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HUFF v. STATE
Summary of Opinion: Earnest Huff v. State of Arkansas, No. CR 86-40 (Ark. Sup. Ct. July 7, 1986)
Factual and Procedural Background
Appellant Earnest Huff was arrested in September 1983 on charges of burglary and theft. A ring recovered from Huff was identified as coming from a robbery committed August 10, 1983, in Sherwood, Arkansas. Huff gave a statement to a Little Rock police officer admitting the robbery. On December 12, 1983, Huff pled guilty to aggravated robbery and burglary and was sentenced to 10 years for burglary and 30 years for aggravated robbery, to be served concurrently.
Huff filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule 37 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel; the petition was presented to the Pulaski Circuit Court. After an evidentiary hearing at which only Huff and his trial attorney testified, the trial court denied relief, finding Huff failed to present sufficient evidence to support his allegations. Huff appealed; this Court's jurisdiction is pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 29(1)(e).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Huff established ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to render his guilty plea unintelligent or involuntary — specifically, whether counsel's advice regarding parole eligibility (or lack thereof) or other alleged errors rendered counsel's performance constitutionally deficient under the Strickland standard.
- Whether pre-plea constitutional deprivations (assault by police, lineup without counsel, coerced confession, and alleged failure to suppress the confession) are pertinent in a collateral attack on a guilty plea.
- Whether erroneous advice about parole eligibility by counsel can satisfy Strickland's prejudice requirement where the petitioner does not assert he would have pleaded not guilty and gone to trial if properly informed.
- Whether the trial court's factual findings (particularly credibility determinations between appellant and counsel) are against the preponderance of the evidence on appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Appellant alleged he was assaulted by police officers and forced to appear in a lineup without counsel despite requesting an attorney.
- He claimed his confession was coerced because a police officer threatened to file additional charges if he did not confess, and that the officer told him what to say in the confession.
- He asserted his trial attorney told him he would try to have the confession suppressed but failed to do so.
- He claimed his attorney erroneously advised him that, if he pled guilty and received a 30-year sentence, he would be eligible for parole in four or five years, and that this promise induced his guilty plea; he also maintained he was not guilty of the aggravated robbery charge.
Respondent / Trial Attorney's Arguments
- The attorney denied advising Huff about parole eligibility prior to the plea; he stated that any parole discussion occurred after Huff entered his plea.
- The attorney testified he generally advises inmates that parole is controlled by the penitentiary/Department of Corrections and that parole eligibility is not something counsel controls or should be relied upon because laws and policies can change.
- The attorney explained that after the Legislature changed parole eligibility and given penitentiary crowding, he advised Huff by letter that he would apply for clemency or take advantage of any laws that would allow early parole, but that this occurred after the plea was entered.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Travis v. State, 283 Ark. 478, 678 S.W.2d 341 (1984) | Counsel is presumed competent. | The Court invoked this presumption and stated the burden is on the petitioner to overcome it. |
| Maddox v. State, 283 Ark. 321, 675 S.W.2d 832 (1984) | The burden of overcoming the presumption of counsel competence rests on the petitioner. | Used to place the burden on Huff to prove counsel was ineffective. |
| Williams v. State, 273 Ark. 371, 620 S.W.2d 277 (1981) | When a guilty plea is challenged, the sole issue is whether the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered with the advice of competent counsel. | The Court framed the inquiry in Huff's collateral attack on his guilty plea accordingly. |
| United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) | Referenced for the heavy burden to establish counsel's advice was not competent. | Combined with other authorities to emphasize the heavy burden on Huff to prove ineffective assistance. |
| Crockett v. State, 282 Ark. 582, 669 S.W.2d 896 (1984) | Ineffective assistance regarding a guilty plea can be shown only by pointing to specific errors by counsel. | Cited to require Huff to identify specific counsel errors and to note difficulty proving prejudice where a plea includes an admission of guilt. |
| Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) | Two-pronged test requiring deficient performance and resulting prejudice depriving the defendant of a fair trial; both showings necessary. | The Court applied Strickland's standard to evaluate Huff's ineffective-assistance claim and to require proof of both deficient performance and prejudice. |
| Pruett v. State, 287 Ark. 124, 697 S.W.2d 872 (1985) | Both Strickland showings are necessary before a conviction can be said to have resulted from a breakdown in the adversarial process. | Used to reinforce that both deficient performance and prejudice must be shown. |
| Knappenberger v. State, 283 Ark. 210, 672 S.W.2d 54 (1984) | On appeal, a trial court's denial of postconviction relief is affirmed unless clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. | The Court applied this standard in reviewing the trial court's denial of Huff's Rule 37 petition and found no such showing. |
| Thomas v. State, 277 Ark. 74, 639 S.W.2d 353 (1982) (quoting Irons v. State, 267 Ark. 469, 591 S.W.2d 650 (1980)) | Pre-plea constitutional deprivations are not pertinent in collateral attack on a guilty plea; other defenses (except jurisdictional defects) are waived. | The Court held Huff's pre-plea claims (assault, lineup, coerced confession) were not pertinent to his collateral attack on the guilty plea and were therefore waived absent jurisdictional defect. |
| Bell v. North Carolina, 576 F.2d 564 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 956 (1978) | Counsel is not required to advise a client about parole because parole is not a direct consequence of a guilty plea. | Cited to support the proposition that lack of parole advice does not automatically undermine voluntariness of a guilty plea. |
| Hunter v. Fogg, 616 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1980) | The voluntariness of a guilty plea is not undermined by a lack of explanation as to the mechanics of the parole system. | Used to reinforce that parole mechanics are not a direct consequence counsel must explain in plea context. |
| Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366 (1985) | Erroneous advice by counsel as to parole eligibility does not satisfy Strickland's prejudice requirement where petitioner does not claim he would have pleaded not guilty and gone to trial if correctly informed. | The Court relied on Hill to note that Huff's claim would fail unless he proved he would have gone to trial rather than plead guilty if properly informed; the Court did not decide the hypothetical where petitioner does claim he would have gone to trial because the case turned on credibility. |
| Smith v. State, 286 Ark. 247, 691 S.W.2d 154 (1985) | Conflicts in testimony are for the trial judge to resolve; the judge is not required to believe the accused. | The Court cited Smith to support the trial court’s resolution of the credibility contest in favor of the attorney and to uphold the denial of relief. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in logical steps grounded in the precedents cited in the opinion:
- Presumption of competence: The Court began by reiterating the presumption that counsel is competent (Travis) and that the burden to overcome that presumption rests with the petitioner (Maddox).
- Framing the inquiry for guilty pleas: Because Huff's conviction resulted from a guilty plea, the Court framed the sole relevant inquiry as whether the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered with the advice of competent counsel (Williams). Thus, collateral attack is limited to voluntariness related to counsel's advice.
- Standard for ineffective assistance: The Court applied the standards of Cronic, Crockett, and Strickland (and Pruett) — requiring a showing of specific errors and both deficient performance and prejudice — and emphasized the heavy burden on a defendant who pleaded guilty to establish counsel's advice was not competent.
- Scope of collateral attack: The Court held pre-plea constitutional deprivations (assault, lineup without counsel, coerced confession, alleged failure to move to suppress) were not pertinent in a collateral attack on the guilty plea; such defenses (except jurisdictional defects) are waived once a guilty plea has been entered (Thomas; Irons).
- Parole advice and voluntariness: The Court noted authorities (Bell; Hunter) that counsel is not required to advise a client about parole because parole is not a direct consequence of pleading guilty, and that lack of explanation about parole mechanics does not automatically undermine voluntariness. The Court also relied on Hill v. Lockhart to state that erroneous advice about parole eligibility does not satisfy Strickland's prejudice requirement where the petitioner does not claim he would have pleaded not guilty and gone to trial if correctly informed.
- Credibility determination: The pivotal factual dispute was whether the attorney told Huff before the plea that he would likely be eligible for parole in four or five years. Huff produced a December 16, 1983 letter from his attorney stating the attorney would represent him before the Parole Board and would "after the appropriate amount of time (approximately 4 or 5 years) apply for early relief by way of parole and/or clemency." At the evidentiary hearing Huff testified he relied on that representation and that it "clinched" his decision to plead guilty. The attorney testified that the parole discussion and the referenced letter reflected post-plea activity and that he did not advise clients to consider parole eligibility in deciding whether to accept a plea.
- Application of appellate standard: Because the hearing presented essentially a swearing match between Huff and his attorney, the trial court's resolution of credibility in favor of the attorney was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. The Court applied the standard from Knappenberger, affirming unless the trial court's denial was clearly against the preponderance.
- Conclusion of analysis: Given (a) the legal requirement that Huff prove specific errors and both Strickland prongs, (b) that pre-plea claims were generally irrelevant to the voluntariness inquiry, (c) the controlling authority that erroneous parole advice is insufficient absent a claim that petitioner would have gone to trial, and (d) the trial court's credibility determination favoring the attorney, the Court concluded Huff failed to meet his burden to show ineffective assistance that rendered his plea involuntary.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The judgment of the Pulaski Circuit Court denying Earnest Huff's Rule 37 postconviction petition is AFFIRMED.
Implications:
- Direct effect: Huff's conviction and sentences (10 years for burglary and 30 years for aggravated robbery, to run concurrently) remain affirmed and his Rule 37 petition was denied.
- Burden & standards reaffirmed: The decision reaffirms that counsel is presumed competent, that a defendant who pleaded guilty bears the heavy burden of proving specific errors and both prongs of Strickland, and that pre-plea constitutional claims (other than jurisdictional defects) are generally waived in collateral attacks on guilty pleas.
- No new precedent announced: The opinion applies existing Arkansas and federal precedent (as cited) to the facts of this case; the Court did not announce a novel rule of law beyond those applications.
Disposition: Affirmed.
1. ATTORNEY CLIENT — COUNSEL PRESUMED COMPETENT — BURDEN ON PETITIONER TO OVERCOME. — Counsel is presumed competent, and the burden of overcoming that presumption rests on the petitioner. 2. CRIMINAL LAW — GUILTY PLEA — VOLUNTARINESS. — When a guilty plea is challenged, the sole issue is whether the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered with the advice of competent counsel, and appellant has the heavy burden of establishing that counsel's advice was not competent. 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — RIGHT TO COUNSEL — HOW INEFFECTIVENESS CAN BE SHOWN WITH REGARD TO A GUILTY PLEA. — Ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to a guilty plea can be shown only by pointing to specific errors by counsel; a petitioner is required to demonstrate both that counsel's performance was so deficient that he was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the sixth amendment and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice so pronounced as to have deprived the petitioner of a fair trial, the outcome of which cannot be relied upon as just. 4. CRIMINAL LAW — GUILTY PLEA — PROOF OF PREJUDICE DIFFICULT. — A defendant whose conviction is based on a plea of guilty ordinarily will have difficulty in proving prejudice since his plea rests on the admission in court that he did the act with which he is charged. 5. ATTORNEY CLIENT — ATTORNEY NOT REQUIRED TO ADVISE CLIENT ABOUT PAROLE. — Counsel is not required to advise his client about parole because that matter is not a direct consequence of his guilty plea, and the voluntariness of a guilty plea is not undermined by a lack of explanation as to the mechanics of the parole system. 6. ATTORNEY CLIENT — ERRONEOUS ADVICE BY COUNSEL AS TO ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE — EFFECT. — Erroneous advice by counsel as to eligibility for parole under the sentence agreed to in a plea bargain is not sufficient to satisfy the court's requirement of prejudice, where petitioner does not claim he would have pleaded not guilty and gone to trial had he been correctly informed. 7. EVIDENCE — CONFLICTS IN TESTIMONY FOR TRIAL JUDGE TO RESOLVE. — Conflicts in testimony are for the trial judge to resolve, and he is not required to believe any Witness's testimony, especially the testimony of the accused, since he has the most interest in the outcome of the proceedings.
JACK HOLT, JR., Chief Justice.
Appellant's petition for Rule 37 postconviction relief was denied by the Pulaski Circuit Court after an evidentiary hearing. This appeal is from that denial and, accordingly, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 29(1)(e). We affirm.
The appellant was arrested in September, 1983 for burglary and theft of property. After his arrest, a ring was recovered from appellant which was identified as coming from a robbery committed August 10, 1983, in Sherwood, Arkansas. Appellant later gave a statement to a Little Rock police officer admitting the robbery. On December 12, 1983, appellant pled guilty to aggravated robbery and burglary and was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for the burglary and 30 years for the aggravated robbery, with directions that the sentences be served concurrently. Appellant's petition for postconviction relief was filed pro se. He is represented by counsel for this appeal, however.
The appellant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel as the basis for postconviction relief. The appellant and his attorney provided the only testimony at the Rule 37 hearing. In denying the relief, the trial court found he failed to present sufficient evidence to prove his allegations.
[1- 4] Counsel is presumed competent. Travis v. State, 283 Ark. 478, 678 S.W.2d 341 (1984). The burden of overcoming that presumption rests on the petitioner. Maddox v. State, 283 Ark. 321, 675 S.W.2d 832 (1984). When a guilty plea is challenged, as here, the sole issue is whether the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered with the advice of competent counsel. Williams v. State, 273 Ark. 371, 620 S.W.2d 277 (1981). The appellant has the heavy burden of establishing that counsel's advice was not competent. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); Crockett v. State, 282 Ark. 582, 669 S.W.2d 896 (1984). Ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to a guilty plea can be shown only by pointing to specific errors by counsel. Crockett, supra. Alleged errors are to be evaluated under the standard enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requires a petitioner to demonstrate both that counsel's performance was so deficient that he was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the sixth amendment and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice so pronounced as to have deprived the petitioner of a fair trial whose outcome cannot be relied upon as just. Both showings are necessary before it can be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the result unreliable. Pruett v. State, 287 Ark. 124, 697 S.W.2d 872 (1985). A defendant whose conviction is based on a plea of guilty ordinarily will have difficulty in proving prejudice since his plea rests on the admission in court that he did the act with which he is charged. Crockett, supra.
On appeal, we affirm the trial court's denial of postconviction relief unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Knappenberger v. State, 283 Ark. 210, 672 S.W.2d 54 (1984).
Appellant claims he was assaulted by police officers and forced to appear in a lineup without an attorney, although he requested one. He also maintains that he confessed because the police officer threatened to file additional charges against him if he refused, and that the police officer told him what to say in his confession. Appellant further argues that his attorney told him he would try to have that confession suppressed and then failed to do so. These claims of constitutional deprivation, because they occurred prior to the entry of his guilty plea, are not pertinent since the focus of inquiry in a collateral attack on a guilty plea is on the question of voluntariness of the plea as it relates to the advice rendered by counsel. Thomas v. State, 277 Ark. 74, 639 S.W.2d 353 (1982), quoting, Irons v. State, 267 Ark. 469, 591 S.W.2d 650 (1980). Any other defenses, except jurisdictional defects, are considered waived by the appellant. Id.
Appellant also alleges that he was erroneously advised by his attorney that, if he pled guilty and received the 30 year sentence, he would be eligible for parole in four or five years. That promise of parole led him to plead guilty, according to the appellant, who also states that he was not guilty of the aggravated robbery charge. His attorney denies advising the appellant when he could be paroled prior to appellant's guilty plea.
Before entering his plea, the appellant filled out a plea statement which stated that he was charged with a felony and no prior convictions. Appellant testified he thought that meant he would be sentenced as a first time offender, leading to the early parole. Both plea statements he signed also stated the minimum and maximum sentences he could receive, and included statements that his plea was not induced by force, promises or threats, and that he was satisfied with his attorney. Counsel is not required to advise his client about parole because that matter is not a direct consequence of his guilty plea, Bell v. North Carolina, 576 F.2d 564 (4th Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 956 (1978), and the voluntariness of a guilty plea is not undermined by a lack of explanation as to the mechanics of the parole system. Hunter v. Fogg, 616 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1980).
The United States Supreme Court has also held that erroneous advice by counsel as to eligibility for parole under the sentence agreed to in a plea bargain is not sufficient to satisfy Strickland's requirement of prejudice where petitioner does not claim he would have pleaded not guilty and gone to trial had he been correctly informed. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366 (1985). We need not decide whether Strickland's prejudice requirement is met where the appellant does claim he would have gone to trial had he been correctly informed, because here, the question is essentially one of credibility.
The appellant introduced into evidence a letter from his attorney dated December 16, 1983, in which the attorney stated:
In accordance with our agreement last week when you entered your guilty plea and received a sentence of 30 years, I am writing this letter to advise you that I will represent you in any matter before the Arkansas Parole Board and will, after the appropriate amount of time (approximately 4 or 5 years) apply for early relief by way of parole and/or clemency on your behalf.
During the evidentiary hearing, the following occurred in reference to this letter:
Q. Okay. Now, did that tie in with your understanding with . . . [your attorney] when you signed the plea statement as to the effect of the no prior convictions plea?
Appellant: This is what really, just really made, I felt that this is what really clinched everything when I signed the plea statement with no prior, I said, I can go on and plead to this and I can go down and therefore, I can go up in four or five years and if I did get a year and I can do another year now and then go up and maybe go up and make a go of it with his help. Because I know of another inmate that had got out like this. So, this is really the reason that I signed this statement. And the letter here, you know, I felt was the clincher and really, you know, if it was not true I felt it was misleading on his part. Because really, you know, I felt that I would have went to court or took a chance on going through other avenues besides pleading guilty, you know, instead of pleading guilty with the Court.
Appellant's attorney, on the other hand, testified as follows:
Q: Okay. And did you advise him as to his parole eligibility?
Attorney: I think this was, this was right after the Legislature had changed the parole eligibility. Penitentiaries were crowded. My discussion with Mr. Huff about parole was that after a period of time I would apply for clemency and/or take advantage of any laws that were on the books at that time for early parole. I think I advised him by letter that we would do this. This was after the plea was over. Not before. I think I advised him there that I would apply for clemency and/or parole and if since —
. . . .
Q: And had you — Did you advise him that parole eligibility was up to the Department of Corrections?
Attorney: I advised Mr. Huff, as I advise everyone who goes to the Penitentiary. That it's their penitentiary, they run it to suit themselves. . . . I never advise anybody or take it into consideration parole eligibility because it is something you have no control over. They change the laws and you go on. . . .
Q: And that's what you told Mr. Huff?
Attorney: I'm sure of it.
Here, the trial court was basically presented with a swearing match: appellant claimed his attorney erroneously advised him that he would be paroled within 4 or 5 years and, based on that, he entered his guilty plea. The attorney claimed that the parole discussion took place after appellant entered his plea and that he never advised anyone to take parole eligibility into consideration when deciding whether to accept a negotiated sentence because the parole laws can change. The trial court evidently believed the attorney. Conflicts in testimony are for the trial judge to resolve, and he is not required to believe any witness's testimony, especially the testimony of the accused since he has the most interest in the outcome of the proceedings, Smith v. State, 286 Ark. 247, 691 S.W.2d 154 (1985). We cannot say his findings are against a preponderance of the evidence.
Affirmed.
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