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PEOPLE v. McCLELLAN
People v. McClellan, Michigan Court of Appeals, Dec. 13, 1985 (Docket No. 77139)
Factual and Procedural Background
Defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted of felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, and as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. He was sentenced to a prison term of 40 months to 8 years. The appeal is as of right.
The underlying incident occurred at a K-mart store in Southfield. Defendant purchased a drill and a saw while placing drill bits into his pants pocket. A store detective allegedly observed the placement of the drill bits and confronted defendant; security was alerted. Defendant removed the drill bits, discarded them, and left the store. Outside, the store detective asked defendant to accompany him back into the store; at some point inside the store defendant sprayed the detective with mace and attempted to escape. He was apprehended in the parking lot and taken to the Southfield police station.
Procedurally, the original information charged armed robbery. A supplemental information was filed soon thereafter. At the plea-taking session the prosecutor moved to amend the information, replacing the armed robbery charge with felonious assault and larceny in a building; a plea agreement was announced under which defendant would plead guilty to felonious assault in exchange for dismissal of the larceny charge. The armed robbery charge was dismissed in the amendment process.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the prosecutor abused his discretion by overcharging the defendant (initially charging armed robbery) in a manner that rendered the defendant unable to deal rationally with the plea agreement.
- Whether the defendant's rights were violated because he did not receive actual notice of the filing of the habitual-offender supplemental information within 14 days after arraignment, as interpreted under People v. Shelton, 412 Mich. 565; 315 N.W.2d 537 (1982).
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- The prosecutor abused his discretion by overcharging the defendant with armed robbery, which prevented the defendant from rationally assessing and dealing with the plea agreement.
- The defendant did not receive actual notice of the filing of the habitual-offender supplemental information until more than 14 days after arraignment, in violation of the rule in People v. Shelton.
Prosecutor's / People's Position
- The prosecutor amended the information after investigation revealed that defendant discarded the stolen goods prior to the assault, making an armed robbery charge inapplicable because the assault was committed to effectuate escape rather than to perpetrate the robbery.
- The prosecutor represented that the initial charge of armed robbery was based on incomplete information; the mistake was discovered while preparing witnesses for trial after the preliminary examination had been waived.
- The supplemental habitual-offender information was filed within 14 days of arraignment, satisfying the filing requirement under Shelton; the 14-day rule applies to filing, not to the defendant's receipt of actual notice.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| People v. Shelton, 412 Mich. 565; 315 N.W.2d 537 (1982) | The Court held that a supplemental information is filed "promptly" if filed not more than 14 days after the defendant is arraigned. | The court applied Shelton to conclude that the 14-day rule concerns the filing of the supplemental information, not the defendant's actual receipt of notice; because the supplemental information here was filed within 14 days, the Shelton requirement was satisfied. |
| People v. Fountain, 407 Mich. 96; 282 N.W.2d 168 (1979) | Defines the requirement that a supplemental information be filed "promptly." | The court cited Fountain (through Shelton's formulation) as the source of the "prompt" filing rule and used it to frame the 14-day filing standard applied in this case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
On the overcharging claim, the court rejected defendant's argument for two principal reasons. First, the court observed that the armed robbery charge did not form part of the plea agreement: it was dismissed by amendment and the plea agreement related only to the two lesser charges (felonious assault and larceny in a building, with the larceny charge to be dismissed under the agreement). Because the dismissal of the armed robbery charge was not part of the agreement, defendant's contention that the initial overcharge prevented rational dealing with the plea agreement lacked legitimacy in the court's view.
Second, the court concluded that the prosecutor's initial armed robbery charge was not an abuse of discretion. The prosecutor's later investigation revealed facts (that defendant discarded the stolen goods prior to the assault) that made armed robbery inapplicable. The court noted the preliminary examination had been waived, so the prosecutor only learned of the mistake while preparing witnesses for trial. Under these circumstances, the court found the charging mistake justified, found no evidence of intentional overcharging, and observed that the mistake could have been uncovered earlier if defendant had moved to quash the information or exercised the right to a preliminary examination.
On the habitual-offender notice claim, the court relied on Shelton to interpret the 14-day rule as a requirement tied to the filing date of the supplemental information rather than the defendant's actual receipt of notice. The court declined to expand Shelton to require actual notice within 14 days. The court reasoned that the purpose of a prompt filing is to provide the accused with early notice of the potential consequences; because the prosecutor filed the supplemental information within 14 days, that purpose was satisfied even though the defendant received actual notice 22 days after arraignment.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Affirmed.
Implications:
- The court affirmed the convictions and sentence imposed on defendant after guilty pleas to felonious assault and adjudication as a fourth-offense habitual offender.
- The court held that (1) the initial armed robbery charge did not amount to prosecutorial abuse under the circumstances described, particularly where the armed robbery count was not part of the plea agreement and where the charging error arose from incomplete information later corrected, and (2) the Shelton 14-day rule governs the filing of supplemental habitual-offender informations and does not, as a matter of that authority, require actual notice to the defendant within 14 days of arraignment.
- The opinion declined to expand existing precedent (Shelton) to encompass an actual-notice requirement within 14 days; the direct effect is limited to affirming the convictions and rejecting the defendant's procedural challenges as presented.
PER CURIAM.
On his pleas of guilty, defendant was convicted of felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, and as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of from 40 months to 8 years on the convictions. The appeal is as of right.
The incident which formed the basis of defendant's convictions occurred at a K-mart store in Southfield. Defendant purchased a drill and a saw, but at the same time he placed some drill bits into his pants pocket. This was apparently witnessed by the store detective, who then confronted defendant. Security was alerted and when the defendant attempted to leave the store he noticed the detective who confronted him earlier waiting outside the store. Defendant then removed the drill bits from his pocket, threw them aside, and left the store.
Once outside, defendant was confronted by the security detective and was asked to accompany him back into the store. Defendant complied, but at some point in the store he sprayed the detective with mace and attempted to escape. Defendant was apprehended in the parking lot and taken to the Southfield police station.
Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends that the prosecutor abused his discretion by overcharging. The original information filed in this matter charged defendant with armed robbery, and a supplemental information was filed soon thereafter. However, the prosecutor moved to amend the information at the plea-taking session to replace the armed robbery charge with one count of felonious assault and one count of larceny in a building. The prosecutor explained that his investigation of the incident revealed that defendant relinquished possession of the stolen goods some time prior to the assault. Thus, the assault was unrelated to the robbery and was committed solely for the purpose of escaping, rendering the armed robbery statute inapplicable. The prosecutor then informed the trial court of a plea agreement pursuant to which defendant would plead guilty to the felonious assault charge in exchange for a dismissal of the larceny in a building charge.
Defendant now argues that he was unable to deal rationally with the plea agreement due to the prosecutor's abuse of discretion in overcharging him with armed robbery. We reject this claim for two reasons. First, the armed robbery charge did not play a part in the agreement. That charge was dismissed in favor of adding the two lesser charges, which were the subject of the plea agreement. We would agree with the defendant's argument if the amendment of the information to dismiss the armed robbery charge was also a part of the agreement. It was not, however, and thus, even if defendant had insisted upon proceeding to trial, the dismissal of the armed robbery charge would have remained unaffected. Under these circumstances, we fail to see any legitimacy to defendant's claim that he was rendered unable to deal rationally with the plea agreement.
Furthermore, we cannot agree with the defendant's characterization of the prosecutor's action as an abuse of discretion. The prosecutor explained that the initial investigation did not reveal that defendant threw the stolen goods aside prior to the assault on the store detective. Without the additional information, the facts would appear to support a charge of armed robbery. Since the preliminary examination was waived, the prosecutor did not learn of the mistake until the witnesses were interviewed in preparation for trial. Under these circumstances, the mistake in charging defendant with armed robbery was entirely justified. We find no evidence in the record which would indicate that the overcharging was intentional. We also note that the mistake could have been corrected sooner than the date of the plea-taking session if defendant had either moved to quash the information or exercised his right to a preliminary examination.
Next, defendant argues that since he did not receive notice of the filing of the habitual offender information until more than 14 days after he was arraigned on the original information the rule set out in People v. Shelton, 412 Mich. 565; 315 N.W.2d 537 (1982), was violated. We disagree. In Shelton, the Supreme Court held that a supplemental information is filed "promptly", as required by People v. Fountain, 407 Mich. 96; 282 N.W.2d 168 (1979), if it is filed not more than 14 days after the defendant is arraigned. Shelton, p 569.
Here, defendant does not dispute that the supplemental information was filed within 14 days of the arraignment. Instead, he complains that he did not receive actual notice of the filing until July 6, 1983, which was more than 14 days after the arraignment. However, the Shelton "14-day" rule is clearly limited to filing, not actual notice to the defendant, and we decline to expand the rule. As noted by defendant, the purpose of a "prompt" filing of the supplemental information is to "provide the accused with notice, at an early stage in the proceedings, of the potential consequences should the accused be convicted of the underlying offense". Shelton, p 569. (Emphasis added.) As a result of the prosecutor's compliance with the Shelton rule in this case, the defendant did in fact receive notice at an early stage in the proceedings, although 22 rather than 14 days after the arraignment. The purpose behind the imposition of the "14-day" rule was thus achieved. Defendant's argument is rejected and his convictions affirmed.
Affirmed.
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