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UNITED STATES v. COADES
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, Allen Coades, was convicted of attempted bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 2113(a)(d). The incident involved two black men wearing stocking masks who approached the rear door of a bank carrying guns. One entered the bank and exchanged gunfire with a security guard before both fled. The security guard chased them and encountered off-duty officers, whom he informed of the suspects' descriptions and direction of flight. The officers pursued and stopped two black males matching the description approximately half a block from the intersection. Upon being ordered to halt, appellant dropped a mask and surgical gloves, and a recently fired gun was found beneath him. The conviction was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the evidence obtained incident to appellant's arrest should have been suppressed due to lack of probable cause at the time of arrest.
- Whether the appellant's confession should have been suppressed because the interrogation was not electronically or stenographically recorded.
- Whether the admission of eyewitness testimony based on a "show-up" identification procedure violated due process.
- Whether the admission of a microscopic piece of glass found in appellant's jacket was improper due to insufficient chain of custody.
- Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of appellant's prior conviction for bank robbery.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The evidence obtained at arrest should be suppressed because the officers lacked probable cause when appellant was ordered to stop and prostrate himself.
- The appellant's confession should be suppressed due to the absence of electronic or stenographic recording of the custodial interrogation.
- The "show-up" identification was unduly suggestive and violated due process.
- The microscopic glass evidence should be excluded because the chain of custody of the jacket was not adequately established to prevent contamination.
- The admission of prior conviction evidence was improper and prejudicial, serving no legitimate purpose and violating Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
Plaintiff-Appellee's Arguments
- The officers had probable cause based on eyewitness accounts and circumstances to arrest appellant at the time he was ordered to halt or shortly thereafter.
- The lack of recording of the confession does not warrant suppression; reliability concerns are matters for legislative consideration.
- The "show-up" was conducted shortly after the crime, minimizing the risk of misidentification under the totality of the circumstances.
- The presumption of regularity applies to the chain of custody of evidence; mere opportunity for tampering is insufficient to exclude the glass evidence.
- Although the introduction of prior conviction evidence was improper, the overwhelming proof of guilt renders any error harmless and does not justify reversal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1974) | Reasonableness of show of force in effectuating a stop based on probable cause. | Supported the court’s conclusion that the officers’ show of force was reasonable given the circumstances of an armed robbery and flight. |
| United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1974) | Distinguishing cases where show of force was unnecessary for reasonable safety during stops. | Distinguished because in Strickler the circumstances did not justify a show of force, unlike the instant case. |
| United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976) | Addressed concerns about reliability of oral confessions without recording. | The court noted the issue but deferred to legislative bodies for rulemaking rather than judicial imposition. |
| Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (1969) | Permissibility and reliability of "show-up" identification shortly after crime. | Supported the court’s view that a prompt "show-up" can be reliable and minimize misidentification. |
| United States v. Gaines, 450 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1971) | Usefulness of "show-up" identifications in expediting release of innocent suspects. | Referenced as supportive authority for the validity of "show-up" identifications. |
| Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) | Due process test for reliability of identification procedures under totality of circumstances. | Applied to determine that the "show-up" did not create a substantial likelihood of misidentification. |
| United States v. Daughtry, 502 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1974) | Presumption of regularity in handling evidence and requirement of affirmative evidence for tampering. | Supported the court’s conclusion that mere opportunity for tampering is insufficient to exclude evidence. |
| Federal Rule of Evidence 403 | Exclusion of evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice. | Applied to find that prior conviction evidence was improperly admitted but harmless error given overwhelming guilt. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first analyzed whether probable cause existed at the moment appellant was ordered to stop. It found the officers had sufficient information from eyewitnesses describing two armed men fleeing an attempted bank robbery, and the suspects’ proximity and matching description justified the stop. The discovery of the mask and gloves in plain view further established probable cause for arrest. The court deemed the officers’ use of force reasonable given the circumstances.
Regarding the confession, the court acknowledged appellant’s argument for recorded interrogations but noted the lack of controlling authority and deferred to Congress for any rule changes. The court thus declined to suppress the confession.
On the "show-up" identification, the court applied the due process totality of circumstances test from Neil v. Biggers and found the identification reliable given the promptness and witness observations, minimizing risk of misidentification.
For the microscopic glass evidence, the court relied on the presumption of regularity in evidence handling and held that the mere opportunity for tampering was insufficient to exclude the evidence absent affirmative proof of bad faith.
Finally, the court agreed that admission of appellant’s prior conviction was improper and served no legitimate purpose, constituting prosecutorial overzealousness. However, given the overwhelming evidence of appellant’s guilt, the error was deemed harmless and did not warrant reversal.
Holding and Implications
The court AFFIRMED the conviction of appellant Allen Coades for attempted bank robbery.
The direct effect of this decision is the upholding of appellant’s conviction despite some evidentiary errors. The court emphasized that while prosecutorial overreach in admitting prior conviction evidence is concerning, the overwhelming proof of guilt can render such errors harmless. The opinion does not establish new precedent but reinforces existing standards for probable cause, identification procedures, evidence handling, and appellate harmless error review.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant challenges his conviction of attempted bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 2113(a)(d). We affirm.
1. Appellant argues that evidence obtained incident to his arrest should have been suppressed because the police officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. Customers and employees of the bank saw two black men with stocking masks step out of a car and approach the rear door of the bank, carrying guns. One man entered the bank. He exchanged gunfire with the security guard. The men ran. The guard gave chase. The guard encountered four off-duty officers in the bank parking lot. He told the officers what had happened, described the robbers as two male Negroes, one wearing a leather jacket, and indicated the direction of their flight. The officers drove off in pursuit. At the next intersection a by-stander pointed down the intersecting street. The officers turned the corner, and saw two black males, one wearing a leather jacket, walking down the street, approximately one-half block from the intersection. They were the only pedestrians in sight. The officers pulled to a stop behind the men, jumped out with drawn guns, and shouted, "Freeze," "Police," "Hit the ground." After a second warning, appellant obeyed. Between the first and second warnings appellant dropped a mask and surgical gloves on the sidewalk. A recently fired gun was found beneath him as he lay on the pavement.
Appellant argues that the arrest occurred when he and his companion were ordered to stop and prostrate themselves, and at that moment the officers lacked probable cause to believe the two men had committed an offense.
The facts known to the officers when appellant was ordered to halt, briefly outlined above, constituted probable cause.
In any event, when the order to halt was given the officers had sufficient information to justify stopping appellant and his companion for further inquiry; and, as appellant concedes, observation of the gloves and mask in plain view immediately thereafter provided probable cause for the subsequent arrest. The show of force employed to effectuate the stop was reasonable in light of the officers' information that the two men were armed and in flight from an attempted bank robbery in which a gun fight had ensued. See United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 1974). The decision in United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1974), is distinguishable for nothing in the circumstances known to the officers in that case when they stopped the suspects at gunpoint suggested that such a show of force was necessary to detain the individuals for questioning with reasonable safety for the officers.
2. Appellant contends that testimony of an FBI agent that appellant confessed to the crime charged should have been suppressed because the interrogation was not recorded electronically or stenographically. Appellant recognizes the lack of authority for his position but urges that we adopt it to insure reliability of police reports of oral confessions during custodial interrogation. Our recent opinion in United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976), does respond to some of appellant's concerns. The need for the rule suggested by appellant and the particular form such a rule should take are appropriate matters for consideration by Congress, not for a court exercising an appellate function.
3. Appellant argues that the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of witnesses based on a "show-up" in the bank after the attempted robbery. Obviously, a "show-up" is more suggestive than a lineup because the suspect is the only person presented for identification. On the other hand, returning a suspect to the scene of a crime shortly after its commission to determine whether eye-witnesses identify him as the perpetrator permits the witnesses to make the determination while the image of the perpetrator is still fresh in their minds ( Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280, 1284 (1969)), and may lead to the expeditious release of innocent suspects. United States v. Gaines, 450 F.2d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 1971); Russell v. United States, supra, 408 F.2d at 1284.
The test to be applied in determining whether due process is denied by introduction of proof of the results of a pretrial "show-up" is the same as that applied to other identification procedures, namely, whether in the "totality of circumstances" the process was so suggestive as to create a very substantial likelihood of misidentification. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196-201, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). Although the opportunity of the witnesses to observe appellant during the robbery was brief, the "show-up" occurred only minutes later and the witnesses were able to identify appellant by distinctive characteristics of his clothing and general appearance. We are satisfied that in all the circumstances the possibility of misidentification was minimal.
4. Appellant argues that the lower court erred in admitting into evidence a microscopic piece of glass found in his leather jacket, since the chain of custody of the jacket was not sufficiently established to insure that the glass was not inadvertently introduced by someone handling the jacket subsequent to the crime. There is a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officials. A mere showing that an opportunity existed for unlawful tampering with the evidence is insufficient to justify exclusion; affirmative evidence of bad faith or actual tampering is required. United States v. Daughtry, 502 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1974).
5. Finally, appellant argues that the trial court erred in permitting the government to introduce evidence of his prior conviction for bank robbery. We agree. Proof of the prior conviction served no legitimate end. The government's contention that the evidence of was relevant to establish the existence of an intent to rob is frivolous. The only contested factual issue was whether appellant was the person who entered the bank; appellant offered to stipulate that whoever entered the bank intended to rob it. It was uncontroverted that the person who entered the bank was wearing a mask and gloves and carried a gun which he fired at the guard before fleeing. Whatever slight probative value evidence of the conviction may have had was patently outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The misuse of evidence of prior misconduct in this case is a deplorable example of prosecutorial overzealousness. Such incidents have occurred with sufficient frequency in recent trials to be a source of growing concern. Whatever the proper remedy may be, however, it would be inappropriate to reverse appellant's conviction on this ground. Proof of appellant's guilt was so overwhelming that the error could not have affected the outcome.
Affirmed.
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