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HARRIS v. OKLAHOMA

U.S. Supreme Court
Jun 29, 1977
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Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

A clerk in a Tulsa, Oklahoma grocery store was shot and killed by a companion of the petitioner during the course of a robbery. The petitioner was convicted in Oklahoma State court of felony-murder based on this incident. The underlying felony was robbery with firearms. After this conviction, the petitioner was separately tried and convicted for the lesser crime of robbery with firearms. The petitioner moved to dismiss the second prosecution on the grounds that it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because he had already been convicted of robbery as an element of the felony-murder charge. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the second conviction, prompting the petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars a separate prosecution for the lesser included offense of robbery with firearms after a conviction for felony-murder based on that robbery.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petitioner argued that the second prosecution for robbery with firearms violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because the robbery was an element of the felony-murder conviction.

State’s Position

  • The State conceded that in the felony-murder trial, all elements of the underlying felony of robbery with firearms were necessarily proven.
  • The State nonetheless proceeded with a separate prosecution and conviction for robbery with firearms, which was affirmed by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889) Conviction of a greater crime includes conviction of the lesser included offense; double jeopardy bars separate prosecution for the lesser offense after conviction of the greater. The Court relied on this precedent to hold that since felony-murder conviction necessarily included robbery, the subsequent robbery conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) Reaffirmed the principle that multiple prosecutions for the same offense are prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Supported the Court’s holding that the petitioner could not be prosecuted separately for robbery after felony-murder conviction.
Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970) Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple prosecutions for the same offense by the same sovereign. Referenced to reinforce the general principle barring successive prosecutions for related offenses.
Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907) Prohibition against multiple prosecutions for the same offense. Used to illustrate longstanding recognition of the double jeopardy protection.
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) Double Jeopardy Clause requires that all charges arising from a single criminal episode be prosecuted in one proceeding. Justice Brennan cited this to argue for reversal on an alternative ground that the State failed to prosecute all charges in one proceeding.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) Supports the principle of prosecuting all related charges in a single proceeding under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Reinforced Justice Brennan’s view regarding the necessity of single proceeding prosecution.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reasoned that the felony-murder conviction necessarily included proof of the underlying felony of robbery with firearms, as the intent for felony-murder depends on the commission of that felony. Because the lesser offense of robbery with firearms was an essential element of the greater offense of felony-murder, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a subsequent prosecution for the lesser offense after the petitioner had already been convicted of the greater offense. The Court relied on established precedent, including In re Nielsen, which holds that one cannot be tried twice for offenses where one is a lesser included offense of the other. The State conceded that all elements of robbery with firearms were proven in the murder trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision affirming the separate robbery conviction.

Justice Brennan, concurring, emphasized an additional ground for reversal, namely that the State failed to prosecute all charges arising from the same criminal episode in a single proceeding, which he argued is required by the Double Jeopardy Clause as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars a separate prosecution for the lesser included offense of robbery with firearms after a conviction for felony-murder based on that robbery.

Implications: This decision directly reversed the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ affirmation of the separate robbery conviction, thereby protecting the petitioner from multiple prosecutions for the same criminal conduct. The ruling reinforces the principle that a defendant cannot be twice put in jeopardy for offenses where one is a lesser included offense of the other. The opinion does not establish new precedent beyond applying established double jeopardy principles to the facts of this case.

Show all summary ...

Where petitioner had been convicted of felony-murder based on his companion's killing of a victim during the course of an armed robbery, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment barred a separate prosecution of petitioner for the lesser crime of robbery with firearms, since conviction of the greater crime of murder could not be had without conviction of the lesser crime.

Certiorari granted; 555 P.2d 76, reversed.

PER CURIAM.

A clerk in a Tulsa, Okla., grocery store was shot and killed by a companion of petitioner in the course of a robbery of the store by the two men. Petitioner was convicted of felony-murder in Oklahoma State court. The opinion of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in this case states that "[i]n a felony murder case, the proof of the underlying felony [here robbery with firearms] is needed to prove the intent necessary for a felony murder conviction." 555 P.2d 76, 80-81 (1976). Petitioner nevertheless was thereafter brought to trial and convicted on a separate information charging the robbery with firearms, after denial of his motion to dismiss on the ground that this prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because he had been already convicted of the offense in the felony-murder trial. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.

When, as here, conviction of a greater crime, murder, cannot be had without conviction of the lesser crime, robbery with firearms, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution for the lesser crime after conviction of the greater one. In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889); cf. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). "[A] person [who] has been tried and convicted for a crime which has various incidents included in it, . . . cannot be a second time tried for one of those incidents without being twice put in jeopardy for the same offence." In re Nielsen, supra, at 188. See also Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 352 (1907).

The State conceded in its response to the petition for certiorari that "in the Murder case, it was necessary for all the ingredients of the underlying felony of Robbery with Firearms to be proved . . . ." Brief in Opposition 4.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring.

I join the Court's opinion but in any event would reverse on a ground not addressed by the Court, namely, that the State did not prosecute the two informations in one proceeding. I adhere to the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the prosecution in one proceeding, except in extremely limited circumstances not present here, of "all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), and cases collected therein.