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DILS v. RICHEY
Case Summary: Frank L. Dils et al. v. June Brown Richey — Court of Appeals of Kentucky (May 10, 1968)
Factual and Procedural Background
The action below was a suit to construe the will of A.L. Stephens and for a declaration of rights. The trial court entered a summary judgment adjudging that appellee June Brown Richey took Stephens' entire estate under the will. Mrs. Richey was a niece of Stephens' deceased wife. The appellants are the co-administrators c. t. a. of Stephens' estate and his legal heirs (two brothers and a sister). The appeal is from the Boone Circuit Court.
The will's operative provisions relied on by the parties were recited in the opinion. The material clauses read, in substance:
"Second — I will and bequeath to my Wife, Alberta K. Stephens, all of my property both real and personal or of whatever nature or wherever situated, in fee simple."
"Third — In the event that my said Wife, Alberta K. Stephens, and myself should be killed at the same time, or my said Wife should die so soon after my death that it would be impossible for her to make a will, then and only in that case, all of my said property both real and personal shall go to my niece, June Brown..."
The factual complication is that the wife predeceased Stephens by almost six years — a circumstance not provided for in the will. Under KRS 394.500 the devise to the wife lapsed. The central contested legal question was whether the will manifested an intent that June Brown should take in the event the wife predeceased Stephens. The trial court had found such an intent; the Court of Appeals reviewed that determination.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, given that Stephens' wife predeceased him (so the devise to the wife lapsed under KRS 394.500), the will manifests an intent that the niece, June Brown, should take the estate despite the will's contingency language referring only to simultaneous death or the wife's immediate post-death incapacity to make a will.
- Whether extrinsic evidence may be used to prove the testator's intent where the will's language is unambiguous as to the contingencies it addresses.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Carroll v. Cave Hill Cemetery Co., 172 Ky. 204, 189 S.W.2d 186, 190 | That a will's meaning is not made ambiguous merely by being brought into contact with collateral facts. | Applied to support the conclusion that the will's language is unambiguous and its meaning is not rendered unclear by the fact that the wife predeceased the testator. |
| Johnson v. Foley, 302 Ky. 848, 196 S.W.2d 733, 735 | Illustrates situations where a will is so imperfectly worded or arranged that the court may determine the testator's intended meaning. | Distinguished: the court held the present will is not imperfectly worded and thus is not analogous to Johnson, so the court may not rewrite or expand the will's terms. |
| Schmidt v. Halpin, Ky., 351 S.W.2d 57 | 1) No intent can be inferred solely from the fact that the testator did not change his will after an unanticipated event occurred. 2) Extrinsic evidence may not be introduced to aid construction when the will is unambiguous. | Relied upon to hold that (1) the testator's failure to change the will after his wife's death does not permit inferring an intent to benefit the niece, and (2) because the will is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to alter its effect. |
| Ratliff v. Yost, 263 Ky. 239, 92 S.W.2d 95 | Supports the principle that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to construe an unambiguous will. | Used, alongside Schmidt, to justify exclusion of extrinsic evidence and to reinforce that no construction beyond the will's clear terms is permitted. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court of Appeals proceeded in a stepwise legal analysis grounded on the text of the will and prior Kentucky precedent:
- The dispositive language of the will (second and third clauses) unambiguously devised the estate to the wife in fee simple and then provided a contingent gift to the niece only if (a) the testator and wife were killed at the same time, or (b) the wife died so soon after the testator that she could not make a will — expressly qualified by the phrase "then and only in that case."
- Because the wife actually predeceased Stephens by almost six years, the will did not address that circumstance. Under KRS 394.500 the devise to the wife lapsed, so the wife's heirs could not take under the will.
- The court examined whether an intention that the niece take in the event the wife predeceased the testator could be inferred. The court concluded the will's language is not ambiguous (neither patent nor latent ambiguity) and thus the court will not resort to extrinsic evidence or inference to supply an unexpressed contingency.
- The opinion distinguished cases where wills are imperfectly worded (e.g., Johnson v. Foley) that permit the court to construe ambiguous language; the present will was not such a case.
- The court relied on Schmidt v. Halpin to reject the notion that the testator's alleged later thoughts or his failure to change the will after the wife's death could create an intent to benefit the niece. It also relied on Schmidt and Ratliff v. Yost to hold that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to alter an unambiguous will.
- Accordingly, because the will's terms did not extend to the unanticipated event (the wife's prior death) and the will is unambiguous, the trial court erred in finding that the niece took under the will in that circumstance.
Holding and Implications
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and directed the entry of summary judgment for the appellants. The core ruling is stated as follows:
REVERSED — summary judgment entered for the appellants.
Implications: The direct effect is that appellee June Brown Richey does not take Stephens' estate under the will as construed by the trial court; instead, summary judgment in favor of the appellants (the co-administrators and heirs) was ordered. The opinion applies existing precedent to refuse expansion of an unambiguous will to cover an unanticipated fact and does not announce any novel rule of law.
CULLEN, Commissioner.
The judgment appealed from is a summary judgment, in an action to construe the will of A.L. Stephens and for a declaration of rights, adjudging that appellee June Brown Richey takes Stephens' entire estate under the will. Mrs. Richey was a niece of Stephens' deceased wife. The appellants are the co-administrators c. t. a. and the legal heirs (two brothers and a sister).
The significant parts of the will are set forth in the second and third clauses, to-wit:
"Second — I will and bequeath to my Wife, Alberta K. Stephens, all of my property both real and personal or of whatever nature or wherever situated, in fee simple.
"Third — In the event that my said Wife, Alberta K. Stephens, and myself should be killed at the same time, or my said Wife should die so soon after my death that it would be impossible for her to make a will, then and only in that case, all of my said property both real and personal shall go to my niece, June Brown, Daughter of Walter and Kathryn Brown." (Our emphasis.)
The problem arises from the fact that the wife died almost six years before Stephens died — a situation which the will did not provide for. Under KRS 394.500 the devise to the wife lapsed, so her heirs could not take under the will. The question is whether an intent may be found in the will that June should take in the circumstance of Stephens' wife's predeceasing him. The trial court found such intent. We think it is not there.
The cold fact is that the terms of the will are in no way ambiguous, either patently or latently. Their meaning is clear, and is not made unclear by being "brought in contact with the collateral facts." See Carroll v. Cave Hill Cemetery Co., 172 Ky. 204, 189 S.W.2d 186, 190. Nor is this a case, such as in Johnson v. Foley, 302 Ky. 848, 196 S.W.2d 733, 735, where the will "is so imperfectly worded or arranged as to leave in doubt the intent of the testator by what he said," so as to authorize the court to determine "what the testator intended to say in the use of the words he employed in drafting the Will." There is nothing imperfect about the wording and no doubt of what the testator meant by the words he used. The trouble is that the words — and therefore the intent — simply do not extend to the situation that happened.
It may very well be that the testator would have intended when he executed the will that June take in the event his wife predeceased him, had he thought of that possibility, and it may well be also that he actually thought, after his wife did die, that June would take under the terms of the will. However, regardless of how clear it may be that he entertained such thoughts in his mind, he did not express them in his will.
It is our opinion that this case is no different from any other in which the testator simply failed to anticipate the happening of a particular event. No intent can be inferred merely from the fact that the testator did not change his will after the unanticipated event did in fact occur. See Schmidt v. Halpin, Ky., 351 S.W.2d 57.
Since the will is unambiguous no construction is called for, hence extrinsic evidence may not be introduced as an aid to construction. See Schmidt v. Halpin, Ky., 351 S.W.2d 57; Ratliff v. Yost, 263 Ky. 239, 92 S.W.2d 95.
The judgment is reversed with directions to enter summary judgment for the appellants in accordance with their motion therefor.
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