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DALLAS COWBOYS CHEERLEADERS v. SCOREBOARD
Factual and Procedural Background
The Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders are employed by the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders Corporation, a subsidiary of the Dallas Cowboys Football Club. In 1977, five members posed for a copyrighted poster showing them in official cheerleading uniforms, which sold over 750,000 copies by December 1978. The Texas Cowgirls, a group of former Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, produced a poster mimicking the Cowboys Cheerleaders poster with nearly identical uniforms and formation, but with partial nudity (unbuttoned halter tops). This poster was offered for public sale and featured in a magazine.
On December 19, 1978, the Cowboys Cheerleaders filed suit against the Texas Cowgirls, Scoreboard Posters, Inc., and Arny Freytag alleging copyright infringement, service mark infringement, and unfair competition, and sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) to halt distribution of the Cowgirls poster. The district court held a hearing three days later, indicating its intent to grant the TRO and convert it into a preliminary injunction pending trial on the merits scheduled for early January 1979. The court found a likelihood of public confusion and irreparable harm to the plaintiffs, and the parties agreed on a $20,000 security bond.
Formal written findings followed, concluding probable copyright infringement, false representation under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and common law unfair competition, with the injunction to remain preliminary pending trial. However, the trial never occurred; instead, the defendants filed an appeal. The plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the appellants consented to treating the TRO as a preliminary injunction, but this motion was denied by the appellate court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the district court abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction based on copyright infringement and unfair competition claims.
- Whether the defendants’ First Amendment rights to publish the Cowgirls poster were improperly restrained by the injunction.
- Whether the defendants’ parody defense constituted fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107 and thus negated the likelihood of infringement.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Louisiana Consumer's League, Inc. v. Louisiana State Board of Optometry Examiners, 557 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1977) | Standard for reviewing preliminary injunctions and factors for granting injunctions. | Used to affirm that granting a preliminary injunction lies within district court discretion and requires showing likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of harms, and public interest. |
| Ruiz v. Estelle, 550 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1977) | Review of preliminary injunctions. | Supported the discretionary standard applied by the court in reviewing the injunction. |
| In re Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1976) | Preliminary injunction standards. | Reinforced the legal framework for evaluating injunctions. |
| Texas v. Seatrain International, S. A., 518 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1975) | Factors to consider in granting preliminary injunctions. | Referenced regarding balancing harms and public interest. |
| Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939) | Constitutional basis for copyright protection. | Supported the principle that copyright protection enriches free expression. |
| Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) | Copyright as a constitutional mandate. | Used to emphasize Congress’s duty to protect authors’ rights. |
| Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 443 U.S. 562 (1979) | Limits of First Amendment vis-à-vis intellectual property rights. | Supported the court’s view that First Amendment rights do not override copyright protections. |
| Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) | Limits of parody defense and fair use in copyright. | Illustrated that not all parodies qualify as fair use; cited to show parody defense may fail. |
| Sid Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) | Fair use and parody doctrine. | Referenced regarding boundaries of parody as a defense. |
| Meredith Corp. v. Harper Row Publishers, Inc., 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974) | Use of preliminary injunctions to prevent copyright infringement. | Supported the appropriateness of preliminary injunctions in copyright cases. |
| Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Grossbardt, 428 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1970) | Preliminary injunctions in intellectual property cases. | Used to show precedent for injunction issuance. |
| Ideal Toy Corp. v. Sayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1962) | Granting preliminary injunctions for copyright infringement. | Supported the court’s injunction decision. |
| Uneeda Doll Co., Inc. v. Regent Baly Products Corp., 355 F. Supp. 438 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) | Preliminary injunctions for copyright protection. | Reinforced judicial practice of injunctions to prevent infringement. |
| Douglas International Corp. v. Baker, 335 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) | Preliminary injunctions in copyright cases. | Referenced for judicial response to imminent infringement. |
| Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958) | Limits on parody as fair use. | Example where parody was found to exceed fair use and constituted infringement. |
| Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964) | Difficulty in distinguishing fair use from infringement. | Used to illustrate complexity of parody/fair use analysis. |
| Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.Cal. 1955) | Fair use and parody boundaries. | Referenced for challenges in fair use determinations. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court recognized that the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion and must be based on factors including likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury, balance of harms, and public interest. The district court found a likelihood of confusion and irreparable harm to the plaintiffs, and the parties consented to treating the TRO as a preliminary injunction pending trial.
The defendants claimed First Amendment rights to publish their poster and asserted a parody defense under the fair use doctrine. The court acknowledged the constitutional protection of free expression but emphasized that it does not override the copyright protections established by Congress under the Constitution and the Copyright Act. The court noted that the defendants did not contest the validity of the Cowboys Cheerleaders’ copyright and admitted copying the original poster.
While parody can be a fair use defense, not all parodies qualify. The court cited precedents where parody defenses were rejected because they exceeded permissible use. The court observed that the defendants offered only a bare assertion of parody without evidentiary support, and the limited record before the district court did not shift the probability in their favor.
The appellate court emphasized that it reviews the district court’s discretion based on the record before it and found no abuse of discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The court declined to address the service mark and unfair competition claims, as the copyright infringement claim alone justified the injunction.
Holding and Implications
AFFIRMED.
The court upheld the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction against the defendants, concluding that the plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the copyright infringement claim and irreparable harm. The decision enforces the protection of intellectual property rights against unauthorized commercial exploitation, even when a parody defense is asserted without sufficient evidentiary support. The ruling does not establish a final determination on the merits of the case, nor does it set new precedent beyond affirming the district court’s discretionary grant of preliminary relief. The case will proceed to trial for a full evidentiary hearing on all claims.
CHARLES CLARK, Circuit Judge:
The Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders are a group of women who perform as cheerleaders on the sidelines during games played by the Dallas Cowboys, a football team. The women are employed by the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. In 1977 five members of the Cowboys Cheerleaders posed for a poster to be distributed commercially. The poster shows the five Cowboys Cheerleaders dressed in their official cheerleading outfits in front of a glittering backdrop, with the words "Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders" appearing in large script at the bottom of the poster. As of December 1978, over three quarter of a million copies of the poster had been sold at an average retail price of $2.50 apiece. The poster is copyrighted.
The Texas Cowgirls are a group of former Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders. Five members of the Texas Cowgirls posed for a poster mimicking the Cowboys Cheerleaders poster. The five women in the Cowgirls poster wear uniforms nearly identical to the official Cowboys Cheerleaders uniforms, they are positioned in a formation like that of the women in the Cowboys Cheerleaders poster, they are in front of a similar backdrop, and at the bottom of Cowgirls poster there is written in large script: "The Ex-Dallas Cheerleaders." In the Texas Cowgirls version of the poster, however, the halter tops of the cheerleading uniforms are unbuttoned, leaving the women in the poster with exposed breasts. This poster was offered for public sale. Orders had been placed and a magazine featuring photographs of naked women had published a picture of the poster.
The Cowboys Cheerleaders filed suit on December 19, 1978 against the Texas Cowgirls, Scoreboard Posters, Inc., the manufacturer and distributor of the Cowgirls poster, and Arny Freytag, the promoter and copyright owner of the Cowgirls poster. The complaint alleged copyright infringement, service mark infringement and unfair competition, and sought a temporary restraining order to prevent distribution of the Cowgirls poster.
Three days following the filing of the complaint, the district court conducted a hearing on the application for a temporary restraining order. After hearing argument from both sides, the district judge indicated to counsel present that he intended to grant the temporary restraining order, and further that he intended to try the case on the merits within two weeks, on January 2 or 3, 1979. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(2). He then ordered a brief recess to allow both sides an opportunity to agree on an appropriate sum for a security bond. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(c). A $20,000 bond was agreed to. When the hearing recommenced the court orally announced its decision on the temporary restraining order application. The court found that there was "a likelihood of confusion in the minds of the public" between the two posters and that dissemination of the Cowgirls poster would cause the plaintiffs "irreparable harm and that no other remedy at law is adequate." In addition, the court made the following statement:
The parties have agreed among themselves that should the Court issue an Injunction, which I have just done, that it be treated as a Temporary Injunction meaning that it will remain in effect until this case is tried and the Court has set it for trial on the merits beginning at 9:30 on January the 2nd 1979, that being Tuesday and concluding, hopefully, no later than Wednesday of that week.
The court later filed formal written findings of fact and conclusions of law amplifying its prior ruling. In the written order the court found it probable that publication of the Cowgirls poster was a copyright infringement, that it constituted false representation in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and that it established a common law tort of unfair competition. Echoing its prior language, the court concluded the order by stating that "because of the consent of all parties, this should be entered as a preliminary injunction pending trial on the merits."
The expeditious trial on the merits contemplated by the district court's order never occurred. Instead, the defendants filed a notice of appeal to this court. A motion to dismiss the appeal was filed by the plaintiff/appellee on the theory that this court did not have jurisdiction because the defendant/appellants had agreed that if the court granted a temporary restraining order it should be treated as an actual preliminary injunction. The appellees claimed that the appellants could not bring an appeal from an order to which they had consented. The motion to dismiss was denied by a panel of this court in an order dated April 5, 1979.
Although we review the district court's order as the grant of a preliminary injunction, we do so on the basis of the record as developed before the district court. In this case the parties put on their proof in a proceeding designated as an expedited hearing to consider the grant of an unreviewable Temporary Restraining Order. It was only at the conclusion of this hearing that the parties requested the court to issue its order as a preliminary injunction. The court responded by saying that it would so style its order, but it expressly emphasized that its action was based on the limited record that had been adduced and that a full exploration of the facts had not occurred. The court consistently manifested a willingness to accord a prompt hearing on a permanent injunction with the right to develop a full evidentiary record. Litigation that might have been expeditious has become protracted, and appellate review that might have been made on a fully developed record has been forced on a sparse one; the situation, however, is of the appellants' own making. Though the prior panel's decision binds us to hold that the order entered is reviewable, it does not bind us to conduct that review without due regard to the posture of the proceedings at the time of entry.
The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction lies within the discretion of the district court and is reviewable on appeal only for abuse of that discretion. Louisiana Consumer's League, Inc. v. Louisiana State Board of Optometry Examiners, 557 F.2d 473, 474 (5th Cir. 1977); Ruiz v. Estelle, 550 F.2d 238, 239 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir. 1976). To obtain a preliminary injunction it must be demonstrated that the movant has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, that irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues, that the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the damage which the injunction may cause the opponent, and that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. E.g., Louisiana Consumers League, supra, 557 F.2d at 474; Texas v. Seatrain International, S. A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975).
Those sponsoring the Cowgirls poster argue that in weighing the factors of irreparable harm, comparative injury to the parties, and the public interest, the district court failed to heed their first amendment rights to publish their poster unfettered by prior restraint. First amendment values, however, are not the only interests of constitutional dimension in this litigation. Congress has an affirmative constitutional duty "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. Const. Art. I. § 8, Cl. 8. The judgment of the constitution is that free expression is enriched by protecting the creations of authors from exploitation by others, and the Copyright Act is the congressional implementation of that judgment. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101 et seq.; Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36, 59 S.Ct. 397, 400, 83 L.Ed. 470 (1939); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214, 74 S.Ct. 460, 471, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1954). The Copyright Act specifically authorizes a federal court to "grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright." 17 U.S.C.A. § 502(a). Preliminary injunctions are a common judicial response to the imminent infringement of an apparently valid copyright. E.g., Meredith Corp. v. Harper Row Publishers, Inc., 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Grossbardt, 428 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1970); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Sayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1962); Uneeda Doll Co., Inc. v. Regent Baly Products Corp., 355 F. Supp. 438, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Douglas International Corp. v. Baker, 335 F. Supp. 282, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The first amendment is not a license to trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual property. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 443 U.S. 562, 577 and n. 13, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 2848-2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965; Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 1978); Sid Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1169-1171 (9th Cir. 1977); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press, 17 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1180, 1192-1193 (1970). If the record demonstrated a substantial likelihood that the Cowboys Cheerleaders could have a valid copyright infringement claim against the defendants the district court was well within its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.
The Cowboys Cheerleaders poster is copyrightable matter. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(5). The defendants have never claimed that the Cowboys Cheerleaders copyright is invalid, and they have not pretended that their poster did not copy from the original Cowboys Cheerleaders poster. Viewing the two works in juxtaposition it is obvious that the Cowgirls poster was intended to imitate its predecessor, so it could derive parasitic value from it. The defendants' defense to the infringement claim is that the partial nudity of the women in their poster is a parody of the original, and thus protected under the doctrine of fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
Not all parodies and satires, however, are protected as fair use. Two celebrated examples of satire that fell short of fair use are contained in Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.Cal. 1955) aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43, 78 S.Ct. 667, 2 L.Ed.2d 583 (1958), and Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, supra, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978). In the Loew's case, comedian Jack Benny satirized the Metro-Goldwyn Mayer picture "Gaslight" in a burlesque television sketch entitled "Autolight." The court found that despite the social value of parody, Benny had exceeded his license in borrowing from the movie original and it upheld the claim of copyright infringement.
The Disney case involved the appropriation of 17 Walt Disney cartoon characters, including Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck, by an underground comic book series known as the "Air Pirates Funnies." The "Air Pirates" portrayed the Disney characters as members of a promiscuous, drug ingesting counterculture. 581 F.2d at 753. As described by one commentator, "Air Pirates" "placed several well-known Disney cartoon characters in incongruous settings where they engaged in activities clearly antithetical to the accepted Mickey Mouse world of scrubbed faces, bright smiles and happy endings." Note, Parody, Copyrights and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F.L.Rev. 564, 371 (1976).
The line between fair use and infringement is not always easy to divine. See Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2nd Cir. 1964); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.Cal. 1955). It may well be that if the parties had developed their proof instead of rushing from this most preliminary hearing to appeal the defendants' fair use defense might prevail. A preliminary injunction may issue, however, despite the existence of a plausible defense, as long as the movant demonstrates a substantial likelihood of success. Nothing beyond an unelaborated invocation of the term "parody" was ever put before the district court, and we cannot fault the court if it found the simple allusion to the concept of parody insufficient to shift the calculus of probabilities in the defendants' favor. Our appellate function is not to try this case in the first instance but to review the discretion of the district judge in light of what was put before him. Finding no abuse of discretion, the grant of the preliminary injunction is
Our holding that the district court was correct in determining that the plaintiffs enjoyed a substantial likelihood of success on the merits in no way intimates any view concerning the correct outcome of this litigation when it is fully tried. Since we have found that the district court's determination on the plaintiffs' copyright infringement claim was not an abuse of discretion, we pretermit any discussion of the plaintiffs' service mark and unfair competition claims.
AFFIRMED.
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