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Matter of MELJARAJO, (N.D.Ill. 1982)
Memorandum Opinion and Order — In re the Matter of Rosa Maria Meljarajo (No. 82 C 5815)
Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner Rosa Maria Meljarajo sought a writ of habeas corpus to prevent the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) from deporting her. An Immigration Judge found petitioner deportable under Section 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)) for entering the United States without inspection. An Order of Deportation was issued after petitioner failed to depart voluntarily by May 16, 1982. Petitioner waived her right to appeal the deportation hearing decision and filed the present petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition and dismissed it.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the district court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's habeas corpus petition challenging the deportation proceedings when petitioner claims constitutional (due process) defects but does not contest deportability.
- Whether petitioner's failure to exhaust available administrative remedies (e.g., to appeal the Immigration Judge's decision or seek a stay of deportation) precludes judicial review in the district court.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- Petitioner contended that her challenge rests on due process grounds and that she is not contesting her deportability; accordingly, she argued that habeas corpus is an appropriate vehicle for judicial review rather than the exclusive appellate-review route.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's specific legal arguments beyond citation of the statutory framework and authorities limiting district court jurisdiction.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 217, 84 S.Ct. 306, 11 L.Ed.2d 281 (1963) | Supports the proposition that district court jurisdiction under the relevant statute is limited and that exclusive jurisdiction to review final deportation orders is vested in the Courts of Appeals by statute. | The court relied on Foti to show that 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) confers exclusive appellate jurisdiction on the Courts of Appeals for review of final deportation orders, thereby limiting district court habeas jurisdiction. |
| United States ex rel. Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa. 1977) | Illustrates that habeas corpus is an appropriate procedure to review denial of discretionary relief from deportation where deportability itself is not at issue. | The court cited Parco for the limited proposition that habeas can be used when the sole issue is discretionary relief and deportability is not contested, distinguishing that scenario from challenges to the validity of deportation orders. |
| Daneshvar v. Chauvin, 644 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir. 1981) | Holds that constitutional challenges to deportation hearings are treated as challenges to the validity of the deportation order and therefore fall within appellate (Court of Appeals) jurisdiction. | The court cited Daneshvar to support its conclusion that petitioner's constitutional/due process claim is effectively a challenge to the deportation order and thus is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals. |
| Shodeke v. Attorney General, 391 F. Supp. 219 (D.D.C. 1975) | Same principle as Daneshvar: constitutional challenges to deportation hearings challenge the validity of deportation orders and belong in the appellate forum. | The court relied on Shodeke as additional authority that constitutional claims about deportation hearings must be pursued in the Courts of Appeals rather than by district court habeas. |
| Te Kuei Lia v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 483 F. Supp. 107 (S.D. Tex. 1980) | Holds that judicial review is not permitted where the alien has failed to exhaust administrative remedies. | The court used Te Kuei Lia to support the rule that failure to exhaust available administrative remedies precludes district court review. |
| Besaganahalli v. United States, 442 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. Pa. 1977) | Also stands for the proposition that a failure to exhaust administrative remedies bars review. | The court cited Besaganahalli to reinforce the conclusion that petitioner's failure to use administrative procedures prevents review in the district court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, grounded in the statutes and authorities cited in the opinion:
- Statutory framework: The court observed that Section 279 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (cited as 5 U.S.C. § 1329 in the opinion) confers district court jurisdiction over causes arising under Title 8, but that this jurisdiction is limited by Section 106(a) of the Act (8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)), which provides that the Courts of Appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to review final orders of deportation made under Section 242(b) (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)). The court cited Foti for this principle.
- Habeas exception limited: The court acknowledged that 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(9) creates an exception permitting habeas review by district courts for aliens held pursuant to deportation orders, and that habeas is an appropriate vehicle when the petition challenges discretionary relief rather than deportability itself (citing Parco).
- Characterization of petitioner's claim: The court addressed petitioner's contention that she was only raising due process (constitutional) objections and not contesting deportability, but explained that courts have treated constitutional challenges to deportation hearings as challenges to the validity of the deportation order. The court relied on Daneshvar and Shodeke to conclude that such constitutional claims fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals rather than within district court habeas jurisdiction.
- Failure to exhaust administrative remedies: The court further noted that 8 U.S.C. § 1105a proscribes review where the alien has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and it cited Te Kuei Lia and Besaganahalli for the proposition that failure to exhaust precludes judicial review. The opinion states that petitioner neither appealed the Immigration Judge's decision (pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 242.21) nor sought a stay of deportation (pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 243.4).
- Conclusion as to jurisdiction: Based on the characterization of the claim as a challenge to the validity of the deportation order and on petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the habeas petition.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The district court dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus for lack of jurisdiction. Petition dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that petitioner’s habeas petition in the district court was dismissed and the district court did not reach the merits of petitioner’s constitutional/due process claims. The opinion emphasizes two jurisdictional bars relied upon by the court: (1) constitutional challenges to deportation hearings are treated as challenges to the validity of deportation orders and therefore fall within the exclusive review jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals, and (2) the petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies (no appeal from the Immigration Judge and no stay sought) independently precluded district court review. The opinion does not announce any new precedent and does not resolve the merits of petitioner’s constitutional claims.
This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add information beyond what that opinion contains.
ASPEN, District Judge:
In this action, petitioner Rosa Maria Meljarajo seeks a writ of habeas corpus to prevent the Immigration and Naturalization Service from deporting her. Pursuant to Section 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2), petitioner was found by an Immigration Judge to be deportable for having entered the United States without inspection, and an Order of Deportation was issued when she failed to depart voluntarily by May 16, 1982. Petitioner waived her right to appeal the result of the deportation hearing, and now seeks relief before this Court. For the reasons set forth below, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider petitioner's request for relief.
Section 279 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, 5 U.S.C. § 1329, confers upon a district court jurisdiction over all causes arising under Title 8, United States Code. However, this jurisdiction is limited by Section 106(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (a), which confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Courts of Appeals to review final orders of deportation made against aliens pursuant to Section 242(b) of the Act, S U.S.C. § 1252(b). See Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 217, 84 S.Ct. 306, 11 L.Ed.2d 281 (1963).
As petitioner points out, section 106(a)(9), S U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(9), makes exception to the exclusive Court of Appeals jurisdiction by providing that any alien held pursuant to a deportation order may obtain judicial review by habeas corpus proceedings. Habeas corpus is an appropriate procedure to review the denial of discretionary relief from deportation where deportability itself is not in issue. United States ex rel. Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976, 978 n. 4 (E. D. Pa. 1977).
Petitioner contends that because she is challenging her deportation hearing on due process grounds and is not contesting her deportability, a habeas corpus proceeding is appropriate. Constitutional challenges to deportation hearings, however, have been held to be challenges to the validity of the deportation order itself and thus within the jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Daneshvar v. Chauvin, 644 F.2d 1248, 1250 (8th Cir. 1981); Shodeke v. Attorney General, 391 F. Supp. 219, 222 (D.D.C. 1975).
Moreover, S U.S.C. § 1105a proscribes that review by a court is not permitted where the alien has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Te Kuei Lia v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 483 F. Supp. 107, 108 (S.D.Tex. 1980); Besaganahalli v. United States, 442 F. Supp. 60, 61 (W.D.Pa. 1977). Petitioner in the instant case neither appealed the decision of the Immigration Judge (as she could have pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 242.21), nor filed for a stay of deportation pursuant to S C.F.R. 243.4. Thus, even if her challenge were appropriate for habeas review, her failure to exhaust administrative remedies would also preclude review by this Court.
Accordingly, this Court being without jurisdiction to consider the petition for writ of habeas corpus, the petition is therefore dismissed. It is so ordered.
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