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PEOPLE v. ANDREWS
People v. Andrews, Docket No. 8,052 — Michigan Court of Appeals (Dec. 12, 1970)
Factual and Procedural Background
George Cooper Andrews was arrested in an area where a murder had occurred six or seven hours earlier. An arresting officer testified that Andrews "fit the description" of one of the suspected murderers. Upon arrest the officer searched Andrews and discovered a .38-caliber blue steel Cobra revolver in his pants pocket. Prior to trial Andrews moved to suppress the revolver as the product of an unreasonable search and seizure; the trial court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing or written opinion. At trial Andrews renewed the motion and the trial court again denied it, admitting the weapon into evidence. The trial court ruled the weapon admissible under the last sentence of Const 1963, art 1, § 11 (a proviso excluding certain seized weapons from exclusion in criminal proceedings), and declined to decide the validity of the arrest or legality of the search. Defense counsel was restricted from questioning the arresting officer at trial regarding the basis for the arrest, and the jury was instructed that, "regardless of the validity of the arrest," a firearm seized outside the curtilage of a dwelling by a peace officer fell within the constitutional proviso and was therefore admissible. The Court of Appeals reviewed the constitutionality of the last sentence of Const 1963, art 1, § 11 and the admission of the revolver, reversed Andrews' conviction, and remanded for a new trial.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the last sentence of Const 1963, art 1, § 11 (the proviso excluding firearms and other dangerous weapons seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage from exclusion) is in conflict with the Fourth Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
- Whether the revolver discovered on Andrews, after a warrantless arrest, was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure and therefore subject to suppression under the rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio.
- Whether the trial court erred in denying the pretrial motion to suppress without holding a full evidentiary hearing and in refusing to permit inquiry at trial into the basis of the arrest.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Defendant argued that his arrest was made without probable cause and that the subsequent search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as applied to the states by Mapp v. Ohio (1961), and that the revolver should therefore have been suppressed.
People's Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the People's specific arguments on appeal beyond the trial court's reliance on state authorities upholding the constitutional proviso.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 | The exclusionary rule implementing the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. | The court relied on Mapp as the controlling federal rule and rejected state constitutional language that would permit admitting evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. |
| People v. Vanlandingham, 6 Mich. App. 128 | Cited in the trial court as a Michigan Court of Appeals decision addressing the constitutional proviso in Const 1963, art 1, § 11. | The trial court relied on Vanlandingham to admit the weapon under the state proviso; the Court of Appeals rejected reliance on such state authority where it conflicted with the Fourth Amendment. |
| Blessing case | Referenced by the trial court as one of the decisions upholding the constitutional proviso (no formal citation given in the opinion). | The trial court relied on this authority; the Court of Appeals treated such reliance as insufficient where federal constitutional protections apply. |
| People v. Barker, 18 Mich. App. 544, 549 (1969) | Cited for criticism of Michigan courts' consistent refusal to consider Mapp's applicability to the state proviso and for highlighting the anomalous treatment of Michigan defendants. | The Court of Appeals referenced Barker to show the ongoing critique of Michigan practice and to support the decision that passive acceptance of the proviso's validity was no longer permissible. |
| United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) | Cited in context of warrantless searches of a person following arrest (see citation in opinion). | Referenced by the opinion in discussing warrantless search principles; the Court concluded that the trial court should have determined the legality of the arrest/search under controlling federal law. |
| Lucas v. Michigan (CA 6, 1970), 420 F.2d 259 | Held that the last sentence of article 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 conflicts with the Fourth Amendment as applied to the states in Mapp. | The Court of Appeals relied on Lucas (Sixth Circuit) as persuasive federal authority supporting the conclusion that the state proviso conflicts with the Fourth Amendment and cannot be applied to admit evidence. |
| Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583 (1963) | Cited in support of the principle that the Supremacy Clause controls when state law conflicts with the United States Constitution. | The Court invoked the Supremacy Clause principle (as cited) to hold the state constitutional proviso subordinate to the Fourth Amendment as applied through Mapp. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court of Appeals began by observing the factual record: Andrews was arrested after fitting a general description of a murder suspect and was searched, yielding a firearm. The trial court admitted the weapon based on the last sentence of Const 1963, art 1, § 11 (a proviso excluding certain dangerous weapons seized outside the curtilage from exclusion in criminal proceedings), and declined to reach the legality of the arrest or the reasonableness of the search.
The appellate court reviewed controlling federal authority beginning with Mapp v. Ohio, which requires states to apply the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained via unreasonable searches and seizures. The opinion criticized Michigan courts' historical refusal to confront Mapp's applicability to the state constitutional proviso (citing People v. Barker). The court concluded that passive acceptance of the proviso's validity was no longer permissible.
The court determined that the last sentence of Const 1963, art 1, § 11 conflicts with the Fourth Amendment as applied to the states by Mapp. The Supremacy Clause therefore renders the state proviso inapplicable where it would permit admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment (the court cited Reynolds v. Sims in support of the Supremacy Clause principle). The Sixth Circuit's decision in Lucas v. Michigan, holding that the proviso conflicts with the Fourth Amendment, was cited as persuasive federal authority.
Because the trial court admitted the disputed evidence under the state proviso and instructed the jury that the admissibility of the firearm did not depend on the validity of the arrest, the appellate court found the admission potentially erroneous and the jury instruction clearly erroneous. The Court of Appeals thus reversed the conviction. The court directed that, if the suppression motion is renewed, the trial court must hold a full evidentiary hearing and decide admissibility in accordance with the federal constitutional standard articulated in this opinion.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court of Appeals reversed Andrews' conviction and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the last sentence of Const 1963, art 1, § 11 conflicts with the Fourth Amendment as applied to the states and, where it would permit admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supremacy Clause controls.
Implications:
- The trial court's admission of the revolver under the state constitutional proviso and its jury instruction that admissibility was unaffected by the validity of the arrest were erroneous. Reversal and remand for a new trial followed.
- On remand, if the suppression motion is reasserted, the trial court must hold a full evidentiary hearing and determine admissibility under the federal Fourth Amendment principles as applied to the states (per Mapp and the reasoning in this opinion).
- The opinion makes clear that the state constitutional proviso cannot be applied to admit evidence when doing so conflicts with the Fourth Amendment; litigants in Michigan cannot rely on that proviso to circumvent federal constitutional protections.
LESINSKI, C.J.
Defendant George Cooper Andrews appeals his jury conviction on the charge of carrying a concealed weapon.
MCLA § 750.227 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.424).
The records of the preliminary examination and the trial reveal that defendant was arrested in an area where a murder had occurred six or seven hours earlier. The arresting officer testified that defendant "fit the description" of one of the murderers. Upon arresting the defendant, the officer searched the defendant and discovered a .38-caliber blue steel Cobra revolver in his pants pocket. Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress this evidence as being the product of an unreasonable search and seizure. The motion was denied without an evidentiary hearing or written opinion. At trial defendant renewed his motion. The trial court again denied the motion stating:
The officer apparently had "heard from other officers [involved in the murder investigation]" that the suspects were two male Negroes. One was a "light-skinned male Negro, tall slim build with an Afro-American haircut". The other was "a male Negro, smaller than [the first man], huskier, and dark complexion". Both "were wearing dark clothing". Defendant was "light-skinned" and was wearing a "fairly dark blue smoking jacket". His hair was in an "Afro-American" cut. The officer testified that outside of a description and the defendant being in the Six Mile Road — Dequindre area, he was not doing anything which caused the officer to believe he had been guilty of a felony. The officer arrested defendant immediately upon seeing him.
Defendant argued in the trial court (as he does on appeal) that his arrest was made without probable cause and that, therefore, the subsequent search violated US Const, Ams 4, 14, as applied to the states by Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643 ( 81 S Ct 1684, 6 L Ed 2d 1081, 84 ALR2d 933).
"This does not involve the question at this time as to the validity of the arrest. This raised the question as to the admissibility of the evidence. All of the matters were disposed of and under the constitutional proviso, article 1, section 10, [ sic] I believe, of the Constitution of 1963, and decided in the case of the People v. Vanlandingham of 6 Mich. App. 128 and in the Blessing case and other decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court, the proviso is that after referring to the protection of a person from unreasonable searches and seizures — and I will read it for purposes of the record: `Article 1, section 11. The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. The protection of this section shall not apply to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drugs, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state.'
"This has been passed upon by our Court of Appeals. The constitutionality of our constitutional proviso has been upheld. The Michigan Supreme Court has upheld this. This court is obliged to follow the decisions of the Court of Appeals, of the Supreme Court of this state, and of the United States Supreme Court. Let the record indicate that this constitutional proviso was adopted by the delegates to the constitution following the decision of Mapp v. Ohio, that the Court of Appeals in the Vanlandingham case and the Supreme Court have upheld the proviso and there has been no decision of law on the part of any court which has jurisdiction over our appeals that would indicate that our proviso is not constitutional and under its term the evidence is admissible." (Emphasis supplied.)
The evidence was admitted.
During trial plaintiff objected to defense counsel's attempted questioning of the arresting officer regarding the basis of defendant's arrest. In the absence of the jury the court stated:
"The court already ruled that regardless of the reasonableness of [sic] probable cause for the arrest, that this evidence is admissible because of the constitutional proviso and the court pre-trial also indicated that in its opinion there was probable cause here and I am not going to go into this again." (Emphasis supplied.)
In the court's instructions to the jury, reference was again made to the search and seizure:
"I do want to charge you as a matter of law that that has bearing in this case at all because, regardless of the validity of the arrest, a firearm seized outside the curtilage of a dwelling by a peace officer comes within the search and seizure proviso of article 1, section 11 of our 1963 Constitution, following an amendment adopted by the people in 1963 and which was continued from the old constitution into the present one, and the search and seizure amendment reads as follows: [Reading Const 1963, art 1, § 11.]
* * *
"So the court, as a matter of law, has ruled that the evidence that was introduced as Exhibit 1 was properly introduced as evidence under the search and seizure proviso." (Emphasis supplied.)
The various rulings and statements of the trial court have placed the issue of the constitutionality of the last sentence of Const 1963, art 1, § 11, squarely before this Court.
In Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643 ( 81 S Ct 1684, 6 L Ed 2d 1081, 84 ALR2d 933), the United States Supreme Court declared that the exclusionary rule, implementing the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable search and seizures, applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In a separate opinion in People v. Barker (1969), 18 Mich. App. 544, 549, Judge CHARLES LEVIN spoke critically of the consistent refusal of the courts of this state to consider the applicability of Mapp to the cited provision of the Michigan Constitution. The result has been to set Michigan apart as the one state in the union refusing to protect the constitutionally-guaranteed rights of criminal defendants subjected to unreasonable search and seizures in this limited area. A review of the record in the instant case convinces us that passive acceptance of the validity of the constitutional provision is no longer permissible. The trial judge, relying on Michigan case authority, refused to decide the issue of the legality of defendant's arrest (and hence, the reasonableness of the warrantless search of defendant's person) holding that the revolver was admissible into evidence in any event under the terms of the last sentence of Const 1963, art 1, § 11. This position cannot prevail. The last sentence of article 1, § 11 of the Constitution of 1963 conflicts with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In such an instance the Supremacy Clause controls.
US Const, Am 4.
US Const, Am 14.
See United States v. Rabinowitz (1950), 339 U.S. 56 ( 70 S Ct 430, 94 L Ed 653).
See Lucas v. Michigan (CA 6, 1970), 420 F.2d 259.
Reynolds v. Sims (1963), 377 U.S. 533, 583 ( 84 S Ct 1362, 12 L Ed 2d 506).
In reaching our decision today, we are mindful of the fact that on January 5, 1970 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided Lucas v. Michigan (CA 6, 1970), 420 F.2d 259, a case arising on a habeas corpus proceeding, wherein it was held "that the last sentence of article 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 is in conflict with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States as applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio." 420 F.2d 259, 263. Since the Federal Court of Appeals also indicated that state (of Michigan) prisoners aggrieved by trial court rulings incorrectly applying art 1, § 11, would no longer be required to exhaust state remedies before seeking Federal relief, we find it most important to settle the instant question to avoid the unseemly situation where "Michigan litigants find it necessary to seek the protection of the Federal courts for vindication of rights enjoyed without question by all in the other 49 states." People v. Barker, supra, at 558.
In view of the possible erroneous admission of evidence and the clearly erroneous instruction to the jury, we reverse. In the event the motion to suppress is once again renewed, the trial court shall hold a full evidentiary hearing and determine the admissibility of the evidence in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
All concurred.
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