36 is identical with plot 57 of the resurvey.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Petitioners') Arguments
- The petitioners (C. A. Scott and wife) sought a decree quieting title to school section 36, asserting that the resurvey (plot 57) represents section 36 and that Scott's title derives from the state's vested title (certificate of purchase dated January 3, 1901).
- Implicit in the petition and the court's summary is that Scott accepted the declaration of the United States land department identifying plot 57 as the location of original section 36.
Respondents' Arguments
- Respondents (Miller, Edwards, Pattersons, etc.) admitted Scott was the state's grantee of section 36 but contended that tract 57 of the resurvey is not the same as original section 36; they asserted tract 57 corresponds to section 33 and that they hold title to it under desert-land entries.
- They challenged the original 1856 United States survey as fraudulent and alleged the township was not properly surveyed until the resurvey; they asserted that the resurvey did not locate the school section consistent with the original survey.
- One occupant (Paulina McElfresh) filed a disclaimer, and other occupants filed answers opposing Scott's claim as described above.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U.S. 510 | Authority for the controlling effect of a resurvey on subsequent rights (as cited by the court). | Cited with other U.S. Supreme Court cases to support the proposition that rights initiated after the order for resurvey are governed by the results of that resurvey. |
| Stoneroad v. Stoneroad, 158 U.S. 240 | Authority regarding the effect of surveys and resurveys on land title rights. | Grouped with other federal decisions to establish that entries made after a resurvey are subject to the resurvey's determinations. |
| Russell v. Maxwell Land Grant Co., 158 U.S. 253 | Principle concerning the controlling force of an official resurvey upon location-based rights. | Used by the court to show federal precedents support the rule that post-resurvey entries are controlled by the resurvey. |
| Horne v. Smith, 159 U.S. 40 | Case cited in the same context of survey/resurvey controlling title and location disputes. | Included among authorities supporting the conclusion that rights founded after resurvey must yield to its results. |
| Cragin v. Powell, 128 U.S. 691 | Authority on survey questions affecting title and location of public lands. | Relied upon with other federal authorities to justify treating the resurvey's declaration as controlling for those whose entries were made subject to it. |
| Nichols v. McCullom, 169 Cal. 611 (147 P. 271) | California decision directly holding that a resurvey "absolutely controls" in the same factual situation. | Specifically cited as closely analogous: the court relied on Nichols to conclude the trial court erred in refusing to accept the land department's determination that original section 36 equals plot 57. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the case in light of the timing of title transfers and the effect of the federal resurvey. It noted that upon approval of the original 1856 survey in 1857, title to section 36 vested in the State of California and that title passed to Scott by certificate dated January 3, 1901 — which was before the congressional order for the resurvey. By contrast, the respondents' rights were initiated by entries made after the act of Congress ordering the resurvey; under the authorities cited, such subsequent rights are governed by the results of the resurvey.
The land department, as a product of the resurvey, had determined that the original section 36 corresponded to plot (tract) 57 of the resurvey. The court reasoned that respondents who took their rights subject to the resurvey could not object to that official determination because their entries were subordinate to the resurvey. The court observed that the only party who could have objected to the land department's determination was Scott (the state's successor in title), but the opinion states that Scott accepted the land department's declaration and the matter was finally adjusted in that manner.
Because the trial court refused to accept as final the land department's identification of original section 36 with plot 57, the Supreme Court held that the trial court committed grave error. The court rested its conclusion on federal precedents addressing the controlling nature of resurveys on subsequent entries and on the California decision in Nichols v. McCullom, which presented a precisely similar situation and held that the resurvey controls absolutely.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County is REVERSED.
Implications:
- The court concluded that the land department's determination, effected by the resurvey, that original section 36 is identical with plot (tract) 57 is controlling as to respondents whose rights arose after the resurvey; such respondents may not collaterally attack that determination in these circumstances.
- The trial court's refusal to accept the resurvey's declaration was error; the Supreme Court reversed on that basis. The opinion relies on existing federal and state precedents (including Nichols v. McCullom) and does not purport to announce a novel rule beyond applying those authorities.
- The opinion includes the notation that application for modification of the judgment was denied. There is no separate lengthy discussion of broader doctrinal change; the decision enforces prior principles regarding the effect of an official resurvey on subsequent entries and titles.
Concurrence: Justices Melvin and Lorigan concurred.
HENSHAW, J.
This action was brought by C.A. Scott and his wife under the provisions of the Torrens Land Act. They sought a decree establishing title in themselves to school section 36, township 13 south, range 13 east, S. B. M., in Imperial County, which section was located as tract 57 of the resurvey of the township under the act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Notice was duly served upon all the persons named as occupants of tract 57 and occupants of the lands adjoining this tract. The petition states that tract 57 of the resurvey is section 36 of the original survey; that John J. Miller occupied the south half thereof; Josiah W. Edwards occupied the north one-half of the northwest quarter and the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter thereof; that W.A. Patterson and his wife occupied a portion of the northeast quarter, defined to be the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter and the south one-half of the northeast quarter; that Paulina McElfresh occupied the south half of the northwest quarter. She filed a disclaimer in these proceedings. Miller, Edwards, and the Pattersons filed a joint answer, and subsequently the Pattersons filed a separate answer. These answers in substance admit that Scott is the grantee of the state of California of section 36, township 13, but aver that that section is not identical with tract 57 of the new survey, but that tract 57 is identical with section 33 of township 13, and the defendants assert ownership in themselves of tract 57 as being section 33, township 13, under their respective desert land entries. The answers attack the original United States survey made in 1856 and approved March 2, 1857, as being fraudulent and fictitious, and allege that township 13 was not surveyed until "the so-called resurvey thereof was made in the year 1908." As to this resurvey it is asserted that "no attempt has been made to locate the school section, or any other section, or any other lands, in accordance with the old United States survey alleged to have been made in 1856."
Upon approval in 1857 of the survey of 1856, title to section 36 vested in the state of California. This title passed to petitioner C.A. Scott under his certificate of purchase of January 3, 1901, before the resurvey was ordered. Upon the other hand, all the rights of the defendants were initiated by entries made after the act of Congress ordering the resurvey, and were therefore controlled by the results of that survey. ( Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U.S. 510, [49 L. Ed. 857, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 530]; Stoneroad v. Stoneroad, 158 U.S. 240, [39 L.Ed. 966, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 822]; Russell v. Maxwell Land Grant Co., 158 U.S. 253, [39 L.Ed. 971, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 927]; Horne v. Smith, 159 U.S. 40, [40 L.Ed. 68, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 988]; Cragin v. Powell, 128 U.S. 691, [32 L.Ed. 566, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 203].)
One of the results of the resurvey was a determination by the land department that this section 36 of the original survey was plot 57 of the resurvey. To this determination, which thus fixed the location of the original section 36, who can object? Not these respondents, whose entries one and all were made in subordination to this resurvey. The only person entitled to object was Scott, who had succeeded to the state's title. If Scott believed that section 36, to which admittedly he had title, was not identical with plot 57 as determined and declared by the resurvey, unquestionably he would have been entitled to urge this contention in the proper forum. Whatever may be the fact as to the identity of locations of section 36 and plot 57, the situation presented is simply this: By errors and irregularities in the original survey, and by the obliteration of landmarks, it was difficult if not impossible to locate section 36. In this condition of affairs the United States caused a resurvey to be made and, in effect, said to the state and to Scott, the successor of the state, "We tender to you plot 57 as representing section 36." If Scott accepted this, no one of these respondents could be heard to object for the reason indicated, that their rights having been initiated subject to the resurvey they were bound by this act of the United States. Scott accepted this declaration of the United States and the matter was finally adjusted.
We have thus outlined the controversy. All of the asserted errors of the trial court revolve around its refusal to accept as final the declaration of the land department that old section 36 is identical with plot 57 of the new survey. In so doing the trial court fell into grievous error. It is unnecessary here to do more than refer to the case of Nichols v. McCullom, 169 Cal. 611, [ 147 P. 271], where precisely the same situation was presented, and where it is held that the resurvey absolutely controls.
The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed.
Melvin, J., and Lorigan, J., concurred.
Application for modification of judgment denied.
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