Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

MATTHEWS v. MATTHEWS

Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Mar 26, 1956
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Case Summary: Matthews v. Matthews, No. 40086 (Sup. Ct. Miss. Mar. 26, 1956)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from an order of the Chancery Court of Hinds County (Chancellor S. V. Robertson, Jr.). Appellant John H. Matthews was held in contempt for failing to comply with a prior decree requiring him to support his infant child. The chancery court ordered the appellant remanded to the Hinds County Jail until he purged himself of contempt by (1) paying the appellee the sum of $50 on arrearages of child support and (2) executing a faithful performance bond in the sum of $500 with good and sufficient sureties conditioned to abide by the court's orders for future child support. Appellant appealed, assigning error as to both aspects of the remand order. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the chancery court erred in committing the appellant to jail for contempt until he paid $50 on child support arrearages as ordered.
  2. Whether the chancery court erred in committing the appellant to jail for contempt until he executed a $500 performance bond to secure future child support obligations.
  3. Whether, after a prima facie showing of contempt by the appellee, the appellant produced sufficient exculpatory proof to exonerate himself.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The chancellor erred in ordering appellant remanded to jail for contempt until he paid $50 on support arrearages that he had previously been ordered to pay.
  • The chancellor erred in ordering appellant remanded to jail for contempt until he executed a $500 faithful performance bond to secure compliance with future child support orders.
  • Appellant provided a collation of authorities in support of his positions: Ramsay v. Ramsay, 125 Miss. 185, 87 So. 491, 14 A.L.R. 712; Collins v. Collins, 171 Miss. 191, 158 So. 914; Dickerson v. Horn, 210 Miss. 655, 50 So.2d 368; Lewis v. Lewis, 213 Miss. 434, 57 So.2d 163; Gibson v. Clark, 216 Miss. 430, 62 So.2d 585.

Appellee's Arguments

  • The chancellor was not manifestly wrong in committing appellant to jail for contempt and conditioning his release upon payment of $50 and execution of a $500 performance bond to insure future support of the child.
  • The appellee's brief cites several authorities in support of the chancellor's actions, including Collins v. Collins, Dickerson v. Horn, Gibson v. Clark, Kincaid v. Kincaid, Lewis v. Lewis, and Muckelrath v. Chezem.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramsay v. Ramsay, 125 Miss. 185, 87 So. 491, 14 A.L.R. 712 The opinion lists this case in the appellant's collation of authorities; the opinion does not state a specific rule from this case. Cited in the briefs; the court's opinion does not rely on or expound a specific principle from this case.
Collins v. Collins, 171 Miss. 191, 158 So. 914 The opinion lists this case in the appellant's collation of authorities; the opinion does not state a specific rule from this case. Cited by counsel; the court did not articulate a particular application of this case in its opinion.
Dickerson v. Horn, 210 Miss. 655, 50 So.2d 368 Cited in the parties' authorities; the opinion does not state the specific rule invoked from this case. Listed in the briefs; no discrete application discussed in the court's written opinion.
Lewis v. Lewis, 213 Miss. 434, 57 So.2d 163 Cited in the parties' authorities; the opinion does not state the specific rule invoked from this case. Listed by counsel; the court's opinion does not explicate reliance on it.
Gibson v. Clark, 216 Miss. 430, 62 So.2d 585 Cited in the parties' authorities; the opinion does not set forth a particular rule from this case. Cited in briefs; not specifically applied within the opinion's textual analysis.
Kincaid v. Kincaid, 213 Miss. 451, 57 So.2d 263 Identified by the court as stating the rule regarding the burden on a respondent (father) to produce exculpatory proof after a prima facie showing of contempt for failure to pay child support. The court expressly applied the rule from Kincaid: after appellee made a prima facie case of contempt, the burden shifted to appellant to produce exculpatory proof, which the chancellor found appellant had not done.
Muckelrath v. Chezem, 184 Miss. 511, 186 So. 621 Cited in the appellee's list of authorities; the opinion does not state the specific rule from this case. Referenced by appellee's counsel; the court's decision does not articulate a distinct reliance on this precedent in its opinion text.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis is concise and follows these steps:

  1. The court recognized that on the contempt hearing the appellee established a prima facie case that appellant had failed to comply with the decree requiring support for his infant child.
  2. Upon that prima facie showing, the burden shifted to the appellant to produce exculpatory proof that would excuse noncompliance; the court referenced the rule stated in Kincaid v. Kincaid for this principle.
  3. The chancellor found that the appellant did not produce sufficient exculpatory proof to exonerate himself; the Supreme Court held that the chancellor was justified in that finding.
  4. The court observed that no rigid rule can be universally applied to all such cases and emphasized that the chancellor should be afforded wide latitude in exercising sound discretion when using coercive powers to enforce decrees.
  5. Based on the foregoing, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court's contempt determination and the remedial conditions imposed for purging the contempt.

Holding and Implications

AFFIRMED.

Direct consequences:

  • The Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court's contempt finding and its orders that the appellant remain remanded until he purged the contempt by (a) paying $50 toward arrearages and (b) executing a $500 performance bond to secure future child support obligations.
  • The court applied and relied on the rule from Kincaid v. Kincaid that, after a prima facie showing of contempt for failure to pay child support, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce exculpatory proof; the appellate court found the chancellor's determination that appellant failed to meet this burden was justified.

Broader implications:

  • The opinion underscores that no single, inflexible rule governs all contempt-for-child-support cases; lower courts are afforded broad discretion in selecting appropriate coercive measures to enforce support decrees.
  • The decision affirms the exercise of chancery discretion rather than announcing a new, limiting precedent; the court expressly noted that "no hard and fast rule can be stated" and approved wide latitude for chancellors.

Opinion by Justice Gillespie; McGehee, C.J., and Justices Kyle, Arrington and Ethridge concurred.

Show all summary ...

1. Contempt — child support — failure to comply with decree requiring — prima facie case — exculpatory proof.

On hearing for contempt for failure of father to comply with decree requiring him to support his infant child, after prima facie case of contempt was made, burden shifted to father to produce exculpatory proof.

2. Contempt — Chancellor's findings — exculpatory proof insufficient to exonerate father.

In such case, Chancellor was justified in finding that father failed to exonerate himself by making required exculpatory proof.

3. Child support — failure to comply with decree requiring — Chancellor's findings — discretion.

No hard and fast rule can be stated that would apply to various situations arising in lower courts in cases of this kind, but Chancellor should be allowed wide latitude in exercise of sound discretion when exerting his coercive powers to enforce his decrees.

Headnotes as approved by Gillespie, J.

GILLESPIE, J.

(Hn 1) On a hearing for contempt for failure to comply with a decree requiring appellant to support his infant child, appellee made a prima facie case of contempt on the part of appellant; thereupon the burden shifted to appellant to produce exculpatory proof. (Hn 2) The chancellor was justified in finding that appellant failed to exonerate himself by making the proof required under the rule stated in Kincaid v. Kincaid, 213 Miss. 451, 57 So.2d 263, and (Hn 3) we hold that the case should be affirmed. No hard and fast rule can be stated that would apply to the various situations arising in the lower courts in cases of this kind, and we think the chancellor should be allowed wide latitude in the exercise of sound discretion when exerting his coercive powers to enforce his decrees.

Affirmed.

McGehee, C.J., and Kyle, Arrington and Ethridge, JJ., concur.