STIFT v. STATE

Franklin, Easterling Fox, for appellant. The court erred in admitting the evidence that at the time of the arrest appellant drew a long dirk knife on the arresting officer and prosecutors. The witness Rogers was allowed to testify over the objection of the appellant as to what the appellant was doing at the time that he was arrested. Before any of this testimony was received the appellant admitted that the Ford was in his possession. The witness Rogers, over appellant's objection, and after admission of the possession of the car, testified that when appellant was arrested "he jumped up, and when he comes up, he comes out with a knife or dirk about that long — it looked like that long to me (indicating), and Barrett was about three feet from him, and he slaps a forty-five on him and says: `Drop it, or I will shoot you in two,' and the boy put his knife in his pocket, and we brought him in." "Q. Was it a knife or a dirk? A. A dirk — wrapped around the handle with tape." The proper place for testimony such as this was under the charge of assault and battery with intent to kill which was at that time on the docket against this appellant, but the astute district attorney saw fit to shoot a blanket load and introduce on a charge of larceny, testimony which should properly have been withheld until the assault charge was reached. It has long been the ruling in our courts that evidence of the commission of other crimes are not admissible on the trial of another where the two charges are in no way connected. Magee v. State (Miss.), 22 So. 890. Rufus Creekmore, Assistant Attorney-General, for the the state. Counsel argue that the court was in error in permitting the state to show what the appellant did at the time he was arrested. The argument is made that when the appellant pulled out his knife that this constituted a separate and distinct offense from that for which he was being tried and that, for this reason, evidence of this separate offense should not be admitted on the trial of this cause. It will be observed from the record that no objection was made to this question asked by the district attorney, which elicited the testimony relative to the drawing of the knife by the defendant, but the objection was made only after the witness had testified fully to the facts relative to the incident. After the testimony had gone to the jury, an objection by the defendant could avail nothing. But if he desired to receive the same benefit which an objection properly made would have given him, he should have moved to exclude the testimony. For reasons best known to himself, he did not see fit to do this. So for this reason, if for no other, the contention of counsel on this proposition must fail. It is true that as a general rule evidence of crimes other than that for which the appellant is being tried, should not be admitted by the court, but it is also true that there are certain well-defined exceptions to this general rule. King v. State, 66 Miss. 502, 6 So. 189; Foster v. State, 70 Miss. 756; Raines v. State, 81 Miss. 489; Collier v. State, 106 Miss. 613, 64 So. 373; Keel v. State, 133 Miss. 160, 97 So. 521. In the case at bar, the action of the defendant in drawing his knife and thus attempting to resist arrest when the officer approached, was competent for the purpose of showing his guilty knowledge of the crime and for the purpose of showing that he was exercising acts of possession and control over the car, itself. For these reasons, the court committed no error in admitting this testimony.