JOHNSON v. ST. PAUL-MERCURY IND. CO

The plaintiff in error, Mrs. Maudie Mae Johnson (whom we shall call the claimant), filed application for compensation, claiming that her husband, while an employee in the Howell House, met with an injury which caused his death. It is contended that the deceased was employed as an engineer. The matter was referred to a single Director of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation, who, after hearing evidence, made an award in favor of the claimant. From that award an appeal to the full board was duly entered by the employer and the insurance carrier. The full board reversed the award of the single director. This award was appealed by the claimant to the superior court on the usual general grounds. The superior court affirmed the award of the full board. The claimant filed exceptions to the judgment of the superior court to this court for review. The only question before this court is whether there is any competent evidence to sustain the award of the full board.

We do not need to go into a detailed statement of the facts. Briefly, but we think sufficiently, the following evidence will suffice: The deceased was employed as an engineer and had been so employed for some nine months. He was seen by an employee of the employer about an hour before the time the deceased's shift expired. He was standing between two of the boilers with some wrenches in his hand. After the time of his shift had expired, the deceased was discovered lying down close to some pipes. His arm was scratched and his nose was bleeding. He was in a comatose condition. He was carried from there to Grady Memorial Hospital, and remained in an unconscious and comatose condition until the next day, and was then carried to his home. In a day or two he was returned to Grady Memorial Hospital and afterwards went back to his home. He died one month and a few days after the incident.

The evidence does not present any material conflicts. There was professional medical evidence both for the claimant and for the employer. A physician testified for the claimant, among other things, that he had spent considerable time in reviewing the records of the deceased at Grady Memorial Hospital; that the records were very complicated and most difficult to read; that he found that the patient was stricken on June 9 and died on July 21 of the same year. He then testified: that the records showed that the deceased had sclerosis of the liver; that he had true pus in his chest, which pus had been pulled out from time to time, and that penicillin and "one thing and another" were put in; that the deceased had empyema, and that it was an infectious thing, usually following pnueumonia, pleurisy or any kind of punctual wound from the outside; the witness was puzzled that the deceased had continued to work regularly and had not had pneumonia within the past month, yet he suffered empyema; that the witness found nothing in the records to indicate that the deceased received a traumatic injury to his left chest such as a fractured rib, bruise or the like; that it could have been possible that the blow which the deceased received on June 9 while at work could have caused this condition; that the records showed that the deceased worked three months prior to the injury, and that this period of work definitely ruled out acute pneumonia which empyema usually followed; that the witness did not know anything about what had happened to the deceased; that he had never examined the deceased nor had he seen him; that all the witness had to go by was the hospital records; that any patient who had diabetes or sugar diabetes or any type of trauma is very apt to have coma. The witness testified that he kept looking through the hospital records hoping to find out what caused this empyema from which the deceased was suffering; that the deceased had so many things wrong with him that any one of the things could kill a person if it got bad enough; that there are four distinct things mentioned in the hospital records, any one of which coma could be connected with.

We have not attempted to detail the medical evidence of the physician for the claimant and we will not detail the evidence of the physician of the employer. Both physicians, however, testified that there was no connection between the occurrence of June 9, 1952, and the death of the deceased on July 21, 1952.

GARDNER, P. J.

There is no evidence in the record that would carry the burden of proof which the claimant must carry in order to prove that the deceased suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. There is no evidence that, if an accident did occur in fact, the death of the deceased, which occurred over a month thereafter, was the result of such injury. To the contrary, the medical evidence is to the effect that the death of the deceased was not so caused, and there is no other evidence whatsoever to contravene this expert testimony. The numerous diseases which the deceased suffered could have been the cause of his death, and not necessarily any accidental injury received by him in the course of his employment and growing out of it. There is ample evidence in this record to sustain the judgment of the superior court in affirming the award of the full board. Counsel for both sides enter into a discussion and cite authorities pro and con as to presumptions which arise by an injury such as revealed by the facts of this record; but, when we sum it all up, we find that the burden of proof is with the claimant, and secondly, that the full board is empowered to reverse the award of the single director, even though there might be some evidence to support the award of the single director, provided, of course, there is competent evidence to sustain the award of the full board. We see no necessity of going into the detail of these questions. They have been dealt with time and again by many decisions of this court.

Judgment affirmed. Townsend and Carlisle, JJ., concur.