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PEOPLE v. FRAZIER
People v. Frazier, Michigan Court of Appeals, Docket No. 66834 (Dec. 18, 1984) — Opinion Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
Defendant was convicted by a jury of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and sentenced to 15 to 30 years' imprisonment. He appealed as of right.
The underlying events occurred on February 10, 1982, when defendant and another person were arrested in connection with a clothing-store robbery in Detroit during which the store security guard was shot and killed. Defendant was arrested approximately 6:00 p.m. on February 10, 1982. On the morning of February 11 he was taken to a hospital for treatment of a hand injury and returned to the station house that evening. Arraignment occurred the morning of February 12, 1982.
At a Walker hearing, the admissibility of a custodial statement made by defendant was challenged. The record showed that during the night of February 11 defendant initiated a conversation with a Detroit Fire Department officer who was present at the station house; defendant indicated a willingness to talk about the robbery. Defendant was then taken to an interview room, advised of his constitutional rights, and gave an inculpatory statement to a police officer. When the officer asked him to put the statement in writing, defendant requested an attorney or his sister. An attorney present at the station house was brought in, told defendant she could not represent him and advised him to remain silent until arraignment. Defendant then asked for his sister, who arrived and entered the interview room. With the officer's aid and in the presence of his sister, defendant reduced his statement to writing; no further request for counsel was made and no further attempt to procure counsel was undertaken.
At trial evidence showed two men committed the robbery, disarming and fatally shooting the guard. A cashier identified the co-defendant Michael Anthony Wicks as the shooter; no witness identified defendant as a perpetrator. Defendant and Wicks were arrested near the store soon after the robbery; the guard's handgun was found in a nearby snowbank. The content of defendant's written statement was that he and Wicks entered to buy clothing, Wicks decided to rob the store, they disarmed the guard, Wicks took the gun, defendant took money from the register and ran out, he heard two shots outside, and put the handgun in his pocket.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the statement attributed to defendant was properly admitted into evidence (i.e., whether the statement was voluntary and admissible).
- Whether defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda and whether his request for counsel required cessation of questioning.
- Whether defendant's alleged reaction to penicillin rendered his statement involuntary or the product of an unclear mind.
- Whether the delay in arraignment was an improper tool used by police to extract a confession.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- That the interrogation and the obtaining of his statement violated his constitutional rights and should have been terminated once he requested an attorney.
- That his capacity to make a voluntary statement was impaired by an allergic reaction to penicillin administered at the hospital.
- That the delay in arraignment was used to extract the confession and therefore rendered the statement involuntary.
Record Evidence and Prosecution Position (as reflected in the opinion)
- The record shows defendant initiated the conversation with a nonpolice officer at the station house, then spoke to police and was advised of his rights prior to making the inculpatory statement.
- The request for an attorney occurred when police sought to have defendant put the statement into writing; the attorney consulted did not discuss facts or represent defendant and advised him to remain silent until arraignment; defendant then asked for his sister, who was present when he reduced the statement to writing.
- The prosecution presented evidence that there was no police overreaching, that defendant made the statement voluntarily, and that the delay in arraignment was explained by defendant's hospital treatment and thus was not unnecessary.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| People v. Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich. 331; 132 N.W.2d 87 (1965) | Referenced as the type of suppression hearing conducted (a Walker hearing) regarding admissibility of statements. | The hearing at which the voluntariness and admissibility of the statement were tested was identified as a Walker hearing. |
| People v. Robinson, 386 Mich. 551; 194 N.W.2d 709 (1972) | Standard of review for suppression rulings—examine whole record and independently determine voluntariness. | The court applied Robinson's standard in independently reviewing the record and concluding the statement was voluntary. |
| People v. Goss, 89 Mich. App. 598; 280 N.W.2d 608 (1979) | Deference standard—trial judge's ruling will be sustained unless appellate court is left with a definite and firm belief that a mistake was made. | The court stated it would sustain the trial judge's ruling unless it had a definite and firm belief of error, and concluded no such error existed. |
| Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) | Authoritative on police interrogation and the right to counsel after invocation. | The court distinguished Edwards, finding the present facts did not involve police-initiated custodial interrogation after a clear request for counsel. |
| People v. Paintman, 412 Mich. 518; 315 N.W.2d 418 (1982) | Discussion of custodial interrogation and Miranda principles; quoted for definition of custodial interrogation. | The court quoted Paintman (and Miranda) to define custodial interrogation and concluded defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation within that meaning. |
| Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | Definition of custodial interrogation and Miranda requirements. | The court cited Miranda's definition (via Paintman) and held the questioning here did not constitute custodial interrogation as contemplated by Miranda. |
| People ex rel Wayne Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge, 79 Mich. App. 495; 261 N.W.2d 63 (1977), lv den 402 Mich. 879 (1978), cert den 436 U.S. 958 (1978) | Expression that a defendant wants an attorney—even if ambiguous—requires cessation of police interrogation. | The court distinguished the present facts from ex rel Wayne Prosecutor, finding the circumstances here different and not requiring cessation under that authority. |
| People v. Plyler, 86 Mich. App. 272; 272 N.W.2d 623 (1978) | Support for the rule that a request for counsel requires cessation of interrogation. | The court noted Plyler but found its facts distinguishable from those in the present case. |
| People v. Giuchici, 118 Mich. App. 252; 324 N.W.2d 593 (1982) | Explains situations where defendants either specifically requested counsel or manifested desire for counsel; also quoted on impingement on subject's ability to cut off interview. | The court cited Giuchici to discuss how requests for counsel have been treated and to support its finding that no police impingement occurred here. |
| Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1979) | Quoted regarding whether police impinged on the subject's continuing option to terminate the interview. | The court used the Nash quotation (via Giuchici) to conclude the officer did not impinge on defendant's option to end the interview. |
| People v. Anglin, 111 Mich. App. 268; 314 N.W.2d 581 (1982) | Deference to the trial judge's factual determinations on voluntariness and mental state. | The court deferred to the trial judge's factual finding that defendant's mental state was not impaired by penicillin, citing Anglin for deference. |
| People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410; 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960) | Requirement that police bring a prisoner before a magistrate for arraignment without unnecessary delay. | The court cited Hamilton in discussing delay in arraignment and concluded the delay here was not unnecessary given the hospital treatment. |
| People v. Jackson, 114 Mich. App. 649; 319 N.W.2d 613 (1982) | Also cited concerning delays in arraignment and whether delays are used to extract confessions. | The court relied on Jackson for the proposition that the record must show unnecessary delay intended to extract a confession and found no such showing here. |
| People v. Wicks, Docket No. 66835 (Nov. 2, 1983) (unpublished) | Record notation of co-defendant's conviction and appellate disposition. | The court noted Wicks—tried jointly with defendant—was convicted and that this Court affirmed his conviction in an unpublished opinion; used for factual context regarding the joint arrest and separate conviction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began with the applicable standard of review for suppression rulings: it must examine the whole record and independently determine whether statements were voluntarily made (citing People v. Robinson). The trial judge's factual findings are to be sustained unless the appellate court is left with a definite and firm belief that a mistake has been made (citing People v. Goss).
Applying those standards, the court examined the chronology and the circumstances surrounding the statement. It emphasized that defendant initiated the conversation with a nonpolice officer and indicated a willingness to talk about the robbery; defendant was then taken to an interview room, advised of his constitutional rights, and made the inculpatory statement prior to his request for counsel or for his sister to be present.
The court analyzed the effect of defendant's subsequent request for counsel. It distinguished the present facts from cases requiring cessation of interrogation when a defendant requests counsel (for example, Edwards v. Arizona and Michigan cases such as People ex rel Wayne Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge and People v. Plyler). The court found that here the request for counsel occurred when police asked defendant to put the statement in writing and that the attorney who was brought in did not discuss the facts or undertake representation but advised defendant to remain silent until arraignment. Defendant then requested his sister and, in her presence, reduced the statement to writing. The court concluded that, under these facts, defendant was not subjected to "custodial interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda, and the police did not overreach or impinge on his ability to terminate the interview (citing People v. Paintman, Giuchici, and Nash v. Estelle).
On the medical-capacity contention, the court noted conflicting testimony at the Walker hearing concerning the effects of penicillin: defendant testified it affected him; his girlfriend testified it caused only a skin rash. The court deferred to the trial judge's factual determination that defendant's statement was not the product of an impaired mind, citing People v. Anglin for the principle of deference to trial-court findings.
Concerning the delay in arraignment, the court recited the statutory requirement that a prisoner be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay (MCL 764.26; MSA 28.885) and reviewed the record showing defendant's hospital transfer on the morning after arrest and arraignment the following morning. The court concluded the delay was not unnecessary and there was no evidence the interval was used to extract a confession (citing People v. Hamilton and People v. Jackson).
After reviewing those points, the court found the circumstances surrounding the confession demonstrated that defendant voluntarily made the inculpatory statement and that none of the defendant's objections required suppression of the statement.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The court held that the statement attributed to defendant was properly admitted because it was voluntarily made, defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda under the facts of this case, the alleged effect of penicillin did not render the statement involuntary, and the delay in arraignment was not unnecessary.
Implications:
- The direct effect: defendant's conviction and sentence were affirmed; the challenged statement remained admissible at trial.
- The opinion does not purport to establish a new rule of law; rather, it applies existing Michigan and federal precedents (as cited) to the particular facts and distinguishes holdings from cases such as Edwards and related Michigan authorities where a defendant's invocation of counsel was treated as requiring termination of interrogation.
Note: This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in the opinion text.
WAHLS, J.
Defendant was found guilty by a jury of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797. The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 to 30 years imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right.
Defendant raises several arguments on appeal. The issue we find sufficiently meritorious to warrant discussion concerns whether a statement attributed to defendant was properly admitted into evidence at trial.
The record reveals that defendant was arrested with another person on February 10, 1982, and charged with first-degree murder and armed robbery in connection with the robbery of a clothing store in Detroit the same day. The security guard was shot and killed. A Walker hearing was conducted in which defendant challenged the admissibility of a statement which he made to police while in custody.
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich. 331; 132 N.W.2d 87 (1965).
The testimony at the Walker hearing revealed that defendant was taken into custody at approximately 6:00 p.m. on February 10, 1982. On the morning of February 11, 1982, defendant was taken to a hospital for treatment of a hand injury. Defendant returned to the station house that evening. Arraignment was conducted on the morning of February 12, 1982.
During the night of February 11, 1982, defendant initiated a conversation with an officer of the Detroit Fire Department, who was in the station house to interview a witness in an arson case. The defendant expressed a willingness to talk about the robbery. This information was conveyed to the police officer investigating the robbery. The defendant was taken to an interview room and informed of his constitutional rights. Defendant then gave a statement to the police officer which implicated his involvement in the robbery and the shooting.
The police officer asked the defendant to put the statement in writing. The defendant then requested that an attorney or his sister be present. The police officer brought in an attorney who was at the station house on line-up duty. The attorney did not discuss the facts of the case with defendant. Rather, she informed defendant that she could not represent him and advised defendant to keep his mouth shut until the arraignment, when an attorney would be appointed. Defendant then requested that his sister be present. Defendant's sister arrived at the station house and entered the interview room. Defendant then reduced the statement to written form with the aid of the police officer. Defendant did not request an attorney and no further attempt was made to procure an attorney for defendant.
The testimony at the Walker hearing also included defendant's testimony that his actions on that evening were affected by the drug penicillin, which was given to him at the hospital. However, defendant's girl friend testified that penicillin caused only a skin rash. At the conclusion of the testimony, defendant argued that the interrogation had been conducted in derogation of his constitutional rights. Defendant argued that, once he requested that he wanted an attorney present, all interrogation should have ended.
The trial judge rejected this argument. The judge held that there was no interrogation because defendant initiated the conversation with the police. The trial judge further reasoned that, in light of the circumstances of defendant's request for either an attorney or his sister, the police were not required to terminate their discussion with defendant prior to reducing his statement to writing.
At the trial, the testimony established that two men perpetrated the robbery of the clothing store. During the robbery, the men disarmed the guard and shot him. The cashier of the store identified the person arrested with defendant, Michael Anthony Wicks, as the one who shot the guard. None of the witnesses were able to identify defendant as one of the robbers. The testimony also established that defendant and Wicks were arrested near the store soon after the robbery and the security guard's handgun was found in a nearby snowbank.
Wicks, who was jointly tried with defendant, was convicted of second-degree murder, armed robbery, assault with intent to rob armed and felony firearm. This Court affirmed his conviction in an unpublished opinion. People v Wicks, Docket No. 66835, decided November 2, 1983.
The substance of defendant's statement is as follows. Defendant entered the store with Wicks to buy clothing. Once inside, Wicks told him that he intended to rob the store. Defendant agreed and together they disarmed the guard. Wicks took the guard's gun. Defendant took the money from the register and ran out of the store. Once outside, defendant heard two shots fired. As both men ran from the scene, defendant placed the handgun in his pocket because his coat was bigger.
The standard of review for suppression rulings requires this Court to examine the whole record and independently determine whether the defendant voluntarily made the statements admitted at trial. People v Robinson, 386 Mich. 551, 557; 194 N.W.2d 709 (1972). The ruling of the trial judge will be sustained unless we are left with a definite and firm belief that a mistake has been made. People v Goss, 89 Mich. 598; 280 N.W.2d 608 (1979). In the present case, the circumstances surrounding the defendant's confession convince us that defendant voluntarily made the inculpatory statement.
The present case is clearly distinguishable from the authoritive cases on police interrogation. See Edwards v Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-484; 101 S Ct 1880; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981); People v Paintman, 412 Mich. 518; 315 N.W.2d 418 (1982). Here, the conversations were initiated by defendant. Neither testimony at the Walker hearing nor at trial suggests that the police officer present took the initiative to extract a statement from the defendant. Defendant was advised of his rights and made the inculpatory statement prior to his request for an attorney or his sister. The request for an attorney was made in response to the police officer's desire to have defendant repeat the statement in writing. Defendant rejected the advice of the attorney to whom he spoke and repeated the statement in the presence of his sister.
In People ex rel Wayne Prosecutor v Recorder's Court Judge, 79 Mich. App. 495; 261 N.W.2d 63 (1977), lv den 402 Mich. 879 (1978), cert den 436 U.S. 958 (1978), this Court held that an expression by a defendant that he wanted an attorney, albeit an ambiguous statement, requires a cessation of police interrogation. See also People v Plyler, 86 Mich. App. 272, 277; 272 N.W.2d 623 (1978). However, we find the facts of this case distinguishable from those cited above. In ex rel Wayne Prosecutor and Plyler, after the custodial interrogation began, the defendants "either specifically requested counsel, and counsel was not made available, or the defendants sufficiently expressed a desire for counsel by asking questions concerning either the availability of counsel or the advisability of procuring counsel". People v Giuchici, 118 Mich. App. 252, 257; 324 N.W.2d 593 (1982). However, we hold that in the present case, defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.
"By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning inititated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
People v Paintman, supra, pp 528-529, quoting from Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
Therefore, while it is true that "custodial interrogation by police may take different forms", People v Paintman, supra, p 529, we do not find any overreaching in the conduct of police in this case. The officer did not "impinge on the exercise of the subject's continuing option to cut off the interview". People v Giuchici, 118 Mich. App. 252, 258; 324 N.W.2d 593 (1982), quoting from Nash v Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 518 (CA 5, 1979).
Likewise, we are not persuaded by the defendant's assertion that he was so unduly influenced by his allergic reaction to penicillin that his statement was not the product of a clear mind. The trial judge heard conflicting testimony of the effect of the drug on defendant. On this question we defer to the factual determination of the trial judge. There is nothing in the record to suggest that his decision was erroneous. People v Anglin, 111 Mich. App. 268; 314 N.W.2d 581 (1982).
Finally, we reject defendant's argument that the delay in his arraignment was used as a tool to extract a confession. Michigan law requires that police bring a prisoner before a magistrate for arraignment without unnecessary delay. MCL 764.26; MSA 28.885. The delay in this case cannot be considered unnecessary. Defendant was arrested on the night of February 10, 1982. The following morning he was transferred to the hospital where he remained until the evening of February 11, 1982. The following morning, defendant was arraigned. The record does not suggest that any portion of the intervening time was intended to extract a statement from defendant. Therefore, this argument must fail. People v Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410; 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960); People v Jackson, 114 Mich. App. 649; 319 N.W.2d 613 (1982).
We find the remainder of defendant's arguments meritless.
Affirmed.
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