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UNITED STATES v. SAMUEL DUNKEL CO

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Mar 11, 1949
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United States v. Samuel Dunkel Co., Inc., et al., 2d Cir. (March 11, 1949) — Opinion by Circuit Judge Clark

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendants Samuel Dunkel Co., Inc., Sondra Egg Products Corporation, Charles Cohen, Julius Cohen, Carl Ebbighausen, and Sidney S. Atlas were convicted in September 1943 on two conspiracy indictments concerning fraudulent wartime sales of dried eggs to the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation. All six defendants were convicted under 18 U.S.C.A. § 88 (conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States). The two corporate defendants and four individual defendants (the first four named) were also convicted under 18 U.S.C.A. § 83 for conspiring to obtain payment of false claims against the United States. The convictions were appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

At trial the jury deliberated more than twelve hours during a 24-hour period and repeatedly requested further instructions. After reporting an inability to reach unanimous agreement, the jury foreman told the court that "there is a majority, very much." The trial judge then gave supplemental instructions which largely repeated the language of Allen v. United States, admonishing jurors of their duty to agree and urging dissenting jurors to reconsider in light of a majority view. Counsel for defendants objected, stating any verdict then reached would be coerced; the court declined to accept the objection unless made in the jury's presence and offered to recall the jury, an offer not accepted. The jury continued deliberating for nearly eight more hours, returned several times for instructions, and ultimately returned guilty verdicts. The court of appeals reviewed these events and reversed and remanded.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court's inquiry into the jury's division (asking whether there was a "pronounced majority" or whether the jury was "nearly equally divided") and the subsequent Allen-type admonitions had a coercive effect sufficient to require reversal of the convictions.
  2. Whether eliciting or learning the nature or degree of the jury's division is permissible, or whether such inquiry alone is ground for reversal under controlling Supreme Court precedent (as discussed in Burton and Brasfield).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Counsel for defendants stated, at the time of the supplemental charge, that "if any verdict is reached now it will be a verdict produced by coercion," asserting that the court's inquiry and admonitions coerced the jury.

Appellee's Arguments (United States)

  • The Government suggested that the convictions might be sustained because the exact numerical division of the jury was not asked for or divulged, implying that the absence of specific numbers might distinguish this case from those reversing for numerical inquiry.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 Language admonishing jurors of their duty to agree; urging dissenters to re‑examine their position in light of the majority. The trial judge's supplemental charge largely quoted Allen. The court recognized that Allen-type admonitions may be used but must not be coercive in effect.
Allis v. United States, 155 U.S. 117 Permissibility of recalling a jury to ascertain difficulties and assist deliberation. Cited to show recalling jurors for assistance is a familiar practice and acceptable in principle.
Israel v. United States, 3 F.2d 743 (6th Cir.) Support for point that courts may point out disadvantages of a new trial and assist juries. Referenced as part of authorities recognizing permissible assistance to juries.
Shea v. United States, 260 F. 807 (9th Cir.) Similar support for assistance to juries and discouraging hung juries. Cited among cases acknowledging the propriety of aiding jurors' deliberations.
Suslak v. United States, 213 F. 913 (9th Cir.) Similar authority regarding assisting juries. Included among supportive precedents for recalling and assisting juries.
Wissel v. United States, 22 F.2d 468 (2d Cir.) A judge "may advise, and he may persuade, but he may not command, unduly influence, or coerce." Used to emphasize limits on judicial admonitions to juries—permissible persuasion but not coercion.
United States v. Allis, 73 F. 165 (C.C.Kan.) (affirmed Allis v. United States, supra) Use of Allen language in supplemental charge was employed in similar form. Noted as an instance where Allen-type admonitions were used; context acknowledged in weighing permissibility.
United States v. Winters, 158 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.) Illustrates prior use of Allen-style instructions in this circuit. Cited as an example where the Allen charge had been employed.
Bord v. United States, 133 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir.) Use of Allen-type instructions; context of supplemental charges. Cited among cases employing Allen language; cited for broader survey of usage.
Boehm v. United States, 123 F.2d 791 (8th Cir.) Use of Allen language; cautions about coercion. Cited as an example of Allen charge usage and noted for context and discretion exercised by courts.
Stewart v. United States, 300 F. 769 (8th Cir.) Criticism of the use of Allen opinion in certain forms. Mentioned as demonstrating some judicial criticism of overuse or misuse of Allen-style admonitions.
United States v. Olweiss, 138 F.2d 798 (2d Cir.) Defense of jury independence against coercive charges; prior treatment of Allen usage. Quoted approvingly to the extent that jurors must maintain independence; indicated the court's circuit precedent view.
Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283 Criticized practice of inquiring into the jury's division even without asking which way the division stood; suggested such knowledge is not material and should not be sought by the judge. Cited as an early Supreme Court case criticizing inquiry into jury division and warning against the practice.
Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 Holds that inquiry into the jury's numerical division itself is ground for reversal; such inquiry is generally coercive and serves no useful purpose. Characterized as the controlling Supreme Court decision settling the law; this Court applied Brasfield to conclude inquiry here required reversal.
St. Louis S.F.R. Co. v. Bishard, 147 F. 496 (8th Cir.) Example of reversal where numerical division was elicited; caution about inquiry into jury division. Used as part of the body of authority that supported reversal for eliciting division information.
Weiderman v. United States, 10 F.2d 745 (8th Cir.) Part of authority addressing inquiries into jury division. Cited among cases considering the effect of inquiry into jury division.
Nigro v. United States, 4 F.2d 781 (8th Cir.) Involved asking whether there was a predominance without indicating numbers; foreman said there was a predominance. Cited to show that even indirect inquiries about a "predominance" were treated as significant by some courts.
Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 339 (5th Cir.) Conviction was sustained in that circuit (one judge dissenting) despite inquiry; certiorari denied. Noted as part of the division of authority prior to Brasfield.
Quong Duck v. United States, 293 F. 563 (9th Cir.) Inquiry held not ground of error in itself, but reversal found because of coercive language in supplemental charge. Cited as an example where the language of the charge (not merely the inquiry) produced reversal.
Spaugh v. United States, 77 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.) Followed Brasfield where the foreman reported eleven-to-one votes on several counts. Listed as a post-Brasfield decision following its holding that inquiry is reversible error.
Jordan v. United States, 22 F.2d 966 (9th Cir.) Extended Brasfield beyond exact facts to similar inquiries (e.g., "about evenly divided"). Cited as an example of application of Brasfield to less explicit inquiries.
Berger v. United States, 62 F.2d 438 (10th Cir.) Foreman reported a six-to-six division; treated in line with Brasfield's concerns. Noted as in accord with Brasfield's rule that eliciting division is problematic.
Bowen v. United States, 153 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.) Distinguished Brasfield where an unsolicited note from the jury foreman reported a deadlock eleven-to-one and led to an unobjectional supplemental charge. Noted as a rare post-Brasfield distinction; that ground is not available here.
Shaffman v. United States, 289 F. 370 (3d Cir.) Earlier case consistent with prohibition on eliciting jury division. Referenced among earlier supporting authorities.
Lucas v. United States, 275 F. 405 (8th Cir.) Earlier case cited to illustrate related practice and rulings. Cited in support of the broader authority on the subject.
Nick v. United States, 122 F.2d 660 (8th Cir.) Suggested that extended deliberation may indicate a delicate balance and that any error could turn the scales. Used to support the proposition that long deliberation can make a verdict more susceptible to being affected by a judicial slip.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the trial events in the context of a large body of authority about permissible judicial intervention in jury deliberations. It acknowledged that recalling juries and giving supplemental instructions to assist deliberations is a familiar and often proper practice (citing Allis and others). The court also recognized that Allen-type admonitions — urging dissenting jurors to reconsider in light of the majority — have been frequently used and are not per se impermissible.

The critical focus of the court's analysis was the trial judge's inquiry into the jury's division. The trial judge asked whether the jury was "nearly equally divided" or had "a pronounced majority" — and the foreman answered that there was "a majority, very much." The court explained that inquiry into the nature or extent of the jury's division has been criticized (Burton) and that the Supreme Court in Brasfield treated such inquiry as inherently harmful and reversible error. Brasfield held that asking the jury to reveal its numerical division serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by less intrusive questions, has a tendency to coerce, and is therefore ground for reversal.

The Second Circuit observed the split in the lower courts prior to Brasfield but concluded Brasfield settled the law: the eliciting of information about the jury's division — even without revealing exact numbers or without the judge's knowing which way the division lay — is generally coercive and unjustifiable. The court rejected attempts to draw fine distinctions between asking for exact numbers and asking whether there was a pronounced majority or predominance; it held that such distinctions are insubstantial and that the possibilities of coercion are practically the same.

Applying those principles, the court concluded that the inquiry made here (eliciting that there was "a majority, very much") coupled with the Allen-type admonitions rendered the trial judge's intervention coercive in effect. Although the court expressed reluctance — noting the defendants had a lengthy, careful deliberation and substantial evidence of guilt, and lamenting the practical consequences of reversal — it felt compelled by the controlling precedents to reverse. Because this rule disposed of the appeal on the principal point, the court declined to address the other assignments of error.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court ordered that the convictions be REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Implications:

  • The Second Circuit applied Supreme Court precedent (Brasfield and Burton) to hold that a trial judge's inquiry into the jury's division — even if not asking for precise numbers — and the giving of an Allen-type admonition directed in the circumstances here amounted to reversible error.
  • As a direct consequence, the convictions based upon the verdicts returned after the questioned inquiry and charge could not stand and were reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
  • The court noted it was following established federal precedent rather than creating new law; it expressly declined to adopt refined distinctions (e.g., between asking for numbers and asking for a "pronounced majority") that it deemed insubstantial and potentially harmful to uniform administration of criminal law.
  • The court did not address other assignments of error because resolution of this issue required reversal.

This summary is limited to and derived exclusively from the content of the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

CLARK, Circuit Judge.

These long delayed appeals arise out of convictions in September, 1943, on two conspiracy indictments, based on fraudulent wartime sales of dried eggs to a government instrumentality, the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation. The two corporate defendants and two of the individual defendants were convicted on both indictments — one under 18 U.S.C.A. § 83, for conspiring to defraud the Government by obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment of false claims, and the other under the broader provisions of 18 U.S.C.A. § 88, for conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, to wit, the delivery of rejected dried egg powder, falsely represented to have been tested and accepted in accordance with the contract. The other two individual defendants were convicted only under the § 88 indictment.

After the jury had deliberated for more than twelve hours over a 24-hour period, during which it had several times requested and received further instructions and explanations of the law, it returned to the courtroom; and upon inquiry of the court clerk as to whether or not it had agreed upon a verdict, the following colloquy occurred:

"The Foreman of the Jury: We wish to inform you that we have been unable to reach a satisfactory agreement, after many hours of due deliberations it appears that we will be unable to reach unanimous agreement.

"The Court: Ladies and gentlemen: I am not going to accept the report of the jury now. This has been a long case, with a considerable amount of evidence, with a rather simple and concise question of fact. We all have duties to perform. We must make every honest effort that we can to perform them. May I ask you, Mr. Whitney, I believe it is, without disclosing the way in which the jury stands, can you tell me, are they nearly equally divided as to a question of fact, or is there a majority, a pronounced majority in agreement, with a pronounced minority in disagreement? I think you know what I mean.

"The Foreman of the Jury: There is a majority, very much.

"The Court: I do not believe there is any use repeating my charge to you, that is as clear as I could make it after some thought, and perhaps a repetition might be only confusing. I am going to say something to you:"

Thereupon the court proceeded to state — in nearly literal quotation except for its change of form to direct admonition — the oft-repeated material found in the opinion in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, at page 501, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528, upon the duty of jurors to agree. Included were the statements that "a dissenting juror or jurors should consider whether his attitude was a reasonable one which made no impression upon the minds of the rest of the jury equally as honest, equally as intelligent as he. * * * It is the duty of each juror to listen with deference to arguments, and with distrust of his own judgment if he finds a large majority of the jury taking a different view of the case from what he does himself."

Upon the retiring of the jury, counsel for the defendants took exception to the instructions just given and said that "if any verdict is reached now it will be a verdict produced by coercion." The court then stated its belief that no exception would be valid unless made in the presence of the jury, but its offer to recall the jury for the purpose was not accepted. The jury continued its deliberations for nearly eight hours more, returning three times to ask questions of the court as to the law. Upon the first occasion the court, after answering the question submitted, stated that a juror had reported that the jury was unable to agree and then went on to urge further consideration, saying, "I do not think that the matters involved are complicated. If these defendants, men and corporations, are innocent, they should be so found. If they are guilty, they should be so found. * * * Approach this task as a task that should be accomplished, a duty to be performed, carefully, quietly, conscientiously; go over the evidence as you remember it. Listen to the arguments of your co-juror. Use your own good common sense in the performance of your duty." Several hours thereafter and after it had returned twice more for instructions, the jury brought in the verdicts upon which the judgments appealed from were entered. The incident narrated furnishes the grounds for the most serious challenge to the convictions presented by the various assignments of error.

"It is a familiar practice to recall a jury, after they have been in deliberation for any length of time, for the purpose of ascertaining what difficulties they have in the consideration of the case, and of making proper efforts to assist them in the solution of those difficulties." Allis v. United States, 155 U.S. 117, 123, 15 S.Ct. 36, 38, 39 L.Ed. 91. But notions have changed since the days when the jurors were kept without "meat, drink, fire, or candle" until they reached agreement, and, if they were not agreed before the judge was due to move on to the next assizes, were carried with him in a cart. A hung jury is certainly undesirable in the administration of justice, and it is proper for the court to point out the specific disadvantages of a new trial in the case before it. Israel v. United States, 6 Cir., 3 F.2d 743, 745; Shea v. United States, 9 Cir., 260 F. 807; Suslak v. United States, 9 Cir., 213 F. 913, 919. The court may likewise urge dissenting jurors to re-examine their conclusions in the light of the majority view. Allen v. United States, supra. But such statements must not be coercive in effect, for a judge "may advise, and he may persuade, but he may not command, unduly influence, or coerce." Wissel v. United States, 2 Cir., 22 F.2d 468, 471.

People v. Sheldon, 156 N.Y. 268, 275, 50 N.E. 840, 41 L.R.A. 644, 66 Am.St. Rep. 564, giving a detailed treatment of the historical development of the jury. The cases are collected in 85 A.L.R. 1420 1450-1452.

Hence each charge must be examined to determine whether or not its effect is to coerce or influence unduly, and a mere formal saving clause alluding to the jury's rights will not suffice to overcome a total effect of coercion. The practice followed here of discussing the dissenting jurors' responsibilities and duties in the language of Allen v. United States, supra, was also employed, in similar form, in United States v. Allis, C.C.Kan., 73 F. 165, 182, affirmed Allis v. United States, supra. As a matter of fact this charge has been often so used. United States v. Winters, 2 Cir., 158 F.2d 674; Bord v. United States, 76 U.S.App. D.C. 205, 133 F.2d 313, certiorari denied 317 U.S. 671, 63 S.Ct. 77, 87 L.Ed. 539; Boehm v. United States, 8 Cir., 123 F.2d 791, 812, certiorari denied 315 U.S. 800, 62 S.Ct. 626, 86 L.Ed. 1200. In Stewart v. United States, 8 Cir., 300 F. 769, some criticism of use of the Allen opinion in this form was expressed. We think, however, as we have previously said, that any jury unable to maintain its individual and collective independence against such a charge, standing by itself, "would have been no better than a sounding board for any judicial whisper." United States v. Olweiss, 2 Cir., 138 F.2d 798, 801, certiorari denied Olweiss v. United States, 321 U.S. 744, 64 S.Ct. 483, 88 L.Ed. 1047. The difficulty here arises because the charge was coupled with an inquiry as to the division of the jury.

The issue of coercion of the jury presented by such an inquiry is one which has divided the federal courts; but it now appears to have been settled by the Supreme Court. In the first of two important cases, Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 305, 308, 25 S.Ct. 243, 249, 49 L.Ed. 482, the trial judge, before giving the Allen charge, had inquired of the jury reporting a disagreement as to their numerical division, but not as to "how many stand for conviction, or how many for acquittal." The foreman had then stated that the jury stood eleven to one. The Supreme Court, after ordering reversal of the judgment below on other grounds, went on to criticize the practice of inquiring as to the proportion of division of the jury, even without the inquiry as to which way the division might be. Stating that this knowledge was not material, since the judge could have made his charge admonishing the jury to make honest endeavors to agree without asking for the information, the opinion continued: "* * * we do not think that the proper administration of the law requires such knowledge or permits such a question on the part of the presiding judge. Cases may easily be imagined where a practice of this kind might lead to improper influences, and for this reason it ought not to obtain."

After this decision the lower courts divided as to whether the Court's remarks were merely hortatory or whether the criticized inquiry constituted reversible error, and the Supreme Court in the later case of Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345, granted certiorari for the purpose of resolving the conflict. Since here the United States has suggested that the conviction may be sustained because the exact numerical division of the jury was not asked for or divulged, it is important to note the cases cited by the Court as disclosing the conflict. On the one side were cases from the Eighth Circuit reversing convictions for such inquiries preceding the Allen charge. While in one of the cases cited, the exact proportion was elicited, St. Louis S.F.R. Co. v. Bishard, 8 Cir., 147 F. 496, 500, and see also Weiderman v. United States, 8 Cir., 10 F.2d 745, yet in the other two it was not. Stewart v. United States, supra, 8 Cir., 300 F. 769, 782, where the inquiry was "whether the jury was evenly divided, or whether there was a larger preponderance one way or the other," and Nigro v. United States, 8 Cir., 4 F.2d 781, 783, where the judge asked the foreman "without indicating how the jury stood in numbers" to state "whether or not there was a predominance" and the foreman said that there was. In the cases cited to the other view the numerical division was elicited. In Bernal v. United States, 5 Cir., 241 F. 339, 342, one judge dissenting, certiorari denied 245 U.S. 672, 38 S.Ct. 192, 62 L.Ed. 540, the conviction was sustained without citation of precedents. In Quong Duck v. United States, 9 Cir., 293 F. 563, the inquiry was held not ground of error in itself, but error was found because of what the court denominated coercive language in the supplemental charge.

It is against this background that the decision in Brasfield v. United States, supra, 272 U.S. 448, 450, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L. Ed. 345, was made with the express intention of settling the law. It ordered a reversal of a conviction because the trial judge had inquired how the jury was divided numerically and was informed by the foreman that it stood nine to three. The Court said:

"We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial that the inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for reversal. Such procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by questions not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its division. Its effect upon a divided jury will often depend upon circumstances which cannot properly be known to the trial judge or to the appellate courts and may vary widely in different situations, but in general its tendency is coercive. It can rarely be resorted to without bringing to bear in some degree, serious, although not measurable, an improper influence upon the jury, from whose deliberations every consideration other than that of the evidence and the law as expounded in a proper charge, should be excluded. Such a practice, which is never useful and is generally harmful, is not to be sanctioned."

The Court went on to say that "the failure of petitioners' counsel to particularize an exception to the court's inquiry does not preclude this court from correcting the error." It added: "This is especially the case where the error, as here, affects the proper relations of the court to the jury, and cannot be effectively remedied by modification of the judge's charge after the harm has been done." This ruling disposes of any suggestion that counsel here could or must make any further or different objection from what he did. The court was in error in thinking that objections to the charge must be made in the hearing of the jury. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 30, 18 U.S.C.A.

The language of the Court is so clear and sweeping that further question seems now impossible. Such seems to be the conclusion of the inferior courts. Thus the decision has been followed in Spaugh v. United States, 9 Cir., 77 F.2d 720 (where the foreman reported eleven-to-one votes on several counts), and extended beyond its exact facts to the case where the foreman answered in the affirmative to the court's question, "Is the jury about evenly divided?" Jordan v. United States, 9 Cir., 22 F.2d 966. In accord is Berger v. United States, 10 Cir., 62 F.2d 438, where the foreman reported a six-to-six division. Though we have no actual decision in this circuit, we have indicated our view that the inquiry alone is ground for reversal under the Brasfield authority. United States v. Olweiss, supra, distinguishing, albeit critically, Quong Duck v. United States, supra. Only once since its rendition has the Brasfield doctrine been even distinguished, and then on a ground which, whatever its general validity, is not available here. In Bowen v. United States, 8 Cir., 153 F.2d 747, certiorari denied 328 U.S. 835, 66 S. Ct. 980, 90 L.Ed. 1611, the delivery of an unsolicited note from the jury foreman to the court, advising it that the jury was deadlocked eleven to one, was held not erroneous, when it led to an unobjectional supplemental charge.

To the same effect were the earlier cases of Shaffman v. United States, 3 Cir., 289 F. 370, 374; Lucas v. United States, 8 Cir., 275 F. 405, 407. In Boehm v. United States, supra, 8 Cir., 123 F.2d 791, certiorari denied 315 U.S. 800, 62 S.Ct. 626, 86 L.Ed. 1200, the court points out that the volunteered information was not completely informative, since there were three defendants, each charged with many separate offenses.

Under these circumstances we do not see how these convictions can be sustained upon the authorities. Thus two of the cases approved in the Brasfield case were those of reversals for the eliciting of information that "a large preponderance" [300 F. 783] or "a predominance" of the jury were voting one way. Such inquiries were at least no more direct than the inquiry here as to whether or not there was "a pronounced majority" in agreement, bringing out the answer that there was "a majority, very much." If the fault is in directing the admonitions of the Allen charge toward a minority, indeed a small minority, of the jury, there seems no justification for advancing fine differentiations resting upon the non-use of specific numbers or upon the nomenclature employed in the isolating of that minority. Practically the possibilities of coercion seem the same; legally it would be undesirable further to add to the uncertainties of criminal law administration by such over-refined distinctions. It seems, too, that sustenance cannot be drawn from the jury's long-continued deliberations and apparent care in discriminating between the defendants when it finally rendered its verdict. The very failure of the jury quickly to reach a conclusion has been suggested as an indication of a balance so delicate that any error on the judge's part may turn the scales. See Nick v. United States, 8 Cir., 122 F.2d 660, 674, 138 A.L.R. 791, certiorari denied 314 U.S. 687, 62 S.Ct. 302, 86 L.Ed. 550; also St. Louis S.F.R. Co. v. Bishard, supra, where the ultimate verdict was delayed for another day's deliberation.

We are bound to say that we do not feel happy over the result, for here the defendants appear to have had the benefit of the most careful deliberation by the jury and it is certainly doubtful whether in fact the judge's remarks may have had any effect in restricting or controlling that deliberation. Here was a long and difficult trial, where the evidence of guilt was substantial, now upset after a seven weeks' effort for this one perhaps doubtful slip. The defendants, out on bail, have already had the benefit of extreme delay in making up the record and preparing the appeal. This case does not make for seemly law administration. But the federal precedents are compelling and we would hardly improve the situation by trying to introduce into the system refined distinctions lacking substance. In view of our conclusion on this point, it does not seem profitable to discuss the other assignments of error.

Witness, too, the doubts expressed by commentators as to the federal rule of reversal in the premises. 8 Wigmore on Evidence 680, 681, n. 3, 3d Ed. 1940 ("but a finical spirit has sometimes rebuked such questions, and has even not scrupled to delay the course of justice for this petty cause"); Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 467, 1947; 41 Harv.L.Rev. 797; 27 Col.L.Rev. 756; 76 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 622; 23 Mich. L.Rev. 296.

Avoidance of the method, set forth in our Rule 17, of presenting an appeal without printing of a record beyond those parts reproduced in the appendices to the parties' briefs, and insistence upon the printing of five large volumes, almost wholly superfluous for consideration of the important issue we have discussed, resulted naturally in controversies over the make-up of the printed books and inordinate delay in presenting the appeal.

Reversed and remanded.