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MATTER OF TURNER v. KOWALSKI

Supreme Court, Westchester County.
Jan 16, 1975
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Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner, Barbara Turner, on behalf of her eight-year-old son Herman Turner and all others similarly situated, commenced a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78. Petitioner sought relief including an order requiring respondents to provide alternative instruction for pupils suspended by respondents, a declaration that the action may be maintained as a class action, a declaration that respondents' policy of not providing alternative instruction to pupils suspended for five days or less is illegal, and injunctions against that policy and against suspensions without providing the statutorily required informal hearing. Herman Turner was suspended by the Horton School principal for five school days beginning November 5, 1974. Respondents conceded they do not provide alternative instruction for suspensions of five days or less and that 187 such suspensions were imposed in the 1973–1974 school year. The petition was heard by Justice Harold L. Wood.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether respondents' policy of not providing alternative instruction to pupils suspended for five school days or less violates Education Law § 3214 (subd. 3, par. e).
  2. Whether the proceeding may properly be maintained as a class action under CPLR 1005.
  3. Whether respondents were required to advise petitioner of her right to an informal conference under Education Law § 3214 (subd. 3, par. d) when the suspension is five days or less.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Education Law requires alternative instruction for suspended pupils and respondents' failure to provide it for suspensions of five days or less is illegal, arbitrary and an abuse of discretion.
  • Petitioner was not notified of her right to an informal conference and that failure prejudiced her opportunity to proceed differently.
  • Petitioner does not challenge the validity of individual suspensions and seeks class relief on a common question of law.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Respondents concede they do not provide alternative instruction for suspensions of five days or less and assert such requirement would be impracticable and unworkable (difficulty arranging immediate tutoring or supervision and limited educational benefit given short duration).
  • The principal has a statutory choice under Education Law § 3214 (subd. 3, par. e) to provide alternative instruction or pursue supervision/detention pursuant to article seven of the Family Court Act (e.g., PINS proceedings).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hunt v. Wilson, 72 Misc.2d 360 Support for class action where individual factual determinations are not challenged. Used to justify treating the matter as a class action because petitioner did not challenge validity of individual suspensions.
Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120 Authority regarding limits on class actions when individual factual inquiries would be required. Cited to support the proposition that the class action is permissible here because underlying suspensions are not being individually litigated.
Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 33 N.Y.2d 304 Interpretation of CPLR 1005 on maintainability of class actions. Relied upon to hold the application is maintainable as a class action under CPLR 1005.
Eisen v. Carlisle Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 Federal guidance on class action procedures. Court concluded Eisen did not affect its holding that the proceeding is maintainable as a class action.
Reeves v. Texas Gulf, 78 Misc.2d 579 Discussion related to Eisen's applicability. Cited in support of the court's view that Eisen does not undermine the class-action determination.
Matter of Crumpler (12 Ed. Dept. Rep. 38) Discussion about requirement to inform of right to informal conference (context: projected suspension in excess of five days). Court observed Crumpler dealt with a suspension in excess of five days and that its statements about notice were dictum and inapplicable here.
Matter of Simmons v. Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Town of Rye, 11 Ed. Dept. Rep. 130 Holds Education Law § 3214 does not require a hearing prior to a suspension not exceeding five days. Relied upon to conclude the court cannot impose on respondents a duty to advise petitioner of her right to an informal conference under the circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined the statutory text of Education Law § 3214 (subd. 3, pars. b–e), noting (1) principals may suspend pupils for up to five school days, (2) longer suspensions trigger specified due-process requirements, (3) for suspensions by the principal the pupil and parent are entitled, on request, to an informal conference, and (4) after suspension immediate steps must be taken for attendance upon instruction elsewhere or for supervision/detention pursuant to article seven of the Family Court Act.

The court found the proceeding properly maintainable as a class action under CPLR 1005 because petitioner did not challenge individual suspension grounds and the matter involved a common legal question affecting numerous pupils (respondents conceded numerous short suspensions had been imposed). The court rejected any controlling effect from Eisen v. Carlisle Jacquelin.

Addressing the primary statutory question, the court acknowledged that a literal reading could require alternative instruction for suspensions of any length but gave weight to practical considerations: respondents' uncontested claim that providing alternative instruction for short (≤5-day) suspensions is impracticable and of little benefit, and that the statute gives the principal a choice between providing instruction or pursuing supervision/detention under the Family Court Act. The court concluded the Legislature's intent was to make alternative instruction unnecessary for pupils suspended for five days or less.

On the informal conference issue, the court noted petitioner received an informal conference but alleged she was not informed of the right to one. The court examined Matter of Crumpler and determined that Crumpler concerned suspensions in excess of five days and that its notice statements were dictum and inapplicable. Relying also on Matter of Simmons, which holds no hearing is required prior to a suspension not exceeding five days, the court concluded it could not impose a duty on respondents to advise petitioner of the right to an informal conference under the circumstances.

Having resolved these issues, the court did not address other defenses raised by respondents.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed the petition.

Implications: The court held that (1) the intent of Education Law § 3214 (subd. 3) is that alternative instruction is unnecessary for pupils suspended for five school days or less, and (2) under the circumstances of a suspension not exceeding five days the court will not impose a duty on respondents to advise parents of the right to an informal conference. The decision disposes of petitioner's requested relief; the opinion does not articulate any broader rule beyond its application to the parties and the statutory interpretation stated above, and no additional precedent is announced by the court.

Show all summary ...

HAROLD L. WOOD, J.

Petitioner, on behalf of her son, Herman, and all others similarly situated, brings this proceeding, pursuant to CPLR article 78 for an order, inter alia:

1. Requiring respondents to provide alternative instruction for pupils suspended from school by respondents. 2. Declaring this action to be a proper class action. 3. Declaring that respondents' policy of not providing alternative instruction to pupils suspended for five days or less is illegal, arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. 4. Enjoining respondents from such illegal action. 5. Enjoining respondents from such suspensions without providing such pupils and the persons in parental relationship to them an informal hearing as statutorily required.

Petitioner is the mother of Herman Turner, an infant eight years of age who attends fourth grade at the Horton School located in the Port Chester-Rye Union Free School District.

On November 4, 1974, in the early afternoon, petitioner was summoned to school and advised by Mr. Frey, the principal thereof, that because of her son's behavior, he was being suspended for five school days, commencing November 5, 1974 and continuing through to November 13, 1974, at which time his educational future would be discussed.

Subdivision 3 of section 3214 Educ. of the Education Law deals with suspension of a pupil and, in pertinent part, states:

"b. The board of education * * * may adopt by-laws delegating to * * * the principal of the school where the pupil attends, the power to suspend a pupil for a period not to exceed five school days.

"c. No pupil may be suspended for a period in excess of five school days unless [certain due process requirements are fulfilled] * * *

"d. In the case of a suspension by the principal pursuant to paragraph b of this subdivision, the pupil and the person in parental relation to him shall, on request, be given an opportunity for an informal conference with the principal at which the person in parental relation shall be authorized to ask questions of complaining witnesses.

"e. Procedure after suspension. Where a pupil has been suspended * * * immediate steps shall be taken for his attendance upon instruction elsewhere or for supervision or detention of said pupil pursuant to the provisions of article seven of the family court act."

Petitioner has made it crystal clear that neither she nor any other member of the class here sought to be included is questioning the validity of the suspension or the underlying grounds therefor. The stated purpose of this concession is to validate this proceeding as a class action, something which would obviously be impermissible, were it necessary to evaluate and determine the varied underlying factual situations inherent in each suspension. ( Hunt v. Wilson, 72 Misc.2d 360; Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120.)

It is conceded by respondents that, as to pupils suspended for five days or less, no alternative instruction is afforded to those pupils and it is this policy of respondents which, says petitioner, is illegal and in violation of section 3214 (subd. 3, par. e) of the Education Law. It is further conceded by respondents (as evidenced by their letter to petitioners' counsel, dated November 13, 1974, attached to petitioners' memorandum of law as Exhibit I) that for the school year commencing in September, 1973 through June, 1974, the school district imposed 187 suspensions of five days or less.

It would appear therefore and this court so holds that the instant application properly deals with "the question * * * of a common or general interest of many persons * * * where the persons who might be made parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court" (CPLR 1005, subd. [a]) and is thus maintainable as a class action pursuant to CPLR 1005. ( Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 33 N.Y.2d 304. ) Upon examination, the court cannot find that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle Jacquelin ( 417 U.S. 156) in any way affects this holding. (See Reeves v. Texas Gulf, 78 Misc.2d 579.)

It is petitioner's contention that under subdivision 3 of section 3214 Educ. of the Education Law, no distinction as to the necessity for alternative instruction is made where the suspension is for more or less than five days. Concededly the statute, in its present format could very well lead to such an interpretation. However, in determining the intent of the Legislature, attention must be paid to the practicality of the matter. Respondents set forth in their answer, and it is nowhere disputed by petitioner, that "To require alternative instruction during the term of a short suspension not exceeding five school days is both impracticable and unworkable since it is virtually impossible to arrange `overnight' tutoring or for attendance supervision or detention of the pupil elsewhere and further, little or no benefit will be derived by the pupil even if such facilities could be arranged since before any continuity of instruction could be obtained, the pupil would be returned to his classes by virtue of the completion of the suspension."

It must be remembered, too, that, pursuant to section 3214 (subd. 3, par. e) of the Education Law, the principal has a choice of two alternatives. He can either provide alternative instruction or can take steps for the pupil's "supervision or detention * * * pursuant to the provisions of article seven of the family court act."

It would appear to be more reasonable to assume that the Legislature would prefer, in the case of suspensions for five days or less, that the pupil not receive alternate instruction for that period when the alternative, under the statute, is a Family Court action in the nature of a person in need of supervision (PINS) proceeding.

Accordingly, this court holds that the intent of the statute is to make unnecessary any alternative instruction for pupils suspended for five days or less.

Petitioner further complains that she was not advised by respondents of her right to an informal conference.

Section 3214 (subd. 3, par. d) of the Education Law set forth in full above, provides that when the suspension is for five days or less (Education Law, § 3214 subd. 3, par. b) the pupil and parents "shall, on request, be given * * * an informal conference". While petitioner here was given an informal conference, the complaint is that no notice of her right to such a conference was given by respondents; that petitioner "stumbled into some facsimile of a hearing situation * * * and thought she was being allowed to talk to the personnel because of a kindly whim of the principal (and) had (she) known that she had a right to, such conference, instead of thinking that she was being given special consideration, she may have proceeded differently".

Petitioner contends that it has been held that the principal is required to inform of the right to an informal conference, citing Matter of Crumpler (12 Ed. Dept. Rep. 38). Examination of that case reveals that it dealt with a projected suspension in excess of five days. It was said there that the failure to advise petitioner of his right to an informal conference, while not commendable, must be considered in the light of the subsequent decision to hold a formal hearing with regard to a suspension in excess of five days. It is obvious, under the statute, that the right to an informal hearing is applicable only to suspensions for a period not to exceed five days and the statement as to notice is clearly dictum and inapplicable to suspensions for more than five days as was contemplated in that case.

It has been held that section 3214 Educ. of the Education Law does not require a hearing prior to a suspension not exceeding five days ( Matter of Simmons v. Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Town of Rye, 11 Ed. Dept. Rep. 130). This being so, the court cannot impose upon respondents the duty to advise petitioner, under the circumstances here applicable, of her right to an informal conference.

In view of the foregoing the court does not find it necessary to reach other defenses raised in respondents' answer and, accordingly, dismisses the petition herein.