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IN RE BRACKIN, (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1982)

United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Oct 29, 1982
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Factual and Procedural Background

Lawrence and Kathleen Brackin, the debtors, were issued a credit card by Philadelphia National Bank. Between June and November 1981, they made approximately eleven purchases and kept the account current through October 1981. From late November 1981 until early January 1982, they made nine additional purchases totaling $761.43. On December 29, 1981, they paid $34.00 on the account. On January 15, 1982, the debtors were evicted for owing $18,000 in back rent. They filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on January 26, 1982. The creditor filed a complaint on June 7, 1982, seeking to determine the nondischargeability of $727.43 owed on the credit card.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the $727.43 debt incurred on the debtors’ credit cards within two months prior to filing for bankruptcy is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) as obtained by false pretenses, false representation, or actual fraud.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Schnore, 13 B.R. 249 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wis. 1981) Elements required to prove nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A): materially false representation, intent to deceive, and creditor reliance. Used to explain the standard creditor must meet to establish nondischargeability.
In re Poteet, 12 B.R. 565 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Tex. 1981) Same as above: requirements for proving nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A). Referenced as part of the established legal framework for fraud under the Code.
In re Pitts, 10 B.R. 557 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla. 1981) Same as above: elements of fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A). Supports the court's explanation of the fraud standard.
Matter of Slutzky, 22 B.R. 270 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Mich.S.D. 1982) Frauds under § 523(a)(2)(A) require moral turpitude or intentional wrong; representations must be knowingly and fraudulently made. Used to emphasize the necessity of intentional fraud for nondischargeability.
In re Stewart, 7 B.R. 551, 554-55 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Ga. 1980) Guidelines for determining intent to deceive under § 523(a)(2)(A), including timing of charges, consultation with attorney, number and amount of charges, debtor's financial condition, and credit limit status. Applied as a framework to evaluate the debtors’ intent in this case.
In re Ciavarelli, 16 B.R. 369 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa. 1982) Held credit card debt nondischargeable where purchases were luxury items made shortly before filing bankruptcy, indicating intent to deceive. Distinguished from the instant case because the debtors’ purchases were necessities and timing/facts differed significantly.
In re Brashears, 12 B.R. 136 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Miss. 1981) Purchase of necessities shortly before filing bankruptcy did not demonstrate intent to deceive. Used to support the court’s conclusion that purchases here were necessities and not indicative of fraudulent intent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the elements required under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) to determine nondischargeability: a materially false representation, intent to deceive, and creditor reliance. It applied the six-factor test from In re Stewart to assess the debtors' intent, including the timing of charges relative to the bankruptcy filing, consultation with counsel, number and amount of charges, financial condition at the time, and whether charges exceeded the credit limit.

The court found that the debtors did not intend to deceive. The wife testified that although they were in financial difficulty, recovery was possible, and they had not considered bankruptcy until after eviction. No charges were made after eviction, and no attorney was consulted before the charges. The purchases were mostly necessities rather than luxuries, contrasting with cases where nondischargeability was found. Although the debtors exceeded their credit limit, the court did not find this sufficient to prove intent to deceive.

The court distinguished this case from In re Ciavarelli, where the debtor made luxury purchases shortly before filing and after a significant salary reduction, which indicated fraudulent intent. Here, the purchases were made over a longer period and were primarily necessary items. The court emphasized the heavy burden on creditors to prove fraud and concluded the creditor failed to meet that burden.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the $727.43 credit card debt is dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

The direct effect is that the debtors are relieved of this debt through their Chapter 7 discharge. The opinion does not establish new precedent but underscores the necessity of proving actual intent to deceive to render credit card debts nondischargeable under the Code.

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OPINION

EMIL F. GOLDHABER, Bankruptcy Judge:

The issue before us is whether a debt of $727.43 incurred by the debtors through the use of their credit cards within the two months preceding the filing of their petition for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code ("the Code") is nondischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Code. We conclude, under the circumstances of this case, that the aforesaid debt is dischargeable.

The facts of the instant case are as follows: Lawrence and Kathleen Brackin ("the debtors") were issued a credit card by the Philadelphia National Bank ("the creditor"). Between June and November of 1981, the debtors made approximately eleven (11) purchases on their charge account and the account was paid up to date as of the end of October of 1981. From the end of November of 1981 until the beginning of January of 1982, the debtors made nine (9) purchases on their account totalling $761.43. On December 29, 1981 the debtors paid $34.00 on their account. On January 15, 1982, the debtors were evicted by their landlord because they owed $18,000.00 in back rent. Subsequent to the eviction by their landlord, the debtors, on January 26, 1982, filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Code. On June 7, 1982, the creditor subsequently filed the instant complaint to determine the nondischargeability of the $727.43 owed to it.

This opinion constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Rule 752 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Code provides:

(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt —
(2) for obtaining money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinance of credit, by —
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)

The courts have interpreted that section to require the creditor to prove that: (1) the debtor made a materially false representation; (2) with the intent to deceive; and (3) the creditor relied on that false representation. See, e.g., In re Schnore, 13 B.R. 249 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wis. 1981); In re Poteet, 12 B.R. 565 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Tex. 1981); In re Pitts, 10 B.R. 557 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla. 1981). Furthermore, the frauds involved in section 523(a)(2)(A) are those which in fact involve moral turpitude or intentional wrong and it must affirmatively appear that such representations were knowingly and fraudulently made. Matter of Slutzky, 22 B.R. 270 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Mich.S.D. 1982); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 523.08(4) at 523-39 (15th ed. 1982).

One court has proposed the following guidelines when determining whether the requisite intention to deceive exists within the meaning of section 523(a)(2)(A):

Intention [to deceive] of course is a very subjective thing and in most instances can only be shown circumstantially. Nonetheless, if the appropriate factors are shown the Court, this intention may be established. Factors for which to look are:
1. the length of time between the charges made and the filing of bankruptcy;
2. whether or not an attorney has been consulted concerning the filing of bankruptcy before the charges were made;

3. the number of charges made;

4. the amount of the charges;

5. the financial condition of the debtor at the time the charges are made; and
6. whether the charges were above the credit limit of the account.
In re Stewart, 7 B.R. 551, 554-55 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Ga. 1980) (footnote omitted).

In the case at bar, we conclude that an analysis of all of the aforesaid factors indicate that the debtors did not use their credit cards with the intention of deceiving the creditor.

As to the financial condition of the debtors at the time the purchases in question were made, the wife-debtor testified that she and her husband were in financial difficulty but that it was possible, given the nature of the mushroom industry, to pull out of a financial slump within a fairly short period of time. (N.T. 7/19/82 at 8, 16, 32). Furthermore, there is no evidence that the debtors had consulted an attorney regarding the filing of a petition seeking relief before the charges in question were made. To the contrary, the wife-debtor testified that she and her husband had not considered filing a petition until after their landlord evicted them for the nonpayment of back rent on January 15, 1982 (N.T. 7/19/82 at 9, 31). No charges were made by the debtor after January 15, 1982.

The creditor's reliance in the instant case on our decision in In re Ciavarelli, 16 B.R. 369 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa. 1982) is misplaced. Ciavarelli is distinguishable from the facts in the present case in that the purchases in the Ciavarelli case were made within two weeks of the date when the debtor's husband's salary was drastically cut and within three weeks of the date the debtor filed a petition for relief. Furthermore, the items purchased by the debtor in Ciavarelli were, for the most part, luxuries such as candy and camera equipment.

See, e.g., In re Vegh, 14 B.R. 345 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla. 1981) (held nondischargeable a credit card debt of $34,573.18 incurred by unemployed debtor within 1 month of filing for relief); In re Schnore, 13 B.R. 249 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wis. 1981) (held nondischargeable credit card debt of $3,467.54 incurred in a two month shopping spree by debtor); In re Poteet, 12 B.R. 565 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Tex. 1981) (held nondischargeable credit card debt of $6,653.65 incurred by debtors within 1 1/2 months of filing for relief); In re Pitts, 10 B.R. 557 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla. 1981) (held nondischargeable credit card debt of $3,808.14 incurred after debtor lost his job and within 2 months of filing for relief); In re Wright, 8 B.R. 625 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio 1981) (held nondischargeable credit card debt of $1,509.17 incurred within two weeks of date debtor's husband lost his job and within 3 months of filing for relief); In re Schartner, 7 B.R. 885 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 1980) (held nondischargeable credit card debt of $2,720.39 incurred by debtor in a 4 week period).

Our conclusion that the debtors did not intend to deceive the creditor is further supported by a consideration of the number of purchases, the amount of those purchases and the types of purchases made by the debtors. We fail to see, keeping in mind the heavy burden the creditor carries when seeking a determination of nondischargeability on the ground that money or credit was obtained by false representation or actual fraud, how the purchase of approximately nine (9) items during the Christmas season lends itself to the inescapable conclusion that the debtors made these purchases without intending to pay for them and in contemplation of filing a petition for relief under the Code. Furthermore, quite unlike the situation in Ciavarelli, supra, the articles purchased in the case sub judice were, for the most part, necessities. Finally, the fact that the debtors' December 31, 1981 statement, which was the last finance statement received by the debtors prior to the filing of their petition, reflected that the debtors had $256.00 still available to them on their account and the fact that the debtors exceeded that credit limit by $465.41 does not give rise to a finding of intent to deceive on the debtors' part within the meaning of section 523(a)(2)(A). We cannot, from the evidence present before us, conclude that the debtors knew, at the time they made the purchases in question, that they would be unable to pay for them and, in fact, intended not to pay for them but intended to file a petition for relief instead. Consequently, we conclude that the debt of $727.43 owed to the creditor is dischargeable.

The purchases in question are as follows:

11/27/81 — $ 27.00 (shoes) 12/20/81 — $ 32.99 (blue jeans) 12/22/81 — $ 42.94 (mens wear) 12/28/81 — $140.65 (mens wear) 12/30/81 — $ 57.40 (shoes) 12/31/81 — $ 44.95 (winter jacket) 12/31/81 — $ 13.00 ( ? ) 1/4/82 — $159.60 (boots and winter vest) 1/5/82 — $270.00 (airplane ticket)
See In re Brashears, 12 B.R. 136 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Miss. 1981) (bankruptcy court held that purchase of $115.77 worth of necessities in the month prior to filing for relief did not give rise to a finding of intent to deceive on the debtor's part).