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JONES v. PERKINS
Jones v. Perkins, Deputy United States Marshal, et al.
Factual and Procedural Background
Jones was arrested for failing to register under the Selective Draft Law of May 18, 1917. After a hearing, a United States Commissioner committed him to custody pending the next term of the United States District Court. [1]
Jones petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his detention was unlawful because the Selective Draft Law violated the United States Constitution. Following a show-cause proceeding and hearing, the District Court denied the petition on the ground that the statute was constitutional. Jones then pursued a direct appeal. [1]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Jones was entitled to habeas corpus on the ground that the Selective Draft Law was unconstitutional. [2][1]
- Whether the court needed to determine if exceptional circumstances permitted pretrial habeas corpus relief when the constitutional challenges had already been rejected in the Selective Draft Law Cases. [3]
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Argument
- Jones argued that he was unlawfully restrained because the Selective Draft Law, under which he was arrested, was repugnant to the United States Constitution. [1]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Riggins v. United States, 199 U.S. 547 | Absent exceptional circumstances, regular criminal procedure should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted before trial. | The Court cited the case as support for the general rule against anticipatory habeas corpus relief in criminal proceedings. [3] |
| Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420 | Absent exceptional circumstances, regular criminal procedure should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted before trial. | The Court cited the case in support of the governing pretrial habeas corpus principle. [3] |
| Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U.S. 245 | Absent exceptional circumstances, regular criminal procedure should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted before trial. | The Court relied on the case as additional authority for the general procedural rule. [3] |
| Arver v. United States, [the Selective Draft Law Cases,] ante, 366 | The constitutional challenges to the Selective Draft Law lacked merit. | Because Arver had resolved every constitutional question raised by Jones adversely to him, the Court applied that ruling and affirmed without deciding whether exceptional circumstances existed. [3] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
- The Court began with the settled rule that, absent exceptional circumstances, criminal defendants must follow ordinary judicial procedure and may not obtain habeas corpus relief before trial. [3]
- Under that rule, affirmance would ordinarily be required unless Jones's case belonged to the exceptional class permitting pretrial relief. [3]
- The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether exceptional circumstances existed because every constitutional challenge asserted by Jones had already been rejected that same day in Arver v. United States. [3]
- Accordingly, the Court applied Arver while expressly preserving the general principle against anticipatory habeas corpus relief. [2][3]
Holding and Implications
AFFIRMED. The Court affirmed the District Court's order denying Jones's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. [2][3][4]
Jones remained subject to the ordinary criminal process, and his constitutional challenge failed under the controlling decision in Arver. The Court did not decide whether his case presented exceptional circumstances warranting pretrial habeas corpus review and did not depart from the existing general rule. [2][3]
Petitioner sought habeas corpus upon the ground that the Selective Draft Law, for disobedience of which he was arrested, was unconstitutional. The constitutional questions he raises having all been decided adversely to him in the Selective Draft Law Cases, ante, 366, the court affirms the trial court's order refusing the writ, without, however, departing from the general principle that habeas corpus should not anticipate trial in criminal cases, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, and without inquiring whether in this case such circumstances existed. 243 F. 997, affirmed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.
Jones, the appellant, was arrested under a warrant charging him with a failure to register as required by the Act of Congress of May 18, 1917, known as the Selective Draft Law, (c. 15, 40 Stat. 76), and after a hearing by a United States Commissioner was committed to custody to await the ensuing term of the United States District Court. Alleging that he was illegally restrained because the statute under the assumed authority of which he was held was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, he petitioned the court below for a writ of habeas corpus. Following a rule to show cause and a hearing on the return thereto, the petition was denied on the ground that the statute was constitutional (243 F. 997), and to reverse the order so adjudging this direct appeal was prosecuted.
It is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of a trial. Riggins v. United States, 199 U.S. 547; Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420; Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U.S. 245. If that rule applied, therefore, our duty would be to affirm, unless this case could be treated as coming within the exceptional class. But we do not deem it necessary to enter into that consideration because, even if it were found to be embraced in such class, every constitutional question relied upon has been this day in Arver v. United States, [the Selective Draft Law Cases,] ante, 366, decided to be without merit. Because of this situation, therefore, without departing from the general principle, we think it suffices in this case to apply the ruling made in the Arver Case and, for the reasons stated in the opinion therein, to affirm.
And it is so ordered.
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