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UNITED STATES v. McDANIEL, (D.D.C. 1957)
United States v. Lindsey McDaniel and Thomas Williams, Cr. No. 980-56 (D. D.C. Sept. 11, 1957) — Opinion of Holtzoff, District Judge
Factual and Procedural Background
Defendants Lindsey McDaniel and Thomas Williams were arrested on a murder charge. While they were in custody at police headquarters, two police officers went to the apartment of Williams to interview two women who lived there. During that interview, and without conducting any search or forcing entry, one officer observed a torn towel in the room being used for the interview. Having information that a towel was involved in the homicide, the officer took possession of the towel.
The towel was seized and the defendants moved to suppress it as evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. Both defendants joined in the motion. Williams asserted ownership of the seized towel. Citing the rule in Jeffers, the court concluded that each defendant had standing to make the motion and proceeded to resolve the motion on the merits.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under the Fourth Amendment, the warrantless seizure of a towel observed in the defendants' premises was an unreasonable search or seizure requiring suppression of the towel as evidence.
- Whether both defendants (McDaniel and Williams) had standing to move to suppress the seized towel, given the ownership claim and the occupancy arrangement (McDaniel as sub-tenant of a room sub-rented from Williams).
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants' Arguments
- The defendants moved to suppress the towel as evidence on the ground that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
- They relied on the established principle that, ordinarily, a home may not be searched without a search warrant except incident to an arrest that occurs on the premises; here, no warrant was obtained.
Government's Position (as reflected in the opinion)
- The officers went to the apartment to interview prospective witnesses, not to search for evidence; they were admitted by the occupants and did not force entry.
- While lawfully present for the interview, an officer observed the towel in plain view and, because the officer had information linking a towel to the homicide, took possession of it. Under these circumstances the seizure was lawful.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 58, 187 F.2d 498; affirmed, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59 | Establishes standing to make a motion to suppress in circumstances relevant to possession/ownership and occupancy. | The court invoked Jeffers to conclude that both defendants had standing to challenge the seizure and therefore proceeded to consider the motion on the merits for each defendant. |
| Smith v. United States, 4th Cir., 2 F.2d 715 | Illustrates the principle that it is not a "search" to observe that which is open and patent. | Used to support the proposition that observing an object in plain view does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant. |
| United States v. Strickland, D.C., 62 F. Supp. 468, 471 | Authority for the proposition that plain observation of open and patent items is not a search. | Relied on to reinforce that the officer's observation of the towel while lawfully present was not a constitutionally proscribed search. |
| Ferrell v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 548, 549, 264 S.W. 1078 | States that a search warrant is not necessary where the object sought is visible, open and obvious to anyone within reasonable distance employing his eyes. | Quoted as authority for the plain-view principle and for the proposition that officers need not ignore an openly visible object that may be evidence. |
| State v. Miller, 121 Wn. 153, 154, 209 P. 9 | Another authority cited to support that viewing open and patent items is not a search. | Applied to corroborate the court's conclusion that the officer's observation of the towel in the apartment did not require a warrant. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first resolved the threshold question of standing by applying the rule of Jeffers: because Williams claimed ownership and McDaniel was a sub-tenant of the room where the item was found, each defendant had standing to move to suppress the towel. The court therefore considered the motion on the merits as to both defendants.
The court accepted the salient facts as undisputed: while the defendants were in custody at police headquarters, officers lawfully entered Williams' apartment to interview two women who lived there; they were admitted by the occupants, made no forced entry, and did not conduct a search. During the interview one officer observed a torn towel in plain view; because he had information that a towel was involved in the homicide, he seized it.
The court framed the Fourth Amendment inquiry around reasonableness: the Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches, not all intrusions or observations. The court acknowledged the generally applicable rule that the interior of a home may not be searched without a warrant except incident to an on-premises arrest, but it emphasized an exception recognized in judicial decisions: when, without conducting a search or making an unlawful entry, a contraband item or item needed by police is openly visible, officers are not required to ignore it or leave it where they saw it.
To support that principle the court cited multiple authorities (Smith, Strickland, Ferrell, Miller) that hold it is not a "search" to observe open and patent articles. The court reasoned that the officers' entry was lawful (they came to interview prospective witnesses and were admitted), the entry was not for the purpose of making a seizure, and the towel was observed in plain view during the lawful visit. Given these facts and the cited authorities, the court concluded that the seizure was not an unreasonable search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court ordered that the defendants' motion to suppress the towel is DENIED.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The seized towel was not suppressed and, accordingly, remained available for use by the Government as evidence in the criminal prosecution.
- The court's decision rests on the application of the plain-view principle and the lawfulness of the officers' entry for the purpose of interviewing witnesses; the opinion does not purport to announce a novel rule or to depart from established precedents.
HOLTZOFF, District Judge.
This is a motion to suppress certain evidence on the ground that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The defendants McDaniel and Williams join in this motion.
The seized article was a towel which was found in a room of which the defendant McDaniel was a sub-tenant, he having sub-rented the room from the defendant Williams. The defendant Williams claims ownership of the seized property. Consequently, under the rule of the Jeffers case (Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 58, 187 F.2d 498, affirmed 342 U.S. 48, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59), each of the defendants has a standing to make the motion and the court will, therefore, consider the motion on the merits as to each of the two defendants.
The salient facts bearing upon this motion are not in dispute. The defendants McDaniel and Williams had been arrested on a charge of murder involved in this case. While they were in custody at police headquarters, two police officers went to the Williams apartment for the purpose of interviewing two women who were also living there. In the course of the interview and without making any search, one of the officers saw a torn towel in the room in which the interview was being conducted. Having had information that a towel was involved in the commission of the homicide, he took possession of the towel.
The moving defendants now seek to suppress this towel as evidence. The defendants invoke the well-established principle that ordinarily a home may not be searched without a search warrant except as incidentally to an arrest that takes place in the premises. Admittedly, there was no search warrant in this instance.
In determining matters under the Fourth Amendment, we must bear in mind the basic principle that, of course, is obvious, but it stands repetition because it is the obvious that is very often forgotten and overlooked, namely, that it is only unreasonable searches that are proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, but not all searches. Whether a particular search is or is not unreasonable must be determined largely by the facts of the particular case.
To be sure, there are certain guides that have been laid down by judicial decisions, but these guides are not rigid or inexorable. One of the guides is that the interior of a home may not be searched without a search warrant except in connection with and incidentally to an arrest taking place in the premises. That statement, however, is subject to an exception that if, without a search and without an unlawful entry into the premises, a contraband article or an article which is needed by the police, is seen in the premises, the police are not required to close their eyes and need not walk out and leave the article where they saw it. Any other principle might lead to an absurd result and at times perhaps even defeat the ends of justice.
The constitutional provision regulating searches and seizures is intended to protect persons against oppression and not to bring into being numerous technical obstructions against the enforcement of the criminal law. It has been said more than once, for example, that it is not a search to observe that which is open and patent (Smith v. United States, 4 Cir., 2 F.2d 715; United States v. Strickland, D.C., 62 F. Supp. 468, 471; Ferrell v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 548, 549, 264 S.W. 1078; State v. Miller, 121 Wn. 153, 154, 209 P. 9). In the Ferrell case, it was stated that a search warrant is not necessary where the object sought by the search is visible, open and obvious to anyone within a reasonable distance employing his eyes.
In this case, the officers did not enter the premises for the purpose of searching or seizing any contraband article. They came for the purpose of interviewing prospective witnesses or persons who could give useful information. They did not break or force the door, but were admitted by the occupants. In the light of all of these circumstances, their entry was lawful. In the course of the conference, one of the officers happened to see an article which he deemed might be helpful in connection with the investigation and he thereupon took possession of it.
Under the circumstances, the Court is of the opinion that the seizure was legal, since the entry into the premises was legal and the entry was not for the purpose of making a seizure.
Accordingly, the motion will be denied.
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