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STATE v. LAFFERTY
State of Connecticut v. Alexander Lafferty (10916) — Supreme Court of Connecticut — March 1, 1983 (Per Curiam)
Factual and Procedural Background
The defendant was charged by information with two counts of larceny in the first degree for allegedly embezzling approximately $309,000 from his employer. At trial the defendant presented psychiatric evidence that, at the time of the conduct, he lacked the ability to conform his conduct to the law because of a mental defect described as pathological or compulsive gambling. The trial court found the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to General Statutes §53a-13 and ordered his temporary confinement in a state mental hospital under General Statutes §53a-47(a)(1) for examination to determine whether his release would constitute a danger to himself or others.
Following the preparation of evaluation reports under §53a-47, the court held a hearing under §53a-47(a)(4) at which the state called Hans Langhammer, a staff psychiatrist, and the defendant called Marvin Steinberg, a psychologist. In an oral decision, the trial court stated that there was no danger as to physical harm but that there was "possibly" a danger to property, and it ordered the defendant's release.
The state, having obtained permission to appeal under General Statutes §54-96, appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The state contended that the trial court erred by construing the statutory phrase "a danger to himself or others" to refer only to physical danger and not to danger to property; the state also argued that the trial court had found the defendant to be a danger to property and that such a danger was included within the statute's meaning. The defendant responded that the trial court found only a possible danger to property and that, regardless, the statute is limited to physical danger.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the phrase "a danger to himself or others" in General Statutes §53a-47(a)(4) includes danger to property (i.e., whether a danger to property falls within the statute's meaning).
- Whether the trial court's oral decision constituted an adequate factual finding on whether the defendant was a danger to property, or whether further articulation of the trial court's findings is required.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (State's) Arguments
- The trial court erred by interpreting "a danger to himself or others" to mean only physical danger and not danger to property.
- The trial court found the defendant to be a danger to property and such a danger is included within the meaning of "a danger to himself or others" in the statute.
Appellee's (Defendant's) Arguments
- The trial court found only that the defendant was "possibly" a danger to property.
- Even if the defendant were a danger to property, the statute is limited to physical danger and his release was proper under the statute.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State v. McCarthy, 167 Conn. 472, 477, 356 A.2d 165 (1975) | Support for the proposition that supervision of a case on appeal rests with the Supreme Court (citing Practice Book authority). | Used to justify the Supreme Court's supervisory role over appealed cases and to support remanding for further action by the trial court. |
| State v. Ostroski, 184 Conn. 455, 460, 440 A.2d 166 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 878, 103 S.Ct. 173, 74 L.Ed.2d 142 (1982) | Authority for the court's practice of remanding a case for a further articulation of the trial court's decision "where necessary to the proper disposition of the cause." | Relied upon to support remanding the case to the trial court for clarification of whether the defendant was a danger to property. |
| Kaplan v. Kaplan, 185 Conn. 42, 46, 440 A.2d 252 (1981) | Further support for the principle that the appellate court may remand for additional findings or articulation when necessary. | Citied as part of the authority for remanding the case for further factual articulation by the trial court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the trial court's oral decision and found ambiguity in its statements. The trial court said that Dr. Langhammer indicated there was no danger of physical harm but that there was "possibly" a danger as to property. The Supreme Court observed it was unclear whether the trial court was merely reciting the psychiatrist's testimony or actually making an independent factual finding that the defendant was a danger to property. The use of the word "possibly" further contributed to the uncertainty.
The Supreme Court emphasized that the question whether the defendant was a danger to property is a question of fact for the trial court to determine. Because the trial court's oral disposition did not clearly articulate a factual finding on that point, the Supreme Court concluded that it could not properly review the claims on appeal. The court invoked its supervisory authority over appeals (citing Practice Book and precedent) and held that, when necessary for proper disposition of the cause, it may remand a case for a further articulation of the trial court's decision.
Holding and Implications
REMANDED WITH DIRECTION
Holding: The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for a further articulation of whether the defendant was a danger to property, because the trial court's oral decision was ambiguous as to whether it made a factual finding or was merely recounting testimony.
Implications: The direct consequence is that the trial court must clarify its factual finding regarding danger to property before the appellate court can address the statutory interpretation issue raised by the state. The opinion does not announce a new rule resolving whether "a danger to himself or others" includes danger to property; instead, it directs further factual articulation and relies on established supervisory authority to permit a remand. No broader legal change or precedent was established in this decision beyond the remand for clarification.
PER CURIAM.
The defendant was charged by information with two counts of larceny in the first degree for allegedly embezzling approximately $309,000 from his employer. At trial, the defendant presented evidence that at the time of the commission of the crimes with which he was charged he was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law as the result of a mental defect known as pathological or compulsive gambling. On the basis of the psychiatric testimony presented, the trial court found the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to General Statutes 53a-13. Thereafter, the defendant was ordered committed to a state mental hospital under General Statutes 53a-47 (a)(1) to determine whether "his release [from custody] would constitute a danger to himself or others." General Statutes 53a-47 (a)(3). At a subsequent hearing under 53a-47 (a)(4), the trial court heard the testimony of Hans Langhammer, a staff psychiatrist at Norwich State Hospital called by the state, and Marvin Steinberg, a psychologist called by the defendant. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court in an oral decision found that the defendant did not constitute a danger to himself or others, and it ordered his release.
General Statutes 53a-13 then provided, in relevant part: "In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant, at the time of the proscribed conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. . . ."
"[General Statutes] Sec. 53a-47 ACQUITTAL ON GROUNDS OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT. CONFINEMENT AND EXAMINATION. RELEASE. (a) . . . (1) When any person charged with an offense is acquitted OR the grounds of mental disease or defect, . the court shall order such person to be temporarily confined in any of the state hospitals for mental illness for a reasonable time, not to exceed ninety days, for an examination to determine his mental condition, except that, if the court can determine, on the basis of the evidence already before it, that such person is not mentally ill to the extent that his release would constitute a danger to himself or others, the court may order his immediate release, either unconditionally or conditionally pursuant to subdivision (2) of subsection (e). (2) The person to be examined shall be informed that, in addition to the examination provided for in subdivision (1), he has a right to be examined during such confinement by a psychiatrist of his own choice. (3) Within sixty days of the confinement pursuant to subdivision (1), the superintendent of such hospital and the retained psychiatrist, if any, shall file reports with the court setting forth their findings and conclusions as to whether such person is mentally ill to the extent that his release would constitute a danger to himself or others. Copies of such reports shall be delivered to the states attorney or prosecutor and to counsel for such person. (4) Upon receipt of such reports, the court shall promptly schedule a hearing. If the court determines that the preponderance of the evidence at the hearing establishes that such person is mentally ill to the extent that his release would constitute a danger to himself or others, the court shall confine such person in a suitable hospital or other treatment facility. . . ."
The state, after obtaining the permission of the trial court pursuant to 54-96 of the General Statutes, appealed to this court claiming that the trial court erred by interpreting the phrase "a danger to himself or others" in 53a-47 (a)(4) to mean only a physical danger, and not a danger to property. The state argues that the trial court found the defendant to be a danger to property and that such a danger is included within the meaning of "a danger to himself and others" in the statute. The defendant responds that the court found only that the defendant was "possibly" a danger to property, but that even if he were so, he was nonetheless properly released because the statute is limited to physical danger.
In its oral decision, the court stated: "[A]s this court understands the testimony, I believe Dr. Langhammer was very precise in this, he indicated that there was no danger as far as physical harm was concerned. There was a danger as far as property was concerned possibly by the defendant's action in this matter." (Emphasis added.) It is unclear Whether the trial court was merely recapitulating the psychiatrist's testimony or whether it was making a finding of fact. Also, the use of the word "possibly" regarding danger to property adds to the ambiguity of the court's oral decision. Whether the defendant was a danger to property is a question of fact which must be determined before we may properly review the claims made in this appeal. It is the function of the trial court, not this court, to find facts. It is therefore necessary for us to remand this case for a further articulation of the trial court's decision on whether the defendant was a danger to property. "The supervision of a case on appeal is in the Supreme Court. Practice Book 3096; State v. McCarthy, 167 Conn. 472, 477, 356 A.2d 165 (1975). Where `necessary to the proper disposition of the cause,' this court may `remand the case for a further articulation of the trial court's decision' Practice Book 3060D . . . State v. Ostroski, 184 Conn. 455, 460, 440 A.2d 166 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 878, 103 S.Ct. 173, 74 L.Ed.2d 142 (1982); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 185 Conn. 42, 46, 440 A.2d 252 (1981).
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