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YEE CHIEN WOO v. ROSENBERG
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter was remanded to the Ninth Circuit after the Supreme Court reversed the court's earlier decision in Yee Chien Woo v. Rosenberg, 419 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1969). Appellee sought "Seventh Preference" refugee classification under § 203(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7)). The Immigration and Naturalization Service (District Director) denied the preference, finding appellee had firmly resettled in Hong Kong; the District Court disagreed and ruled for appellee. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's prior ruling and remanded for review of the District Court's findings that appellee had not firmly resettled in Hong Kong under the legal test set out by the Supreme Court. The underlying factual description of appellee's resettlement is set forth in the court's earlier opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the District Court's finding that appellee had never firmly resettled in Hong Kong comported with the legal standard prescribed by the Supreme Court in Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo (i.e., whether appellee's physical presence in the United States was a consequence of flight in search of refuge and reasonably proximate to that flight).
- Whether the Immigration and Naturalization Service's determination that appellee had firmly resettled in Hong Kong was an abuse of discretion.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 91 S.Ct. 1312, 28 L.Ed.2d 592 (1971) | Supreme Court's legal test for determining resettlement: physical presence in the U.S. must be a consequence of flight in search of refuge, reasonably proximate to that flight; not following an intervening residence terminating the original flight. | The court applied the Supreme Court's standard and remanded to review the District Court's findings under that standard; the Supreme Court established that the District Director applied the proper standards. |
| Yee Chien Woo v. Rosenberg, 419 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1969) | The court's earlier holding that appellee was entitled to Seventh Preference classification despite possible resettlement in Hong Kong. | Referenced as the prior Ninth Circuit decision which the Supreme Court reversed; factual background of resettlement is set out in that opinion. |
| Dong Yup Lee v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 407 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1969) | Standard that review of a denial of preference classification is limited to whether there has been an abuse of discretion. | Cited to support the principle that the courts' review is confined to abuse-of-discretion review of the INS determination. |
| Kirsten-Sanders Dental Laboratory, Inc. v. Sahli, 348 F.2d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 1965) | Support for the limitation of review to abuse-of-discretion in similar administrative determinations. | Cited as additional authority for limiting judicial review to abuse of discretion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court's articulation of the correct legal standard required review of whether appellee's U.S. presence was a reasonably proximate consequence of flight in search of refuge rather than following an intervening residence terminating that flight. The Ninth Circuit noted the District Director had applied that correct legal standard. Under controlling precedent, the court's review of the INS denial is limited to whether the decision constituted an abuse of discretion. The court concluded the Service's finding that appellee had firmly resettled in Hong Kong was supported by rational explanation and substantial evidence in the record. Because the Service applied proper standards and its finding had substantial support, the District Director's ruling did not amount to an abuse of discretion and should have been accepted by the District Court.
Holding and Implications
REVERSED.
Holding: The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's contrary judgment and upheld the District Director's determination that appellee had firmly resettled in Hong Kong; the District Director's denial of Seventh Preference classification was not an abuse of discretion. Implications: The direct effect is reversal of the District Court's decision and validation of the INS determination on these facts. The opinion does not announce broader new precedent beyond applying the Supreme Court's standards and affirming that the INS finding had substantial support.
MERRILL, Circuit Judge:
This case has been remanded to this court following reversal of our earlier decision, Yee Chien Woo v. Rosenberg, 419 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1969). Appellee sought "Seventh Preference" treatment as a refugee under § 203(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7). We held that since appellee was a national of no country but Communist China, he was entitled to Seventh Preference classification notwithstanding the fact that he may have become firmly resettled in Hong Kong following his flight from China.
The Supreme Court, in Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 91 S.Ct. 1312, 28 L.Ed.2d 592 (1971), reversed upon this point and remanded in order that we might review, under the legal test and appropriate standards set out by the Court, the District Court's findings that appellee had never firmly resettled in Hong Kong.
The facts of appellee's resettlement are set forth in our earlier opinion, 419 F.2d at page 253. Upon these facts the Immigration and Naturalization Service, in denying appellee a preference classification, found that he had firmly resettled in Hong Kong. The District Court reached the opposite result.
With reference to standards for determining resettlement, the Supreme Court stated, 402 U.S. 56, 57, 91 S.Ct. 1316-17:
"The District Director applied the correct legal standard when he determined that § 203(a)(7) requires that `physical presence in the United States [be] a consequence of an alien's flight in search of refuge,' and further that `the physical presence must be one which is reasonably proximate to the flight and not one following a flight remote in point of time or intervening residence in a third country reasonably constituting a termination of the original flight in search of refuge.'"
With reference to legislation upon which we had relied, the Court stated, 402 U.S. 56, 91 S.Ct. 1316.
"It was never intended to open the United States to refugees who had found shelter in another nation and had begun to build new lives."
In reviewing the denial of a preference classification, the courts are limited to the determination of whether there has been an abuse of discretion. See Dong Yup Lee v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 407 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1969); Kirsten-Sanders Dental Laboratory, Inc. v. Sahli, 348 F.2d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 1965). The Supreme Court has established that the Immigration and Naturalization Service applied the proper standards. The finding of the Service that appellee had firmly resettled in Hong Kong was not lacking in rational explanation and cannot be held to be without substantial support in the record. Accordingly, the District Director's ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion and should have been accepted by the District Court.
Reversed.
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