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PEOPLE v. CRAWFORD
People v. Crawford, Docket No. 63530 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1983)
Factual and Procedural Background
Defendant Ronald Crawford was convicted of two counts of assault with intent to commit murder (MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278), one count of carrying a concealed weapon (MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424), and one count of felony-firearm (MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2)). Sentences imposed included two life terms for the assault convictions, three to five years for carrying a concealed weapon, and the mandatory consecutive two-year term for felony-firearm. The convictions arose from a shoot-out at the Grand Rapids Hall of Justice on January 9, 1981, during which two police officers were shot by defendant as he attempted to leave the courthouse when confronted by an officer executing an outstanding arrest warrant. On appeal, multiple issues were raised; the court identified one instructional issue as meriting discussion and requiring reversal of the assault convictions. The court affirmed the carrying-concealed-weapon conviction, vacated the felony-firearm conviction, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial court's jury instruction that allowed conviction for assault with intent to commit murder upon either (a) proof that the defendant intended to kill or (b) proof that the defendant consciously created a very high degree of risk of death with knowledge of the probable consequences, was legally sufficient given Supreme Court authority requiring actual intent to kill.
- Whether the defendant's felony-firearm conviction should be vacated on the authority of People v Carter, 96 Mich. App. 694; 293 N.W.2d 681 (1980), lv den 410 Mich. 872 (1980).
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| People v Scott, 6 Mich. 287 (1859) | The Supreme Court authority that actual intent to kill must be proven to support a conviction of assault with intent to commit murder. | Used collectively with other cited Supreme Court authorities to establish that the jury must be instructed that actual intent to kill is required; supported reversal of the assault convictions because the instruction permitted conviction on an alternative theory inconsistent with these precedents. |
| Maher v People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862) | Same principle: requirement of actual intent to kill for assault with intent to commit murder. | Applied with other Supreme Court cases to conclude that the trial instruction was legally insufficient and required reversal. |
| Roberts v People, 19 Mich. 401 (1870) | Same principle: requirement of actual intent to kill for assault with intent to commit murder. | Relied upon as part of the Supreme Court authority demonstrating the necessity of proving actual intent; supported reversal of assault convictions. |
| People v Ochotski, 115 Mich. 601; 73 N.W. 889 (1898) | See also authority supporting the rule that actual intent to kill is required. | Referenced to reinforce the conclusion that the jury must be instructed on actual intent to kill. |
| Wilson v People, 24 Mich. 410 (1872) | See also authority supporting the rule that actual intent to kill is required. | Referenced to reinforce the conclusion that the jury must be instructed on actual intent to kill. |
| People v Carter, 96 Mich. App. 694; 293 N.W.2d 681 (1980), lv den 410 Mich. 872 (1980) | Authority relied upon by the panel to address the status of felony-firearm convictions in the circumstances presented. | Applied to vacate defendant's felony-firearm conviction. |
| People v Ross, 410 Mich. 864 (1980) | Referenced as a pending request for review concerning the issue of the intent element of assault with intent to murder. | Not applied; noted as pending before the Supreme Court in connection with the broader issue of the intent element and stating that review was outstanding at the time of the opinion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the jury instruction given at trial, which told jurors they could convict on the assault charges if they found either (1) the defendant "intended to murder" the officers or (2) the defendant "consciously created a very high degree of risk of death with knowledge of the probable consequences of his act" under circumstances not justifying or excusing the conduct. The panel observed that this instruction authorized conviction based on an objective or implied-danger standard as an alternative to proof of an actual intent to kill.
The court then identified controlling Supreme Court authority holding that actual intent to kill must be proven to sustain a conviction for assault with intent to commit murder (citing People v Scott; Maher v People; Roberts v People; and related cases). Because the jury instruction allowed conviction without requiring a finding of actual intent to kill, the instruction was incorrect on an essential element of the offense. The court also noted that the defendant's intent was the sole disputed issue at trial.
Given the instructional error on an essential element and the centrality of intent to the dispute, the court concluded that reversal of the assault-with-intent convictions was required and remanded for a new trial on those charges. The opinion further observed that the challenged instruction had been taken from the standard jury instruction in effect at the time and that the instruction had since been amended to align with Supreme Court authority.
Separately, relying on People v Carter, the court vacated the felony-firearm conviction. The carrying-concealed-weapon conviction was affirmed. The court also directed that the issue of nonproduction of alleged res gestae witnesses, raised by defendant in a motion to remand, be resolved by the lower court on remand.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Specifically:
- Assault with intent to commit murder convictions: Reversed and remanded for a new trial on the assault charges because the jury was improperly instructed regarding the required element of actual intent to kill.
- Felony-firearm conviction: Vacated on the authority of People v Carter, 96 Mich. App. 694; 293 N.W.2d 681 (1980), lv den 410 Mich. 872 (1980).
- Carrying a concealed weapon conviction: Affirmed.
Implications: The direct consequences are return of the assault counts for retrial and vacatur of the felony-firearm conviction; the concealed-weapon conviction stands. The opinion notes that the standard jury instruction used at trial has since been amended to conform with Supreme Court authority. The opinion does not purport to establish a new precedent beyond applying existing Supreme Court authority and People v Carter.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Ronald Crawford, was convicted of two counts of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278, one count of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424, and one count of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). He was sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment on the assault convictions, three to five years on the carrying a concealed weapon conviction, and the mandatory consecutive two-year term on the felony-firearm conviction.
Defendant's convictions arose out of a shoot-out at the Grand Rapids Hall of Justice on January 9, 1981. Two police officers were shot by defendant as he tried to leave the courthouse when confronted by an officer attempting to execute an outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest.
Of the several issues raised by defendant on appeal, one merits discussion and requires reversal of his convictions of assault with intent to commit murder.
Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court instructed the jury that, to support convictions on the assault charges, they were to find that at the time of the assaults, defendant "intended to murder" the police officers. The court further instructed:
"Murder is the killing of one person by another with malice. Malice is a term with special meaning in the law. Malice means that the defendant intended to kill or that he consciously created a very high degree of risk of death with knowledge of the probable consequences of his act and that he did so under circumstances which did not justify, excuse or mitigate the crime."
Thus, the jury was authorized to convict defendant of assault with intent to commit murder upon finding either that he intended to kill the officers or that he intended consciously to create a very high degree of risk of death with knowledge of the probable consequences of his acts.
The Supreme Court has held, however, that actual intent to kill must be proven to support a conviction of assault with intent to commit murder. People v Scott, 6 Mich. 287 (1859); Maher v People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862); Roberts v People, 19 Mich. 401 (1870). See also People v Ochotski, 115 Mich. 601; 73 N.W. 889 (1898), and Wilson v People, 24 Mich. 410 (1872).
The instruction given in this case was taken from the standard jury instruction in effect at the time of defendant's trial. The instruction has since been amended to accord with Supreme Court authority. See II Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions, 17-23 to 17-26. CJI 17:2:01. Pending currently before the Supreme Court is a request for review in a case wherein the issue of the intent element of assault with intent to murder is raised. People v Ross, 410 Mich. 864 (1980).
Because the jury was not properly instructed on an essential element of assault with intent to commit murder and because defendant's intent was the sole disputed issue, we reverse defendant's assault convictions and remand for a new trial on the assault charges.
On the authority of People v Carter, 96 Mich. App. 694; 293 N.W.2d 681 (1980), lv den 410 Mich. 872 (1980), we vacate defendant's felony-firearm conviction. His conviction of carrying a concealed weapon is affirmed.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The issue of nonproduction of alleged res gestae witnesses, raised by defendant in his motion to remand, shall be resolved in the lower court on remand.
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