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HARRISON v. BAILEY
Case Summary: Harrison et al. v. Bailey et al., No. 3028 (Ct. Civ. App. of Texas, Eastland, July 17, 1953; rehearing denied Sept. 18, 1953)
Factual and Procedural Background
This suit was originally brought by E. Stanley Stinsman and others against Vern W. Bailey and others seeking an accounting, partition of a jointly owned leasehold interest, and establishment of a constructive trust and equitable lien against Bailey's interest. R. M. Harrison and Jack Hailey, doing business as Harrison Hailey, Well Servicing Company, intervened asserting a note for $6,036.29 executed by Bailey and a deed of trust securing that note against Bailey's undivided interest in the leasehold. Intervenors sought judgment on their debt and foreclosure of their deed of trust lien.
The trial court appointed an auditor and a receiver to take charge of the partnership property and operate producing wells. On trial without a jury, the court made detailed factual findings including that on December 16, 1946 Bailey, Stebinger, Griffin and Stinsman formed a written joint venture to develop oil and gas leases; leases were taken in the names of Bailey and Griffin in trust for all partners; interests were later sold to investors; and various advances and withdrawals were made by partners.
Relevant monetary findings included: Stinsman advanced $29,123.77 to the partnership, of which $15,416.67 was repaid, leaving $13,707.10 due to Stinsman unsecured by any written instrument; Griffin withdrew $7,916.67 and expended $3,076.57 for partnership purposes leaving $4,740.10 due the partnership from Griffin; and Bailey withdrew $30,434.63 and expended $11,181.74 for partnership purposes leaving $19,352.90 due the partnership from Bailey, unsecured by written instrument. In November or December 1949 intervenors drilled a well for Bailey on land not belonging to the partnership; Bailey executed the $6,036.29 note and a deed of trust on his undivided partnership interest to secure it.
The trial court concluded that plaintiffs (Stinsman and the other partners) held a prior equitable lien on the partnership property ahead of the intervenors' deed of trust. The court directed the receiver to keep managing the partnership property and ordered distribution of funds then on hand or later received as follows: $13,707.10 to Stinsman (balance of his advances); $16,308.14 to plaintiffs from Bailey's portion (described as amount due the partnership by Bailey); and $3,303.80 to intervenors (amount due them on their note), with plaintiffs' claims to be paid prior to intervenors' claim. Intervenors appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the deed of trust executed by Bailey to intervenors (Harrison and Hailey) has priority over the equitable lien claimed by plaintiffs (Stinsman and other partners) for sums due the partnership.
- Whether the trial court erred in admitting a lis pendens notice into evidence on intervenors' motion to reform the judgment after trial.
Arguments of the Parties
Intervenors' Arguments
- Intervenors contended the court erred by directing that plaintiffs' claims be paid prior to the payment of intervenors' claim secured by the deed of trust.
- Intervenors assigned error to the trial court's admission of a lis pendens notice introduced at the hearing on their motion to reform the judgment, asserting that admission was improper.
Appellees' (Plaintiffs') Position
- Plaintiffs asserted an equitable lien on Bailey's interest for amounts owing the partnership and relied on the fact that they had filed suit and recorded a lis pendens before Bailey executed the deed of trust in favor of intervenors.
- On the motion to reform, appellees introduced the previously recorded lis pendens notice to support the priority of their claim.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 68 C.J.S., Partnership, §§ 397, 398, p. 914 | Support for the proposition that partners may have an equitable lien for amounts owing to the partnership. | Used to establish that Stinsman and the other partners had an equitable lien on Bailey's partnership interest for amounts Bailey owed the partnership. |
| Grigsby v. Cocke's Ex'r, 85 Ky. 314, 3 S.W. 418; 6 A.L.R. 160 | Cited authorities supporting the existence/recognition of an equitable lien in favor of partners. | Quoted along with C.J.S. to support the court's conclusion that plaintiffs held an equitable lien on Bailey's interest. |
| Sherk v. First Nat. Bank of Hereford, Tex.Com.App., 206 S.W.2d 507 | Support for the principle that a partner has no specific divisible interest in partnership property apart from his share of the surplus after payment of partnership debts and that such interest cannot be subjected until partnership debts are paid. | Applied to hold that Bailey had no specific interest subject to intervenors' deed of trust until partnership debts (including amounts due partners) were satisfied; intervenors' lien thus subordinated. |
| Miller v. Howell, Tex.Civ.App., 234 S.W.2d 925 | Support for the same principle regarding a partner's limited interest in partnership property and priority of partnership debts and partners' claims. | Relied upon with Sherk to conclude the deed of trust could not attach to any interest of Bailey until partnership obligations were paid, making intervenors' lien subject to plaintiffs' prior claim. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the priority dispute by combining its factual findings about the partnership obligations with established equitable and partnership principles. The dispositive analytical steps stated in the opinion were:
- The court first found that plaintiffs had already filed suit against Bailey and the other partners for an accounting and for establishment of an equitable lien, and that a lis pendens based on that suit was of record before Bailey executed the deed of trust in favor of intervenors.
- Because the lis pendens was of record at the time the deed of trust was executed, intervenors were charged with constructive notice of plaintiffs' claim when they took the deed of trust.
- The court stated that Stinsman and the other partners had an equitable lien on Bailey's partnership interest for the amounts Bailey owed the partnership, citing 68 C.J.S., Grigsby v. Cocke's Ex'r and related authority to support that proposition.
- Relying on authority that a partner has no specific, divisible interest in partnership property except the surplus after payment of partnership debts (Sherk and Miller), the court reasoned that Bailey had no interest subject to the deed of trust until partnership debts (including amounts due partners) were paid.
- Consequently, the court concluded that intervenors' deed of trust was taken subject to the plaintiffs' prior equitable lien and that the trial court correctly ordered plaintiffs' claims to be paid before intervenors' claim.
- Regarding the motion to reform, the court applied Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 270 to admit the lis pendens notice into evidence at the hearing on the motion to reform, finding the admission proper and that intervenors were not harmed by its introduction.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The trial court's judgment was affirmed.
Implications and direct effects on the parties (as stated in the opinion):
- The court affirmed the trial court's priority ruling that plaintiffs (Stinsman and the other partners) hold a prior equitable lien on the partnership property and that such claims should be paid before the claim of intervenors (Harrison and Hailey).
- The receiver was to continue managing the partnership property and to pay from partnership funds the sums as directed by the trial court: $13,707.10 to Stinsman (balance of his advances), $16,308.14 to plaintiffs from Bailey's portion (described in the judgment as the amount due the partnership by Bailey), and $3,303.80 to intervenors (amount due them on their note), with plaintiffs' claims paid first.
- The court further held that admission of the lis pendens at the motion-to-reform hearing was proper under Rule 270 and did not prejudice intervenors.
The opinion does not announce that it establishes any broader new legal precedent beyond applying recognized principles respecting partners' equitable liens, constructive notice via lis pendens, and a partner's limited proprietary interest in partnership assets.
LONG, Justice.
This suit was instituted by E. Stanley Stinsman and others against Vern W. Bailey and others, for an accounting, partition of a leasehold interest owned jointly by the parties and for the establishment of a constructive trust and equitable lien on the interest of Bailey. R. M. Harrison and Jack Hailey, operating and doing business under the trade name of Harrison Hailey, Well Servicing Company, intervened, alleging the execution by Bailey of a note in their favor in the sum of $6,036.29 and a deed of trust securing the same covering the undivided interest of Bailey in the leasehold interest involved herein. Intervenors sought judgment against Bailey for their debt and a foreclosure of their deed of trust lien. The court appointed an auditor to determine the accounts between the parties and also appointed a receiver to take charge of the property of the partnership and operate the producing oil wells situated thereon. Upon a trial before the court without a jury, the court found, in substance, that on December 16, 1946, Vern W. Bailey, Harry A. Stebinger, Robert W. Griffin and E. Stanley Stinsman entered into a written agreement whereby they formed a joint venture for the purpose of developing oil and gas leases owned by them or to be thereafter acquired by the parties. Thereafter the partnership acquired oil and gas leases situated partly in Eastland County and partly in Stephens County, Texas. These leases were taken in the name of Bailey and Griffin who held the same in trust for the benefit of all of the partners equally. In order to raise money for the development of the partnership properties, interests were sold therein to persons referred to in the record as 'investors.' Stinsman made various advancements to the partnership for the purpose of developing the properties. On November 22, 1948, Stebinger assigned his interest in the partnership property to Bailey who held the same in trust for himself, the other two original partners and the investors. In November or December, 1949, intervenors Harrison and Hailey drilled a well for Bailey on land that did not belong to the partnership. Bailey executed a note in the sum of $6,036.29 in favor of Harrison and Hailey in consideration of the drilling of said well and to secure same, Bailey executed in favor of intervenors, a deed of trust covering his undivided interest in the leasehold estate involved in this case. Stinsman advanced the partnership the sum of $29,123.77 of which sum $15,416.67 was repaid, leaving a balance of $13,707.10 due Stinsman by the partnership which was not secured by any instrument in writing. Griffin withdrew from the partnership funds the sum of $7,916.67 of which he expended $3,076.57 for partnership purposes leaving a balance due the partnership by Griffin of $4,740.10. Bailey withdrew from the partnership funds the sum of $30,434.63 of which he expended $11,181.74 for partnership purposes, leaving a balance of $19,352.90 due by Bailey to the partnership which is unsecured by any instrument in writing. The court concluded that Stinsman and the other plaintiffs had a prior lien on the partnership property to the lien of intervenors Harrison and Hailey and rendered judgment accordingly. The court directed that the partnership property remain under the management and control of the receiver. The receiver was directed to pay from funds now on hand or that may hereafter come into his hands, belonging to the partnership, $13,707.10 to Stinsman, said sum representing the balance due from money advanced by him to the partnership. The receiver was further directed to pay to plaintiffs, out of said funds, from that portion belonging to Bailey, the sum of $16,308.14, said sum representing the amount due the partnership by Bailey. The receiver was directed to pay to intervenors Harrison and Hailey from the funds belonging to Bailey the sum of $3,303.80 which sum represented the amount due them on the note for which they here sue. The receiver was directed to pay the claims of plaintiffs prior to the payment of the claim of intervenors. From this judgment, intervenors have appealed.
This case is before us without any statement of facts.
It is the contention of intervenors that the court erred in directing the payment to Stinsman and the other plaintiffs of their claim prior to the payment of the claim of intervenors. We find no merit in this contention. At the time of the execution of the deed of trust by Bailey in favor of intervenors, plaintiffs had filed this suit for an accounting between the partners and for the establishment of an equitable lien against the interest of Bailey in the partnership property.
Plaintiff duly filed a lis pendens notice of this suit which was of record at the time of the execution of the deed of trust by Bailey in favor of intervenors. Consequently, intervenors took the deed of trust with constructive notice of the claim of plaintiffs. Stinsman and the other partners had an equitable lien on the interest of Bailey for the amount Bailey owed the partnership. 68 C.J.S., Partnership, §§ 397, 398, page 914; Grigsby v. Cocke's Ex'r, 85 Ky. 314, 3 S.W. 418; 6 A.L.R. 160.
Intervenors took their lien subject to the lien of Stinsman and the other plaintiffs. Bailey had no specific interest in any part of the partnership property but only in that portion of the surplus of the whole after payment of partnership debts including the amounts due the other partners. The deed of trust from Bailey to intervenors covered only the undivided interest of Bailey in the partnership property. He had no interest which could be subjected to the deed of trust lien until after the payment of partnership debts including the sums due the partners. Sherk v. First Nat. Bank of Hereford, Tex.Com.App., 206 S.W.2d 507; Miller v. Howell, Tex.Civ.App., 234 S.W.2d 925.
The court correctly held that the claims due Stinsman and the other plaintiffs should be paid prior to the payment of the claim of intervenors.
After the court had rendered judgment, intervenors filed a motion to reform the judgment. Upon a hearing of this motion, appellees introduced the lis pendens notice. The notice was not introduced upon the trial. Intervenors assign as error the action of the court in permitting the introduction of the lis pendens notice upon the hearing of the motion to reform the judgment. We believe the court did not err in admitting the lis pendens notice. Under Rule 270, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the court at any time may permit additional evidence to be offered where it appears to be necessary to the due administration of justice. We cannot see in what way the intervenors were injured by reason of the action of the court in admitting such notice. The learned trial court entered the proper judgment which is accordingly affirmed.
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