KOVACHY v. CLEVELAND

Municipal courts — Judges — Term of office — How affected by Uniform Municipal Court Act — Salary — Change during term of office prohibited.

Per Curiam.

Was the term of office of plaintiff, as a judge of the Municipal Court of Cleveland, whose elected term of office had not expired on the effective date of the Uniform Municipal Court Act, abolished by that act, or was his term of office continued with increased jurisdiction as a judge of the Cleveland Municipal Court until the expiration of the full six-year term for which he was elected?

In considering this question, two constitutional provisions must be kept in mind. Under Section 27 of Article II of the Constitution, the General Assembly does not have power to appoint judges, and under Section 20 of Article II, the General Assembly is without power to increase the salary of a judge during his term of office.

Section 1588, General Code, provided that "each judge" under the old Municipal Court Act "shall serve as such judge, under the terms of this [the Uniform Municipal Court] Act for the full length of the term for which he was elected," and that the "judges" under the old act (Municipal Court of Cleveland) "shall be the incumbent judges under this [Uniform Municipal Court] Act."

Section 1617, General Code, provided that candidates qualifying as such before or after the effective date of the Uniform Municipal Court Act should be candidates for the new court, and that existing terms "shall not be diminished, but shall continue for the period for which they were created," i.e., by election to the Municipal Court of Cleveland, although such a term continues after the new court (Cleveland Municipal Court) is the existing substitute.

It is apparent from the foregoing sections that the General Assembly intended to and did continue the unexpired terms of the judges elected to the old court, rather than to appoint them as judges of the new court in contravention of the constitutional prohibition.

Construing the act as effecting a continuance of the office of plaintiff, he is not entitled to the increased compensation, as the General Assembly is without power to increase the salary of a judge during his term of office.

If the term of office of plaintiff was abolished by the repeal of Section 1579-1 et seq., General Code, and the enactment of the Uniform Municipal Court Act, as contended by plaintiff, the judges serving on the new court would have had to be elected, or appointed by the Governor to serve until an election was had, and a judge of the old court continuing to serve on the new court without being elected or appointed would be either acting without color of office and entitled to no compensation or acting as a de facto judge and entitled to the reasonable value of the services rendered.

The demurrer to the petition was properly sustained.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

WEYGANDT, C.J., ZIMMERMAN, STEWART, BELL, TAFT, MATTHIAS and HERBERT, JJ., concur.