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EX PARTE MCGEE
Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner Jerry McGee entered a guilty plea on August 22, 1975, in Criminal District Court No. 4 of Dallas County, Texas, to an indictment charging him with knowingly and intentionally possessing a forged prescription—a criminal instrument—with intent to use it in obtaining possession of a controlled substance. The court assessed punishment at seven years. Subsequently, petitioner filed a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding under Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P., challenging the validity of his conviction. The trial court, Judge John Mead presiding, reviewed the application and found petitioner entitled to relief, leading to this appeal before the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether petitioner was properly convicted under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 16.01 (Unlawful Use of a Criminal Instrument) given that the indictment charged possession of a forged prescription.
- Whether the special statute governing possession of forged instruments, V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 32.21(a)(1)(C), controls over the more general statute, Sec. 16.01, in this context.
- Whether the convicting court had jurisdiction to try the offense charged under Sec. 16.01 when the proper charge should have been under Sec. 32.21(a)(1)(C).
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ex parte Harrell, Tex.Cr.App., 542 S.W.2d 169 | Clarification that Sec. 16.01 and Sec. 32.21(a)(1)(C) cover the same subject matter, and that the special statute controls over the general one. | Used as binding authority to conclude petitioner was improperly convicted under Sec. 16.01 rather than Sec. 32.21(a)(1)(C). |
| Hines v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 515 S.W.2d 670 | Supports the rule of statutory construction that a special statute controls over a general statute. | Reinforces the court’s interpretation favoring the special statute for possession of forged instruments. |
| Cuellar v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 521 S.W.2d 277 | Supports the principle of statutory construction regarding special versus general statutes. | Further supports the court’s statutory interpretation in favor of the special statute. |
| Sheffield v. State, 165 Tex.Crim. 354, 307 S.W.2d 100 | Precedent concerning the application of statutory construction rules between general and special statutes. | Applied to affirm that the special statute governs possession of forged instruments. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the statutory framework governing possession of criminal instruments and forged writings. It noted that Section 16.01 of the Penal Code broadly prohibits unlawful use of criminal instruments, while Section 32.21(a)(1)(C) specifically addresses possession of forged writings with intent to utter them. The court applied the well-established rule of statutory construction that when two statutes cover the same subject matter, the special statute controls over the general one. Citing its prior decision in Ex parte Harrell and other precedents, the court concluded that petitioner’s conviction under the broader Sec. 16.01 was improper because the forged prescription falls under the more specific Sec. 32.21(a)(1)(C). Consequently, the convicting court lacked jurisdiction over the felony charge, as the proper charge was a misdemeanor under the special statute.
Holding and Implications
The Court granted relief to the petitioner, set aside the conviction, and ordered the indictment dismissed.
The direct effect is that petitioner’s felony conviction under Sec. 16.01 is vacated because the offense should have been charged as a misdemeanor under Sec. 32.21(a)(1)(C), which the convicting court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate. The opinion does not establish new precedent but follows prior decisions confirming the primacy of the special statute over the general one in this context.
DAVIS, Commissioner.
This is a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding brought under the provisions of Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P.
Petitioner entered a plea of guilty in Criminal District Court No. 4 of Dallas County on August 22, 1975, to an indictment charging that he did unlawfully "knowingly and intentionally possess a criminal instrument, namely: a forged prescription, with intent to use it in the commission of obtaining possession of a controlled substance. . . . " Punishment was assessed at seven years.
The Honorable John Mead, Judge of the Criminal District Court No. 4 of Dallas County, upon consideration of petitioner's application, concluded that petitioner was entitled to the relief prayed for, finding that the indictment was identical to the one in Ex parte Harrell, Tex.Cr.App., 542 S.W.2d 169, where this Court granted relief to a petitioner who had been convicted under a like indictment charging him with an offense under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 16.01. In Harrell, it was found that Sec. 16.01, supra (Unlawful Use of a Criminal Instrument), and V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 32.21(a)(1)(C) (possession of a writing that is forged with intent to utter it), covered the same subject matter. Since Sec. 16.01, supra, "is a broad and general statute applicable to all types of possession of criminal instruments with intent to use them in commission of an offense," and Sec. 32.21(a)(1)(C) is a special statute dealing with possession of forged instruments, including forged prescriptions, with intent to utter, this Court held that under the well-settled rule of statutory construction the special statute will control. See Hines v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 515 S.W.2d 670; Cuellar v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 521 S.W.2d 277; Sheffield v. State, 165 Tex.Crim. 354, 307 S.W.2d 100.
We conclude, as we did in Harrell, that petitioner herein was improperly convicted of unlawful possession of a criminal instrument under Sec. 16.01, supra, a felony, and should have been charged with forgery under Sec. 32.21(a) (1)(C), a misdemeanor, over which the convicting district court did not have jurisdiction.
We are in agreement with the trial court's conclusion that petitioner is entitled to the relief he seeks.
The relief requested by the habeas corpus is granted, the conviction is set aside, and the indictment ordered dismissed.
Opinion approved by the Court.
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