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IN RE AMERICAN ENERGY, INC., (Bankr.D.N.D. 1985)

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. North Dakota
Jun 11, 1985
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Factual and Procedural Background

American Energy, Inc. (AEI), a producers' cooperative association, entered into approximately 1,140 individual contracts called "Growers Grain Supply Agreement" with member farmers, obligating them to supply grain over seven years. AEI planned to construct a grain processing facility for anhydrous ethyl alcohol. AEI assigned its contract rights to Beneficial Finance Leasing Corporation as collateral for loans. The growers allegedly failed to perform their contractual obligations despite demands. AEI filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on November 14, 1984. The Chapter 7 Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding on May 3, 1985, against 36 growers seeking turnover under section 542 of the Bankruptcy Code and damages for breach of contract. Defendants raised defenses including failure of consideration, unconscionability, lack of mutuality, anticipatory breach by AEI, and requested jury trials or abstention by the Bankruptcy Court. The court addressed whether it had jurisdiction over the Trustee’s cause of action.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction to hear and finally determine the Trustee’s contract-based turnover action under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and § 157.
  2. Whether the Trustee's cause of action constitutes a "core" proceeding under Title 11 or is instead a "related" non-core proceeding.
  3. Whether the Defendants are entitled to a jury trial in the bankruptcy court on the contract claims.
  4. Whether the Bankruptcy Court should abstain from hearing the adversary proceeding based on jurisdictional and abstention principles under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
28 U.S.C. § 1334 Defines the jurisdictional scope of bankruptcy courts over cases and civil proceedings related to Title 11 bankruptcy cases. Used to analyze the categories of jurisdiction (cases under Title 11, civil proceedings arising under, arising in, or related to Title 11 cases) and to determine that the Trustee’s contract claims do not fit core jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 157 Defines "core" proceedings and the authority of bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments. Interpreted to limit core proceedings to those arising directly under the Bankruptcy Code, excluding contract claims; emphasized that related non-core proceedings cannot be finally adjudicated by bankruptcy courts without consent.
In re Seton-Scherr, Inc., 26 B.R. 563 (Bankr.D.Ohio 1983) Definition of core proceedings as those proceedings which would not exist outside bankruptcy. Supported the court’s interpretation that core proceedings are narrowly defined and do not include contract claims like those here.
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) Limits on bankruptcy court jurisdiction and the constitutional requirement that Article III courts exercise certain powers, including jury trials. Used to temper broad interpretations of core proceedings and to support the conclusion that contract claims are outside core jurisdiction; emphasized unconstitutional delegation of Article III powers to bankruptcy judges.
In re Atlas Automation, Inc., 42 B.R. 246 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1984) Contract claims are generally not core proceedings and may not be properly adjudicated by bankruptcy courts. Supported the court’s conclusion that the Trustee’s contract claim is not core and that jurisdictional infirmities exist under the 1984 Act.
In re Dakota Grain Systems, Inc., 41 B.R. 749 (Bankr.N.D. 1984) Reiterates the limits on bankruptcy court jurisdiction over contract claims and reliance on Marathon. Used to support the court’s jurisdictional analysis and abstention decision.
Heagle v. Haug, 19 B.R. 223 (Bankr.D.Ore. 1982) Defines "related" proceedings requiring a reasonable nexus or logical connection to the bankruptcy estate. Used to clarify that a tenuous or incidental connection to the bankruptcy estate is insufficient to confer jurisdiction.
Romeo J. Roy, Inc. v. Northern Nat'l Bank, 32 B.R. 1008 (D.C.D.Me. 1983) Jurisdiction depends on the character of claims and their relationship to bankruptcy, not merely on party status. Supported the court’s narrow view of related proceedings jurisdiction.
Matter of Colorado Energy Supply, Inc., 728 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1984) Definition of related proceedings as those that could be brought in state or district court absent bankruptcy. Reinforced the court’s conclusion that contract claims related only incidentally to bankruptcy do not confer jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court.
28 U.S.C. § 1411(a) Preserves jury trial rights only for personal injury or wrongful death tort claims in bankruptcy proceedings. Used to analyze the availability of jury trials in bankruptcy court and to conclude that jury trials are unavailable for contract claims in bankruptcy court.
Macon Prestressed Concrete Co. v. Duke, 46 B.R. 727 (D.C.M.D.Ga. 1985) Discusses bankruptcy court authority to conduct jury trials and the advisory nature of such trials absent party consent. Referenced in the court’s analysis of jury trial availability and bankruptcy court authority, ultimately disagreeing with the conclusion that bankruptcy judges have full jury trial powers.
In re Proehl, 36 B.R. 86 (D.C.W.D.Va. 1984) Supports the view that bankruptcy judges do not have Article III powers, including presiding over jury trials. Supported the court’s conclusion that bankruptcy judges lack constitutional authority to preside over jury trials.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) Permits discretionary abstention by bankruptcy courts in the interest of justice, comity, or respect for state law. Provided the statutory basis for the court’s decision to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the contract claims.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began with the jurisdictional framework established by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, which limits bankruptcy court jurisdiction to four categories of cases and proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1334. It distinguished between "core" proceedings, which arise under or in Title 11 cases and can be finally adjudicated by bankruptcy courts, and "related" non-core proceedings, which bankruptcy courts may hear but cannot finally decide without party consent.

The Trustee’s action, though styled as a turnover under section 542, was found to be fundamentally a contract claim governed by state law. The court held that such contract claims do not constitute core proceedings because they exist independently of bankruptcy law and thus fall outside the bankruptcy court’s final adjudicatory jurisdiction under § 157(b)(2). The court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s Marathon decision, which limits bankruptcy court jurisdiction over state law contract claims.

The court then examined the concept of "related" proceedings, emphasizing that a mere incidental or tenuous connection to the bankruptcy estate is insufficient to confer jurisdiction. The Trustee’s action was only incidentally related to the bankruptcy case and lacked an independent federal jurisdictional basis. Consequently, the court concluded it did not have authority to enter final judgment.

Regarding the right to a jury trial, the court analyzed the 1984 Act’s amendments to jury trial provisions. It found that jury trials are generally unavailable in bankruptcy courts except for personal injury or wrongful death tort claims, preserved by § 1411(a). Since the Trustee’s contract claims were "at law" rather than equitable, the parties had a constitutional right to a jury trial that bankruptcy judges lack authority to conduct. Thus, if a jury trial is demanded, the case must be heard by an Article III district court judge.

Given the state law nature of the claims, the absence of core bankruptcy jurisdiction, the lack of an independent federal jurisdictional basis, and the right to jury trial, the court exercised its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) to abstain from hearing the case and dismissed the adversary proceeding on jurisdictional grounds.

Holding and Implications

The court held that it lacks jurisdiction to finally adjudicate the Trustee’s contract-based turnover action and must abstain from hearing the case.

The direct effect of this decision is dismissal of the adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court, requiring the Trustee to pursue the contract claims in a court with proper jurisdiction, likely a state court or a federal district court if jurisdiction exists. The ruling affirms the constitutional and statutory limits on bankruptcy court jurisdiction post-1984 Act, particularly emphasizing the distinction between core and related proceedings and the right to jury trials. No new precedent beyond applying established principles was set.

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ORDER OF ABSTENTION

WILLIAM A. HILL, Bankruptcy Judge.

The Debtor, American Energy, Inc. (AEI), is a corporation organized as a producers' cooperative association to perform marketing and other functions for member growers and in connection therewith, it was to construct a facility at Hankinson, North Dakota, for the processing of grain into anhydrous ethyl alcohol and other products. Growers who constituted the membership of AEI agreed through individual contracts called "Growers Grain Supply Agreement" to unconditionally supply AEI and its assignees quantities of grain over a seven-year period. Approximately 1,140 individual contracts were signed by various farmers. The grower contracts were signed allegedly in consideration of certain enumerated obligations and promises of AEI, among them being the construction and operation of the anhydrous ethyl alcohol plant. AEI assigned its rights under the contracts to Beneficial Finance Leasing Corporation, Leasing and Industrial Lending Division of New Jersey, as collateral for loans made by Beneficial to AEI. The growers have allegedly failed to perform according to the terms of the contracts despite demands for the same being made by AEI and Beneficial.

AEI filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on November 14, 1984. The Chapter 7 Trustee, on May 3, 1985, commenced the present adversary proceeding against 36 of the growers in an effort to collect sums allegedly due AEI on account of their respective contracts. The Trustee has couched his Complaint as one for turnover under section 542 and seeks a mandatory injunction compelling the Defendants to perform according to the terms of their respective contracts. Damages for breach of contract are also requested.

Five of the named Defendants in identical Answers allege the contracts are uneforceable for failure of consideration, unconscionability and lack of mutuality of obligation. They further allege AEI anticipatorily breached the contracts in that it did not construct the alcohol plant — a condition precedent to grower performance. They have counterclaimed for rescission and ask in the alternative for a jury trial or abstention by the Bankruptcy Court. Seven other Defendants in a joint Answer allege the contracts to be unconscionable, without consideration, and the product of mistake and misrepresentation. These Defendants also affirmatively allege anticipatory breach as a defense and also demand a jury trial.

The Defendants, by their Answers, have directly raised the issue of whether the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction over the Trustee's cause of action as framed by the Complaint. It is this issue which is now addressed.

1.

Under the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (1984 Act), the bankruptcy court has no general grant of jurisdictional authority but is restricted by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1334 which specifies the legal controversies that can arise before a bankruptcy court. This grant of jurisdiction may be broken down into four categories:

(1) All cases under Title 11;

(2) All civil proceedings arising under Title 11;
(3) All civil proceedings arising in cases under Title 11; and
(4) All civil proceedings related to cases under Title 11.

This grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court exists only with regard to those claims or causes of action which are capable of being included in at least one of the foregoing categories. The first category, "cases under Title 11", is distinct from the other three and simply means the original bankruptcy petition itself from which all other bankruptcy proceedings spring. A civil proceeding "arises" under Title 11 when it is the type of proceeding typically associated with bankruptcy adjudication. 28 U.S.C. § 157 has made an effort to define these types of proceedings as being "core" proceedings. They are those types of proceedings which spring from the operation and application of the Bankruptcy Code itself. A civil proceeding "arising in a case" under Title 11 is the type of claim or proceeding that secondarily springs from a pending case which arose under Title 11. The final category is made up of those proceedings which do not arise under Title 11 or in a case under Title 11 but are nonetheless "related" to cases under Title 11.

The bankruptcy court may hear all cases in each of the four categories but may determine, that is to say, resolve by entry of judgment, only those cases under Title 11 and all core proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in a case under Title 11. As for the last category, non-core proceedings related to a case under Title 11, the bankruptcy judge may hear the case but may not render a final judgment. The bankruptcy judge's authority over non-core proceedings which are related to a case under Title 11 is restricted to hearing the case and submitting proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court who in turn enters final judgment. See section 157(c)(1). If the parties consent, however, the district court may allow the bankruptcy court to also enter final judgment in such cases.

The term "core" proceedings is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code but, by enumerated illustrations set out in section 157(b)(2), was meant to encompass those proceedings which would not exist at law in absence of the Bankruptcy Code. One court has defined the term as including those proceedings at the core of the bankruptcy court's power — proceedings which would have no existence outside of a bankruptcy proceeding. In re Seton-Scherr, Inc., 26 B.R. 563 (Bankr.D.Ohio 1983). Congress apparently was in favor of giving bankruptcy courts expansive jurisdiction through the various categories enumerated as core proceedings because a "core" proceeding, by definition, may also include the broad range of matters covering the administration of the estate as well as other proceedings affecting the liquidation of assets or adjustment of the debtor-creditor or equity security holder relationship. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (O). The apparent broad application that could be given to section 157(b)(2)(A) and (O) should, however, be tempered by Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) and the other categories of section 157(b)(2) which are more specific in their terminology. Although section 157(b)(2) was meant by Congress to be a non-exclusive list of what might be included in the term "core" proceedings, this Court does not believe the sections or categories should be interpreted or expanded so as to in effect emasculate the jurisdiction proscriptions of the Marathon case. Clearly, subsections 157(b)(2)(A) and (O) should not be interpreted to include related non-core proceedings since 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) specifically prevents a bankruptcy judge from rendering final judgments in such instances. A common sense interpretation of the term "core" would dictate that it include only those proceedings which are specifically defined in subsection (b)(2)(B) through (N) or in the Bankruptcy Code itself. This is the interpretation which this Court believes is the most correct and which will be relief upon when the question is presented.

Although the Trustee cites section 542 of the Code as a basis for his cause of action, the Complaint as well as the Defendants' Answers and Counterclaims are based solely upon contract law. As noted in the case of In re Atlas Automation, Inc., 42 B.R. 246 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1984), money which may come into an estate for whatever reason might be regarded as being included in a broad reading of section 157(b)(2)(O) or as "property of the estate" for which turnover under section 542 would be appropriate but, said the court, reading either section 157 or section 542 so as to include actions based on contract would ignore the jurisdictional infirmities sought to be corrected by the 1984 Act. The Trustee's cause of action in the instant case sounds in contract. This Court, in its decision of In re Dakota Grain Systems, Inc., 41 B.R. 749 (Bankr.N.D. 1984), recalled that it was a breach of contract action commenced by a debtor-in-possession that caused the United States Supreme Court to hand down the linchpin Marathon decision. The Supreme Court in that case specifically noted that an action for breach of contract "involves a right created by state law, a right independent of an antecedent to the reorganization petition that conferred jurisdiction upon a bankruptcy court. . .". The court in the Atlas Automation case was also faced with an action brought by a debtor-in-possession based upon contract theories and observed that in view of Marathon:

"[I]t is doubtful that Congress intended this type of case to be tried by a bankruptcy court. Thus, although the perimeters of the definition of "turnover property of the estate" and "proceeding affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate" are yet to be explored, they do not include actions of this type." 42 B.R. at 247.

From the foregoing analysis, this Court must conclude that the Trustee's cause of action in the instant case is not a core proceeding arising under Title 11 nor is it one arising in a case under Title 11. Accordingly, this Court does not have jurisdiction under section 157(b)(2) to hear and finally determine the case. As previously outlined, this does not preclude a bankruptcy judge from hearing the case and rendering proposed findings if, despite the fact that it is not a core proceeding, it is otherwise related to the case under Title 11.

As with "core" proceedings, the term "related" proceeding is not precisely defined in the 1984 Act. The emergency rule upon which the 1984 jurisdictional amendments were based does define, in a limited fashion, a "related" matter as being a claim which would have existed irrespective of the fact of a bankruptcy, including claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against the estate. In other words, the cause of action must in some way relate to the administration of the bankrupt estate. That is to say, there must be some reason why adjudication of the claim is better placed with the bankruptcy court as opposed to a state court. Giving a very broad definition to the term would transform every state-created cause of action into a federal matter merely because a debtor were involved, but this would be a jurisdictionally infirm construction. Courts construing the term "related" have said that it means that there must exist a direct relationship to the administration of the bankrupt estate. As noted in Heagle v. Haug, 19 B.R. 223 (Bankr.D.Ore. 1982), "[T]here must be a reasonable nexus or logical connection between the civil proceeding for which jurisdiction is sought and the parent bankruptcy proceeding. A tenuous connection between the controversy and the debtor, his assets, and the administration of his estate will not support jurisdiction. . .". 19 B.R. at 224. The term for purposes of conferring jurisdiction has also been said to depend upon "the character of the claims asserted and the relationship of those claims to the bankruptcy proceeding rather than with the status of the parties as debtors or creditors." Romeo J. Roy, Inc. v. Northern Nat'l Bank, 32 B.R. 1008 (D.C.D.Me. 1983). Further guidance is afforded by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the recent case of Matter of Colorado Energy Supply, Inc., 728 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1984) which defined a related proceeding as:

"Related proceedings are those civil proceedings that, in the absence of a petition in bankruptcy, could have been brought in a district court or state court . . ."

The Tenth Circuit, in the foregoing case, noted that the term related proceeding as referred to in the Marathon decision was given a narrow definition as pertaining only to the proposition that a "traditional state common-law action, not made subject to a federal rule of decision, and related only peripherally to an adjudication of bankruptcy under federal law, must, absent the consent of the litigants, be heard by an Article III court if it is to be heard by any court or agency of the United States". Citing Marathon, 458 U.S. at 92, 102 S.Ct. at 2882. This Court has taken the position in related proceedings based solely on state created contract law that the clear expression of both the United States Supreme Court and Congress cannot be ignored. In re Dakota Grain Systems, Inc., supra. Such cases, although tangentially related to a pending bankruptcy proceeding, are not sufficiently related to the proceeding to confer jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) unless there also exists an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

2.

The question of whether a jury trial is available in a bankruptcy proceeding has always been a troublesome question, but it has become even more perplexing in light of the 1984 Act.

Cases that can be properly characterized as "core" proceedings are those which are considered equitable in nature and for which traditionally no right to a jury trial exists. In re Minton Group, Inc., 43 B.R. 705 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Sunair Intern, Inc., 32 B.R. 142 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1983); In re Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, 23 B.R. 271 (Bankr.D.C. 1982). Bankruptcy judges are free to hear and finally determine such cases because they are in the nature of an equitable proceeding. However, as to cases which can be characterized as "at law", the right to jury trial is made inviolate by the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, and this right is in a limited fashion referred to in 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a) as enacted by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984:

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this chapter and title 11 do not affect any right to trial by jury that an individual has under applicable nonbankruptcy law with regard to a personal injury or wrongful death tort claim.

The problem is that a comparison of section 1411(a) with its predecessor, 28 U.S.C. § 1480(a), strongly leaves one with the impression that a jury trial is no longer available in bankruptcy court except with regards to a personal injury or wrongful death tort claim. Former section 1480(a) now replaced by section 1411(a), provided that:

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this chapter and Title 11 do not affect any right to trial by jury, in a case under title 11 or in a proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11, that is provided by any statute in effect on September 30, 1979.

For whatever reason, Congress by striking the broader language of section 1480(a) from section 1411(a) left bankruptcy courts with a strong suggestion that the only right to trial by jury that is retained in bankruptcy matters is that of an individual in an action for personal injury or wrongful death under nonbankruptcy law. If this is a correct interpretation of section 1411(a), then it means that not only is a jury trial unavailable in core proceedings — the "equity" cases — but it is also unavailable in non-core related proceedings ("at law" cases) if those cases are to be heard by a bankruptcy judge as allowed by section 157(c)(1). Thus, a dichotomy arises between what is created by the Constitution as an inviolate right to trial by jury and the limited jurisdictional grant of authority to bankruptcy courts. At least one court, avoiding a discussion of section 1411(a), believed that section 157(a) vested the bankruptcy judge with the same authority to conduct a jury trial as the federal district court but felt that even with such authority a jury trial in bankruptcy court would be pointless because, absent the parties' consent, such judgment would be only advisory in nature and subject to de novo review. Macon Prestressed Concrete Co. v. Duke, 46 B.R. 727 (D.C.M.D.Ga. 1985). This Court, while agreeing with Duke as to the practicality of a bankruptcy judge conducting a jury trial, disagrees with that court's conclusion that bankruptcy judges are vested with the same power to conduct jury trials as are district judges. The Supreme Court in its Marathon decision was quite clear in its holding that the grant of Article III powers to bankruptcy judges was an unconstitutional delegation to an adjunct court. Of the Article III powers specifically mentioned by the Supreme Court was the power to preside over jury trials. See In re Proehl, 36 B.R. 86 (D.C.W.D.Va. 1984). As this Court previously noted, section 157(a) should not be interpreted or expanded so as to emasculate the Supreme Court's decision.

Accordingly, this Court concludes that jury trials must remain available to cases "at law" (related non-core), but those cases cannot be heard by a bankruptcy judge if a jury trial is requested. If a jury trial has been requested and the case is one sufficiently "related" to the bankruptcy proceeding to remain in federal court, then the case should be heard by the federal district judge in the first instance. If a jury trial has been requested but the case, although "related", is based on state law with no independent basis for federal jurisdiction, then the bankruptcy court ought to abstain. Where no jury trial has been requested but the case is based primarily on state law and only incidentally related to the bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy court ought to abstain because of the character of the claim asserted.

28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) allows the court in its discretion to abstain in the interest of justice or in the interest of comity or in respect of state law. This Court believes the Trustee's cause of action in the instant adversary case is based solely on matters of state law, has no independent basis for federal jurisdiction and is only incidentally related to the bankruptcy proceeding. Moreover, the Plaintiff's cause of action is one "at law" rather than "at equity", and the parties thereto have a right to trial by jury — a right which cannot be accorded them in bankruptcy court. Accordingly, it is the opinion of this Court that in this case abstention is mandated, and the case must be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

IT IS SO ORDERED.