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CAMPBELL v. COMMONWEALTH
Case Summary: Campbell v. Commonwealth of Virginia, Supreme Court of Virginia (Staunton), September 11, 1936
Factual and Procedural Background
The accused, Campbell, was charged before a police justice of the City of Bristol with maintaining a common nuisance as defined under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (referred to in the syllabus as section 4675(55) of the Code of 1936 and in the opinion as section 55 of the Act, Acts 1934, chapter 94). He was found guilty by the police justice and, on appeal, was tried in the Corporation Court of the City of Bristol without a jury and again convicted. The case was brought to the Supreme Court of Virginia by writ of error.
Facts developed at trial: two police officers executed a search warrant at Campbell's home and found eleven full pints, two half pints of whiskey, and two-thirds of a pint of gin in the icebox; the bottles were sealed and stamped with the State Alcohol Control Board stamp and had been purchased at Store 155 in Appalachia, Virginia. In the basement were three dozen half-gallon fruit jars and several A.B.C. store cartons. The officers encountered Campbell on the street before the search and informed him of the warrant; he stated he would shortly be at home. Three Commonwealth witnesses who lived nearby testified that they had not been inside Campbell's home, had not seen whiskey moved in or out or sold there, had not heard unusual noise or disturbances, but had observed heavier-than-usual automobile traffic and people coming and going, some carrying packages. Campbell testified that he traded in livestock, drank freely, frequently had guests to whom he served drinks, and usually purchased liquor in gallon quantities at the Appalachia store; he explained the quantity found as purchases made at three different times and said some containers in the basement belonged to him while others were left by a prior occupant. The wife of the accused corroborated his account.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain a conviction for maintaining a common nuisance under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (section 55 of the Act, Acts 1934, chapter 94, as referenced in the opinion; also referenced in the syllabus as section 4675(55) of the Code of 1936).
Arguments of the Parties
Commonwealth's Case (Prosecution)
- Officers executing a search warrant found sealed and stamped alcoholic beverages (eleven full pints, two half pints of whiskey, two-thirds pint of gin) in Campbell's icebox.
- In the basement were three dozen half-gallon fruit jars and several A.B.C. store cartons.
- Three nearby residents testified they observed more than the usual number of automobiles stopping in front of Campbell's home and people going in and out, some carrying packages—suggesting unusual activity at the house.
- The prosecution's witnesses established proximity and observational testimony regarding increased traffic and people entering and leaving the house.
Accused's Case (Defense)
- Campbell testified he traded in livestock in a small way, lived near livestock yards, drank freely, and frequently had guests to whom he served drinks.
- He explained that the liquor found was lawfully purchased at Store 155 in Appalachia, was sealed and stamped by the Alcohol Control Board, and had been bought at three distinct times (as shown by markings of A.B.C. agents).
- He said some containers found in the basement were his and some remained from the prior occupant, who, according to a Commonwealth witness, had a reputation for bootlegging before Campbell moved in.
- The accused's wife corroborated his explanation regarding possession and use of the liquor.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by identifying the statutory definition of a "common nuisance" under the Act as "All houses ... where alcoholic beverages are manufactured, stored, sold, dispensed, given away or used contrary to law by any scheme, or device whatever." The opinion then recited the evidence introduced at trial: discovery of sealed and stamped alcoholic beverages in the accused's icebox, jars and cartons in the basement, and testimony from nearby residents describing increased traffic and people entering and leaving the house.
The court considered the accused's testimony and corroboration by his wife: that the liquor was lawfully purchased at an ABC store over time, that he drank and entertained guests, and that some containers predated his tenancy. The court observed the reasonableness and naturalness of this explanation and noted corroboration by the wife. The Commonwealth's witnesses did not testify to seeing sales, seeing liquor moved in or out for sale, hearing disturbances, or making complaints to police; their testimony mainly described increased automobile and pedestrian traffic on a street already characterized by heavy traffic.
Importantly, the court stated that, "Without regard to the testimony of the accused and his witnesses, which, to say the least, was potent in its refutation of the guilt of the accused, we are of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial court." On that basis the court reversed the conviction. The opinion does not elaborate further legal analysis beyond these observations and the conclusion that the proof failed to meet the standard necessary to uphold the conviction for maintaining a common nuisance under the statute.
Holding and Implications
REVERSED. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain a conviction for maintaining a common nuisance under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (section 55 of the Act / section 4675(55) of the Code of 1936 as cited in the syllabus).
Implications: The direct effect of the decision was to reverse the judgment of the trial court and, therefore, to vacate the conviction. The opinion does not discuss broader legal implications or announce a new rule of law; it confines its disposition to the insufficiency of the evidence in this specific case.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Maintaining Common Nuisance — Sufficiency of Evidence to Sustain Conviction — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a prosecution for maintaining a common nuisance in violation of section 4675(55) of the Code of 1936, defining such nuisance as a house where alcoholic beverages are manufactured, sold or used contrary to law, police officers found in accused's home twelve pints of whiskey properly sealed and stamped, and three witnesses for the Commonwealth testified that they lived close to the accused but had never been in his home; that they had never seen any whiskey taken in or away from his home or sold there; that they had never heard any unusual noise or commotion there, but that more than the usual number of automobiles stopped in front of the accused's home and that people went in and out, some carrying packages.
Held: That the evidence was insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction.
BROWNING, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
The accused was charged before a police justice of the City of Bristol with maintaining a common nuisance as defined in section 55 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, Acts 1934, chapter 94, and was found guilty.
Upon his appeal to the Corporation Court of the City of Bristol, where he was tried without the intervention of a jury, he was again convicted.
Section 55 of the Act with which we are here concerned makes it a misdemeanor to maintain a common nuisance. The Act defines such nuisance in the following terms:
"All houses, * * * where alcoholic beverages are manufactured, stored, sold, dispensed, given away or used contrary to law by any scheme, or device whatever, * * *."
The accused lived in what is called a slum district of the city. He testified that he traded in live stock in a small way and that where he lived was near the livestock yards.
Two police officers, in execution of a search warrant, found in the home of the accused eleven full pints and two half pints of whiskey and two-thirds of a pint of gin in the ice box; that they were admitted to the house by the wife of the accused; that on their way to the house for the purpose of searching it they saw the accused on the sidewalk of one of the streets and they told him that they had a search warrant for the purpose of searching his home; that accused said, "All right," that he would be up to his home shortly; that all of the liquor found at the home of the accused was properly sealed and stamped with the stamp used by the Alcohol Control Board of the State of Virginia, and was purchased at Store 155, located at Appalachia, Virginia; that stored in the basement of the house was found three dozen half gallon fruit jars and several A.B.C. store cartons.
The Commonwealth then introduced three witnesses to prove its case.
They lived in close proximity to the home of the accused but none of them had ever been in his home; they had never seen any whiskey taken in or away from the home or sold there; that they had never heard any unusual noise, swearing or commotion emanating from Campbell's home and that they had never made any complaint against the place to the officers of the city.
The onus of their testimony was that automobiles, consisting of taxis and private cars, passed along Virginia Street, day and night, and that more than a usual number stopped in front of Campbell's house; that they had seen people go in and out of the home and one witness testified that some people were carrying packages and this witness testified, "that the passing of cars and people going to and from Campbell's home was nuisance to himself and family."
It was uncontradicted that there was a great deal of traffic on Virginia Street.
The explanation of the accused of having in his possession the quantity of liquor which was found in his house was that he was fond of it and drank freely; that he frequently had guests to whom he served drinks; that he usually purchased liquor in quantities of one gallon at a time when he visited the Appalachia store; that his supply on hand at the time of the search was purchased at three distinct times as was shown by the marking of the A.B.C. agents from whom it was purchased; that some of the containers found in the basement belonged to him and some he found there when he moved into the house. It may here be said that the Commonwealth's witness, Sulfridge, testified that prior to Campbell's moving into the house, it was occupied by a man who had a reputation for bootlegging.
The explanation is not without reasonableness and naturalness.
It is fully corroborated by the wife of the accused.
Without regard to the testimony of the accused and his witnesses, which, to say the least, was potent in its refutation of the guilt of the accused, we are of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial court. We therefore reverse the said judgment.
Reversed.
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