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RICHARDSON v. STATE
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, Harlan A. Richardson, was convicted on March 18, 1952, in Cause No. 96574 in County Court at Law No. 3 of Harris County, Texas, for the offense of driving while license suspended. After that judgment became final, he committed the same offense again and was convicted on October 16, 1952, in Cause No. 99157 in County Court at Law No. 2 of Harris County. Subsequently, on or about November 10, 1952, appellant was charged with driving while his operator's license was suspended, following the finalization of the prior convictions. The jury assessed punishment at 60 days in jail and a $300 fine. This appeal arises from that conviction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the information was fatally defective for failing to allege that the judgment in Cause No. 96574 had become final before the commission of the primary offense.
- Whether the information's failure to specify the type of license suspended (operator's, commercial operator's, or chauffeur's) or the appellant’s residency status rendered it insufficient.
- Whether the information adequately alleged that the prior convictions were for offenses of like character to authorize punishment enhancement.
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction for driving while license suspended on November 10, 1952.
- On rehearing, whether the allegation that "his operator's license was suspended" constituted a sufficient primary offense allegation without specifying residency status.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The information failed to allege that the judgment in Cause No. 96574 had become final.
- The information did not allege whether the suspended license was an operator's, commercial operator's, or chauffeur's license, nor did it state whether appellant was a resident or non-resident.
- The information lacked an allegation that the prior convictions were offenses of like character to the current charge.
- There was insufficient evidence to prove that appellant had an operator's license suspended at the time of the alleged offense on November 10, 1952.
- On rehearing, the appellant contended that the information was insufficient because it did not allege that he was a resident whose operator's license was suspended or a non-resident whose driving privilege was suspended.
State's Arguments
- The information sufficiently alleged that the judgment in Cause No. 96574 had become final prior to the commission of the primary offense.
- It is unnecessary to allege prior offenses with the same particularity as the primary offense; alleging that the operator's license was suspended suffices.
- The prior convictions were for violations of the same statute, thus constituting offenses of like character, which authorizes punishment enhancement under the applicable statute.
- Evidence including convictions, official records, and testimony from a Department of Public Safety officer sufficiently showed that appellant’s operator's license was suspended on November 10, 1952.
- On rehearing, the State argued that since the information charged suspension of the operator's license, it was sufficient; if appellant were a non-resident, the information should have alleged cancellation of driving privilege as a non-resident, which it did not need to do otherwise.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Stover v. State, 145 Tex.Crim. R., 168 S.W.2d 871 | Prior offenses alleged must not be merely conclusory but sufficiently pleaded. | The court held that alleging prior offenses as "offenses of like character" would be a conclusion of the pleader and thus insufficient if unsupported. |
| Walker v. State, 138 Tex.Crim. R., 135 S.W.2d 498, 499 | Indictment or information must include time, name of charge, and court to show nature of prior offenses; conclusions are insufficient. | The court applied this standard to conclude the information sufficiently alleged prior convictions by including necessary details rather than mere conclusions. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the sufficiency of the information and the evidence as follows:
- The information adequately alleged that the judgment in Cause No. 96574 had become final before the primary offense, as it explicitly stated the prior judgments were final.
- The information's failure to specify the exact type of license suspended or appellant's residency status did not render it fatally defective because the statute automatically suspends all types of licenses held upon conviction, and the information charged suspension of the operator's license generally.
- It is unnecessary to allege prior offenses with the same particularity as the primary offense; the information sufficiently alleged prior convictions for the same statute, satisfying the requirement for punishment enhancement.
- The court relied on documentary evidence, including judgments from prior convictions and official notations, as well as testimony from a Department of Public Safety officer identifying appellant and confirming his license suspension on the date of the offense.
- The court rejected appellant's contention that there was no evidence of a suspended operator's license, noting that the final convictions extended the suspension periods beyond the date of the charged offense.
- On rehearing, the court found the information sufficient despite the absence of specific residency allegations, holding that if appellant were a non-resident, the information should have alleged suspension of driving privileges accordingly, but since it did not, the information as drafted was adequate.
Holding and Implications
The court affirmed the judgment of conviction.
The direct effect of this decision is the upholding of appellant’s conviction and sentence for driving while license suspended. The court did not establish new precedent but reaffirmed existing principles regarding the sufficiency of pleadings for prior convictions used to enhance punishment and the evidentiary standards for license suspension in such cases.
WOODLEY, Judge.
The complaint and information charged that appellant was convicted on March 18, 1952, in Cause 96574 in County Court at Law No. 3 of Harris County, Texas, of the offense of 'Driving while license suspended' and after such judgment became final he committed the offense of driving while license suspended and was on October 16, 1952, convicted of said offense in Cause 99157 in County Court at Law No. 2 of Harris County.
It was then alleged that on or about November 10, 1952, in Harris County, Texas, appellant 'after the judgment of conviction in said Cause No. 96574 and after the judgment of conviction in said Cause No. 99157 had become final, his operator's license was suspended, and after it was suspended and while it was suspended, did then and there drive and operate a motor vehicle upon a public street and highway in said Harris County, Texas.'
This appeal is from a judgment of conviction under said complaint and information, the jury having assessed the punishment of appellant at 60 days in jail and a fine of $300.
Appellant contends that the information is fatally defective for a number of reasons. First, that it fails to allege that the judgment of conviction in Cause 96574 had become final.
The information alleges that the offense for which appellant was convicted in Cause No. 99157 was committed after the judgment in Cause 96574 had become final, and that the primary offense was committed 'after the judgment of conviction in said cause No. 96574 and after the judgment of conviction in said cause No. 99157 had become final.'
These allegations sufficiently charge that the judgment in Cause No. 96574 had become final prior to the commission of the primary offense charged to have been committed on or about November 10, 1952.
Next it is contended that the information failed to allege that the defendant's operator's commercial operator's or chauffeur's license was suspended, or that the defendant's privilege as a non-resident had been cancelled, suspended or revoked, and that it contained no allegation as to appellant being a resident or a non-resident.
These complaints are evidently addressed to the allegation of the prior offenses charged, for it is alleged that appellant's 'operator's license was suspended' when he drove a motor vehicle on a public street and highway on or about November 10, 1952.
It is unnecessary for the state to allege the prior offenses charged in the information with the same particularity as is required in alleging the offense presently charged.
It is further contended that there is no allegation that the prior convictions charged are offenses of like character to that presently charged.
The primary offense charged was the violation of Art. 6687b, Sec. 34, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St., the name of which offense is 'Driving while license suspended or revoked.'
The prior convictions alleged were convictions for violation of the same statute, or as stated in the applicable statute, 'the same offense'. Art. 61, P.C.
The further allegation that such prior offenses were 'offenses of like character' would be merely a conclusion of the pleader Stover v. State, 145 Tex.Crim. R., 168 S.W.2d 871.
In Walker v. State, 138 Tex.Crim. R., 135 S.W.2d 498, 499, we said:
"The time of the conviction, the name of the charge so as to show the nature of the offense, the court in which he was tried, and not the conclusion of the pleader that it was an offense of like nature, must be found in the indictment or the complaint and information."
We conclude that the pleading sufficiently alleged two prior convictions for offenses of like character so as to authorize enhancement of the punishment under Art. 61, P.C.
The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction is challenged.
On November 10, 1952, appellant was observed by Officer Corrigan while driving an automobile on the streets of Houston. It appeared to the officer that appellant was exceeding the speed limit in a school zone and the officer stopped him. Officer Corrigan called for appellant's driver's license and appellant said that he did not have any.
The record shows a judgment of conviction in Cause No. 99157 in County Court at Law No. 2 of Harris County, against Harlan A. Richardson, upon a plea of guilty, for 'Unlawfully drive and operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway while license was suspended,' with a fine of $300 assessed. The judgment bears date of October 16, 1952, and a notation 'Motion overruled * * * Capias Profine to issue' appears bearing date November 7, 1952.
The record also shows a judgment in Cause No. 96574 dated March 18, 1952, where upon a plea of guilty Harlan A. Richardson was adjudged guilty of 'operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway while operator's license is suspended' and a fine of $75 was assessed. The judgment appears to have been entered in County Court at Law No. 3, Harris County.
The judgment in Cause 96574 was made final by the overruling of the motion for new trial on April 18, 1952, while judgment in Cause No. 99157 became final on November 7, 1952, when the motion for new trial was overruled.
John Caid, an officer of the Department of Public Safety Drivers License Division, assigned to the suspension and revocation department, identified appellant as the person convicted in said previous trials and testified that the record showed that on November 10, 1952, appellant's license was in a state of suspension.
But appellant insists that it is not shown that he had an operator's license, which is specified in the information as the license which was suspended when he drove a motor vehicle on November 10, 1952.
John Caid testified in answer to question of appellant's counsel, referring to the time of the previous trials, that appellant had a 'driver's license'. Whether appellant's license was an operator's license, commercial operator's license, or chauffeur's license is not shown other than by his plea of guilty in the case wherein he was charged with driving while his operator's license was suspended.
Under the terms of Art. 6687b, Sec. 25, upon final conviction the operator's commercial operator's and chauffeur's licenses held by the person convicted are suspended automatically, and the court is charged with the duty to require their surrender for forwarding to the Department of Public Safety.
The judgment of conviction in Cause No. 96574 became final on April 18, 1952, and the period of suspension of appellant's operator's license was thereby extended. This period of extension of necessity did not expire until some time after October 18, 1952.
Cause No. 99157 was tried on October 16, 1952, and the judgment which became final on November 7, 1952, further extended the period of suspension.
Under these facts we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to show that appellant's operator's license was under suspension on November 10, 1952, when he was found driving an automobile on the streets of Houston.
We direct attention to the fact that there is attached to the statement of facts as State's Exhibit A, judgment in Cause 99157 in County Court at Law No. 2 of Harris County; as State's Exhibit B, the notation of the overruling of a motion 'Capias Profine to issue', and as State's Exhibits C and D, the judgment and similar notation as to Cause No. 96574 in County Court at Law No. 3 of Harris County.
The statement of facts is agreed to by counsel and approved by the court, and in view of the exhibits above referred to we are at a loss to understand the contention found in appellant's brief 'that no degree of testimony was permitted which would indicate that this defendant had been previously convicted of any offense.'
The judgment is affirmed.
On Motion for Rehearing
MORRISON, Judge.
Appellant, in his motion for rehearing, presents as the sole question now to be considered 'whether or not the following allegation in the information 'his operator's license was suspended and after it was suspended and while it was suspended, did then and there drive a motor vehicle upon the public streets and highways in said Harris County, Texas' constitutes a primary offense.'
If we understand appellant's contention, it is that the information is insufficient, because it failed to allege that the accused was 'a resident whose operator's license has been suspended' or 'a non-resident whose driving privilege has been suspended.'
The information charged that the defendant's operator's license had been suspended. If appellant had been a non-resident, then the information should have been drawn in the terms of Section 34 of Article 6687b, alleging that his 'driving privilege as a nonresident' had been cancelled. This seems to answer appellant's contention.
We hold the information herein sufficient.
Appellant's motion for rehearing is overruled.
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