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STATE ex rel. PEACHER v. SENCINDIVER
Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner Charles W. Peacher, Jr. was arrested on June 30, 1976, and subsequently indicted on September 21, 1976, in Jefferson County for murder and burglary. He underwent psychiatric examinations by four psychiatrists—two at the Jefferson County jail and two at Weston State Hospital. The court-ordered examination at Weston in December 1976 concluded that Peacher was competent to stand trial but recommended further neurological testing to rule out organic pathology potentially caused by heavy drug use. The other psychiatrists also found him competent but could not opine on his criminal responsibility at the time of the alleged offenses.
On January 19, 1977, Peacher moved for a continuance of his trial, scheduled for February 8, to allow time for the neurological examination. The trial court denied this motion. Subsequently, this Court issued a rule to show cause why prohibition should not be granted to prevent the trial until the neurological examination was completed. The matter was argued on March 1, 1977.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the writ of prohibition should issue to prevent the trial of defendant Peacher until he undergoes a neurological examination.
- Whether the West Virginia murder statute, W. Va. Code 61-2-1, is unconstitutional for violating due process by creating an impermissible inference or presumption shifting the burden of proof on malice, willfulness, and premeditation to the defendant.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner’s Arguments
- Petitioner argued that the trial should be prohibited until a neurological examination, including EEG and brain scan, was conducted as recommended by psychiatrists to rule out organic pathology.
- Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the West Virginia murder statute (W. Va. Code 61-2-1), asserting it violates due process by impermissibly shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to disprove malice, willfulness, and premeditation, citing Mullaney v. Wilbur and State v. Penfry.
- He contended that the statute’s felony-murder rule creates a presumption of malice that the defendant must rebut to avoid first degree murder conviction.
Respondents’ Arguments
- This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| County Court v. Boreman, 34 W. Va. 362, 12 S.E. 490 (1890) | Writ of prohibition does not lie for errors or grievances redressable by ordinary judicial processes such as appeal. | Supported the court’s refusal to grant prohibition for an alleged abuse of discretion (denial of continuance). |
| State v. Milam, 226 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976) | Granting a continuance is a discretionary act of the trial court. | Confirmed that denial of continuance is not grounds for prohibition as it is discretionary. |
| Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) | Due process requires prosecution to prove every element of a crime; burden cannot be shifted to defendant to disprove malice. | Analyzed petitioner’s constitutional challenge to the murder statute’s burden shifting. |
| State v. Williams, 98 W. Va. 458, 127 S.E. 320 (1925) | Felony-murder rule allows conviction for first degree murder without proof of intent, deliberation, or malice. | Upheld the constitutionality of the felony-murder rule, rejecting burden-shifting argument. |
| Ford v. Coiner, 156 W. Va. 362, 196 S.E.2d 91 (1972) | Supporting precedent on burden of proof and felony-murder rule. | Used to reinforce the court’s position on burden of proof under felony-murder rule. |
| State v. Lewis, 133 W. Va. 584, 57 S.E.2d 513 (1949) | Supporting precedent on felony-murder and burden of proof. | Reinforced the court’s understanding of felony-murder rule application. |
| State v. Beale, 104 W. Va. 617, 141 S.E. 7 (1927) | Supporting precedent on felony-murder rule. | Further precedent upholding felony-murder rule without burden shifting. |
| State v. Bragg, 140 W. Va. 585, 87 S.E.2d 689 (1955) | Clarification of statutory definitions of first degree murder and felony-murder application. | Confirmed that felony-murder cases do not require proof of wilfulness, deliberation, or premeditation. |
| State v. Goodseal, 220 Kan. 487, 553 P.2d 279 (1976) | Consideration of felony-murder rule post-Mullaney. | Referenced to show other jurisdictions did not find felony-murder rule unconstitutional under Mullaney. |
| State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 226 S.E.2d 652 (1976) | Consideration of felony-murder rule post-Mullaney. | Referenced similarly to show no due process violation found in felony-murder application. |
| Warren v. State, 29 Md. App. 560, 350 A.2d 173 (Ct. Spec. App. 1976) | Felony-murder statutes unaffected by Mullaney v. Wilbur. | Used to support the court’s conclusion that felony-murder rule is constitutionally sound. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first addressed the request for prohibition to halt the trial until a neurological examination was conducted. It noted that the writ of prohibition is only appropriate where a lower court lacks jurisdiction or exceeds its legitimate powers, not for correcting errors or abuses of discretion. Since granting a continuance is discretionary, the trial court’s denial of the continuance was not a proper basis for prohibition.
Regarding the constitutional challenge to the murder statute, the court analyzed the petitioner’s reliance on Mullaney v. Wilbur, which held that due process requires the prosecution to prove every element of a crime and forbids shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. The petitioner argued that the felony-murder statute impermissibly presumes malice, willfulness, and premeditation, thereby shifting the burden to the defendant.
The court reviewed its prior decisions upholding the felony-murder rule, which permits conviction of first degree murder based on commission of enumerated felonies without requiring proof of intent or malice. It found that under West Virginia law, the prosecution must prove the commission or attempt of the felony and the accompanying murder, with no burden shift to the defendant. The court also considered decisions from other jurisdictions rejecting claims that Mullaney invalidated the felony-murder rule.
Consequently, the court concluded that the felony-murder statute does not violate due process and that the petitioner’s constitutional challenge was without merit.
Holding and Implications
Writ of prohibition denied.
The court held that prohibition is not warranted to delay the trial pending a neurological examination, as the denial of a continuance is within the trial court’s discretion and not subject to prohibition. Furthermore, the court upheld the constitutionality of West Virginia’s felony-murder statute, rejecting the argument that it impermissibly shifts the burden of proof in violation of due process. The direct effect is that the petitioner’s trial may proceed without the requested neurological examination and under the existing statutory framework. No new precedent altering the felony-murder rule or the standards for granting prohibition was established.
HARSHBARGER, JUSTICE:
Petitioner Charles W. Peacher, Jr. was arrested June 30, 1976 and indicted in Jefferson County on September 21, 1976 for murder and burglary.
He was examined by four psychiatrists, two, separately, in the Jefferson County jail, and two at Weston State Hospital.
The Weston examination was court-ordered and made in December, 1976. The psychiatrists reported on January 3, 1977 that defendant was competent to stand trial but they recommended, "A further neurological examination, EEG, and brain scan, neurological examination to rule out organic-pathology as a result of heavy drug usage."
The other psychiatrists also opined that Peacher was competent to be tried. None could give an opinion about his criminal responsibility at the time he allegedly committed the crimes.
On January 19, 1977 petitioner moved the trial court for a continuance of the case, which was docketed for trial on February 8, to allow the neurological examination to be conducted. The court denied the motion and this Court issued a rule to the trial court, the prosecuting attorney and the sheriff to show cause why prohibition should not issue. The matter was argued March 1, 1977.
The question is whether prohibition should issue to prevent trial of defendant Peacher until he has the neurological examination.
W. Va. Code 53-1-1 provides, "The writ of prohibition shall lie as a matter of right in all cases of usurpation and abuse of power, when the inferior court has not jurisdiction of the subject matter in controversy, or, having such jurisdiction, exceeds its legitimate powers."
"But it does not lie for errors or grievances which may be redressed in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, by appeal or writ of error." County Court v. Boreman, 34 W. Va. 362, 366, 12 S.E. 490, 492 (1890).
We cannot issue prohibition when the action of the trial court could be attacked as an abuse of discretion; and granting continuance has always been held by us to be discretionary. State v. Milam, ___ W. Va. ___, 226 S.E.2d 433 (1976).
Petitioner also prayed that the writ be granted to prohibit his trial for murder and burglary because our murder statute, W. Va. Code, 61-2-1, is unconstitutional, violating his due process rights.
He cites Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), and State v. Penfry, ___ W. Va. ___, 227 S.E.2d 210 (1976), arguing that an impermissible inference of malice, willfulness, and premeditation is raised by the statute, creating a presumption of these elements that defendant must disprove to avoid a first degree murder conviction. W. Va. Code 61-2-1 states in part:
"Murder by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or by any wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or in the commission of, or attempt to commit, arson, rape, robbery or burglary, is murder of the first degree. All other murder is murder of the second degree."
In Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, the United States Supreme Court examined Maine's rule requiring a defendant charged with murder to prove, in order to reduce his offense to manslaughter, that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. The Court found the rule to violate the requirement of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that the prosecution prove every element necessary to constitute the crime charged. Maine law created a presumption of murder and shifted the burden of proof for reducing the crime to manslaughter, to the defendant.
The felony-murder rule has been considered by this court on several occasions prior to Mullaney. While the validity of its application has been challenged, its underlying constitutionality has been presumed. In State v. Williams, 98 W. Va. 458, 127 S.E. 320 (1925), we held that a conviction for first degree murder, when the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery, may be had without proof of previous intent to kill, and without showing deliberation, willfulness, or premeditation. We decided that the trial court did not err when it refused to instruct the jury that the State has the burden of proving malice. See also, Ford v. Coiner, 156 W. Va. 362, 196 S.E.2d 91 (1972); State v. Lewis, 133 W. Va. 584, 57 S.E.2d 513 (1949); and State v. Beale, 104 W. Va. 617, 141 S.E. 7 (1927). In State v. Bragg, 140 W. Va. 585, 600, 87 S.E.2d 689, 699 (1955), the Court examined the three statutory definitions of first degree murder. ". . . [T]his case was prosecuted on the theory that the defendant shot and killed Gullett in the commission of a robbery, [and] the question whether the killing was a `wilful, deliberate and premeditated' killing under W. Va. Code, 61-2-1, does not enter into this case."
Petitioner cites several cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that Mullaney has somehow affected the legality of the felony-murder rule. In none of these cases, however, did a court hold that application of the felony-murder rule denied a defendant due process. See, State v. Goodseal, 220 Kan. 487, 553 P.2d 279 (1976); State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 226 S.E.2d 652 (1976); and Warren v. State, 29 Md. App. 560, 350 A.2d 173 (Ct.Spec.App. 1976). In Warren, the court observed that felony-murder statutes are not remotely affected by anything in Mullaney v. Wilbur.
Under our felony-murder statute, there is no shift of burden of proof. The crime of first degree murder is proved by the prosecution when it proves the defendant's commission of, or attempt to commit one of the enumerated felonies, and when it proves the accompanying murder.
Writ denied.
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