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NOLL v. CARLSON
- Here although Noll twice amended his complaint, he did so without the benefit of the court notifying him of any deficiencies in his previous pleadings. When the district court dismissed Noll's second amended complaint and the action without leave to amend, it failed to provide a statement of the complaint's deficiencies. Because it is not absolutely clear that Noll could not amend his complaint to allege constitutional violations, the district court erred by not notifying Noll of the amended complaint's deficiencies and allowing him leave to amend. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1228 n. 9; Potter, 433 F.2d at 1088.
- While Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 places leave to amend within the sound discretion of the trial court, we have stressed that a court must remain guided by "the underlying purpose of Rule 15 . . . to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities." United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is "absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment." Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (Per Curiam).
- William Noll, a federal prisoner, brought a Bivens-type civil rights action pro se and in forma pauperis against four officials of the United States Bureau of Prisons. After Noll twice amended his complaint at his own instance, the district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. In dismissing the action, the court did not advise Noll in what respects his second amended complaint was deficient, nor did the court allow Noll leave to amend. We review de novo the dismissal of the action. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985).
- The requirement that courts provide a pro se litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his or her complaint helps ensure that the pro se litigant can use the opportunity to amend effectively. Without the benefit of a statement of deficiencies, the pro se litigant will likely repeat previous errors. This is equally true for the pro se litigant who amends his complaint at his own instance without any guidance from the court. Amendments that are made without an understanding of underlying deficiencies are rarely sufficient to cure inadequate pleadings.
- Noll alleges in his second amended complaint that he was placed in prison with "known enemies" in violation of due process and the eighth amendment. Although his allegations are conclusory, he may be able to amend his complaint to allege facts showing that prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to his physical safety in violation of the eighth amendment, see Whitely v. Albers, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982), or that the officials violated Noll's substantive due process liberty interest in being secure in his person against assault, see McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 785 (9th Cir. 1986).
Additionally, Noll alleges that he was unconstitutionally placed in administrative segregation for ten and one-half months without outdoor exercise in order to separate him from his "known enemies." Noll may be able to amend his complaint to state a claim for violation of procedural due process, see 28 CFR §§ 541.22(c), (d); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468, 103 S.Ct. 864, 869, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1984); or the eighth amendment, see Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1492-93 (9th Cir. 1984); Franklin v. State of Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1346 (9th Cir. 1981); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979).
Finally, Noll makes conclusory allegations of inadequate medical care. It is not absolutely clear that he cannot amend his complaint to show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d at 1111. - The rule favoring liberality in amendments to pleadings is particularly important for the pro se litigant. Presumably unskilled in the law, the pro se litigant is far more prone to making errors in pleading than the person who benefits from the representation of counsel. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (Per Curiam); see also Maurer v. Individually and as Members of Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept., 691 F.2d 434, 437 (9th Cir. 1982); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1980).
- The procedural requirements were again considered in Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984). There, we observed that in forma pauperis plaintiffs lack sufficient economic deterrents to filing frivolous lawsuits and limited the Armstrong-Potter requirement that a pro se litigant appearing in forma pauperis is entitled to have process served. Id. at 1226-27. In Franklin, we held that the district court may dismiss with prejudice an in forma pauperis complaint before service of process under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) when the complaint is frivolous, fails to state a claim, or contains a complete defense to the action on its face. Id. at 1227. We also held that reversal of the district court's dismissal of one of Franklin's claims was necessary because the court did not notify Franklin of the defects in his pleadings and grant leave to amend the complaint. Id. at 1230.
- We are nevertheless mindful that courts should not have to serve as advocates for pro se litigants. A statement of deficiencies need not provide great detail or require district courts to act as legal advisors to pro se plaintiffs. Rather, when dismissing a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim, district courts need draft only a few sentences explaining the deficiencies. For example, in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action where the pro se plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law, the court need point out only that the complaint fails to state a claim because it fails to allege facts sufficient to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.
- In Armstrong v. Rushing, 352 F.2d 836, 837 (9th Cir. 1965), we established that a pro se litigant bringing a civil rights suit in forma pauperis is entitled to five procedural protections. These are:
- Because the dismissal was on the merits, Noll was barred from filing another complaint under the res judicata doctrine. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979); Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 775 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that "dismissal based on failure to state a claim requires a judgment on the merits"), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2919, 91 L.Ed.2d 547 (1986).
- The question presented by this appeal is whether the district court adhered to well established procedural requirements before dismissing this civil rights action brought by a pro se plaintiff, who had twice amended his complaint on his own initiative without the assistance of the court's statement of deficiencies. We reverse.
(1) process issued and served, (2) notice of any motion thereafter made by defendant or the court to dismiss the complaint and the grounds therefore, (3) an opportunity to at least submit a written memorandum in opposition to such motion, (4) in the event of dismissal, a statement of the grounds therefor, and (5) an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome the deficiency unless it clearly appears from the complaint that the deficiency cannot be overcome by amendment.
- The order of dismissal is therefore reversed, and the matter remanded to the district court to give Noll an opportunity to amend his complaint after notifying him of its defects.
Factual and Procedural Background
William Noll, a federal prisoner, filed a pro se Bivens-type civil rights action against four officials of the United States Bureau of Prisons. He amended his complaint twice on his own initiative. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim without advising Noll of the specific deficiencies in his second amended complaint or allowing him leave to amend. The dismissal was on the merits, barring Noll from filing another complaint on the same claim under the doctrine of res judicata. This appeal challenges whether the district court complied with procedural protections owed to a pro se plaintiff before dismissing the case.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the district court complied with established procedural requirements before dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim without providing notice of deficiencies or leave to amend.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) | Established the basis for a civil rights action against federal officials for constitutional violations. | Identifies the nature of Noll’s claim as a Bivens-type action. |
| Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1985) | Standard of review for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim (de novo review). | Used to frame the appellate review of the district court’s dismissal. |
| Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979) | Dismissal for failure to state a claim constitutes a judgment on the merits and bars refiling under res judicata. | Supports the conclusion that Noll was barred from filing another complaint on the same claim. |
| Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 775 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1985) | Dismissal for failure to state a claim is a judgment on the merits. | Reinforces the res judicata effect of the dismissal. |
| Armstrong v. Rushing, 352 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1965) | Enumerated five procedural protections required for pro se civil rights plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis. | Serves as the foundational procedural standard the district court failed to meet. |
| Potter v. McCall, 433 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1970) | Reaffirmed Armstrong procedural protections and reversed dismissal for failure to comply. | Supports reversal of dismissal due to procedural deficiencies. |
| Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984) | Clarified that dismissal without service under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is permissible for frivolous or deficient complaints but requires notice and leave to amend. | Supports the requirement that the district court notify and allow amendment, which was not done here. |
| United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1981) | Emphasized Rule 15’s purpose to facilitate decisions on merits over pleadings technicalities. | Supports liberal leave to amend for pro se litigants. |
| Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) | Established liberal pleading standards and leave to amend principles. | Supports the court’s approach to favor amendment over dismissal. |
| Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1980) | Leave to amend must be given unless it is absolutely clear that deficiencies cannot be cured. | Applied to require leave to amend here. |
| Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) | Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. | Supports the requirement to give pro se plaintiffs notice and opportunity to amend. |
| Whitely v. Albers, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986) | Deliberate indifference standard for Eighth Amendment claims regarding prisoner safety. | Suggests Noll may be able to amend to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. |
| Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1986) | Deliberate indifference standard applied in prison conditions cases. | Supports potential amendment to allege deliberate indifference. |
| Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982) | Deliberate indifference and substantive due process in prison conditions. | Supports possible constitutional claims Noll could allege. |
| McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1986) | Substantive due process liberty interest in personal security from assault. | Indicates potential for amendment to allege violation of substantive due process. |
| Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) | Procedural due process protections for administrative segregation of prisoners. | Supports the possibility of procedural due process claims in amended complaint. |
| Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1984) | Procedural due process and Eighth Amendment standards for prison conditions. | Supports potential claims regarding administrative segregation and medical care. |
| Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1984) | Eighth Amendment standards for prisoner treatment. | Supports possible Eighth Amendment claims on segregation conditions. |
| Franklin v. State of Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981) | Standards for prisoner rights and conditions. | Supports claims regarding segregation and conditions of confinement. |
| Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979) | Prisoners’ constitutional rights and conditions of confinement. | Supports potential procedural and substantive due process claims. |
| Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) | Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates Eighth Amendment. | Indicates Noll may be able to amend to state a claim for inadequate medical care. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed whether the district court complied with procedural protections owed to pro se, in forma pauperis civil rights plaintiffs before dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim. It identified the five procedural safeguards established in Armstrong v. Rushing: issuance of process, notice of dismissal motions and grounds, opportunity to oppose, statement of grounds for dismissal, and leave to amend unless amendment is futile.
The court found that although Noll amended his complaint twice, the district court never notified him of the deficiencies in his pleadings nor granted him leave to amend after dismissal. This lack of guidance likely prevented Noll from curing defects. The court emphasized that while courts need not provide detailed legal advice, a brief statement of deficiencies is necessary to enable meaningful amendment.
The court cited Franklin v. Murphy to highlight that dismissal without service under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is appropriate only for frivolous or plainly deficient complaints and that leave to amend is required when defects are curable. Because it was not “absolutely clear” that Noll could not cure his complaint’s deficiencies, the district court erred in dismissing without notice and leave to amend.
The court also referenced Noll’s allegations, noting they were conclusory but potentially amendable to state claims under the Eighth Amendment (deliberate indifference to safety and medical care), procedural due process (administrative segregation without outdoor exercise), and substantive due process (liberty interest in personal security). This further supported the need for an opportunity to amend.
Holding and Implications
The court REVERSED the district court’s dismissal of Noll’s second amended complaint and REMANDED the case with instructions to provide Noll notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend.
The direct effect is to afford Noll procedural protections necessary to attempt to cure pleading deficiencies before dismissal. The decision does not establish new substantive precedent but reinforces established procedural safeguards for pro se civil rights plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis.
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
William Noll, a federal prisoner, brought a Bivens-type civil rights action pro se and in forma pauperis against four officials of the United States Bureau of Prisons. After Noll twice amended his complaint at his own instance, the district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. In dismissing the action, the court did not advise Noll in what respects his second amended complaint was deficient, nor did the court allow Noll leave to amend. We review de novo the dismissal of the action. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985).
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).
Because the dismissal was on the merits, Noll was barred from filing another complaint under the res judicata doctrine. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979); Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 775 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that "dismissal based on failure to state a claim requires a judgment on the merits"), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2919, 91 L.Ed.2d 547 (1986).
The court dismissed the action against two of the named officials on a motion made after service of process and dismissed the action sua sponte against the other two named officials under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) before service of process.
The question presented by this appeal is whether the district court adhered to well established procedural requirements before dismissing this civil rights action brought by a pro se plaintiff, who had twice amended his complaint on his own initiative without the assistance of the court's statement of deficiencies. We reverse.
In Armstrong v. Rushing, 352 F.2d 836, 837 (9th Cir. 1965), we established that a pro se litigant bringing a civil rights suit in forma pauperis is entitled to five procedural protections. These are:
(1) process issued and served, (2) notice of any motion thereafter made by defendant or the court to dismiss the complaint and the grounds therefore, (3) an opportunity to at least submit a written memorandum in opposition to such motion, (4) in the event of dismissal, a statement of the grounds therefor, and (5) an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome the deficiency unless it clearly appears from the complaint that the deficiency cannot be overcome by amendment.
Id. at 837 (footnote omitted).
Five years later in Potter v. McCall, 433 F.2d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), we restated Armstrong's procedural requirements and, because the district court failed to comply with several of them, we reversed the dismissal of a pro se litigant's civil rights action.
The procedural requirements were again considered in Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984). There, we observed that in forma pauperis plaintiffs lack sufficient economic deterrents to filing frivolous lawsuits and limited the Armstrong-Potter requirement that a pro se litigant appearing in forma pauperis is entitled to have process served. Id. at 1226-27. In Franklin, we held that the district court may dismiss with prejudice an in forma pauperis complaint before service of process under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) when the complaint is frivolous, fails to state a claim, or contains a complete defense to the action on its face. Id. at 1227. We also held that reversal of the district court's dismissal of one of Franklin's claims was necessary because the court did not notify Franklin of the defects in his pleadings and grant leave to amend the complaint. Id. at 1230.
While Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 places leave to amend within the sound discretion of the trial court, we have stressed that a court must remain guided by "the underlying purpose of Rule 15 . . . to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities." United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is "absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment." Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (Per Curiam).
The rule favoring liberality in amendments to pleadings is particularly important for the pro se litigant. Presumably unskilled in the law, the pro se litigant is far more prone to making errors in pleading than the person who benefits from the representation of counsel. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (Per Curiam); see also Maurer v. Individually and as Members of Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept., 691 F.2d 434, 437 (9th Cir. 1982); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1980).
The requirement that courts provide a pro se litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his or her complaint helps ensure that the pro se litigant can use the opportunity to amend effectively. Without the benefit of a statement of deficiencies, the pro se litigant will likely repeat previous errors. This is equally true for the pro se litigant who amends his complaint at his own instance without any guidance from the court. Amendments that are made without an understanding of underlying deficiencies are rarely sufficient to cure inadequate pleadings.
We are nevertheless mindful that courts should not have to serve as advocates for pro se litigants. A statement of deficiencies need not provide great detail or require district courts to act as legal advisors to pro se plaintiffs. Rather, when dismissing a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim, district courts need draft only a few sentences explaining the deficiencies. For example, in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action where the pro se plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law, the court need point out only that the complaint fails to state a claim because it fails to allege facts sufficient to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.
Here although Noll twice amended his complaint, he did so without the benefit of the court notifying him of any deficiencies in his previous pleadings. When the district court dismissed Noll's second amended complaint and the action without leave to amend, it failed to provide a statement of the complaint's deficiencies. Because it is not absolutely clear that Noll could not amend his complaint to allege constitutional violations, the district court erred by not notifying Noll of the amended complaint's deficiencies and allowing him leave to amend. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1228 n. 9; Potter, 433 F.2d at 1088.
Noll alleges in his second amended complaint that he was placed in prison with "known enemies" in violation of due process and the eighth amendment. Although his allegations are conclusory, he may be able to amend his complaint to allege facts showing that prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to his physical safety in violation of the eighth amendment, see Whitely v. Albers, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982), or that the officials violated Noll's substantive due process liberty interest in being secure in his person against assault, see McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 785 (9th Cir. 1986).
Additionally, Noll alleges that he was unconstitutionally placed in administrative segregation for ten and one-half months without outdoor exercise in order to separate him from his "known enemies." Noll may be able to amend his complaint to state a claim for violation of procedural due process, see 28 CFR §§ 541.22(c), (d); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468, 103 S.Ct. 864, 869, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1984); or the eighth amendment, see Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1492-93 (9th Cir. 1984); Franklin v. State of Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1346 (9th Cir. 1981); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979).
Finally, Noll makes conclusory allegations of inadequate medical care. It is not absolutely clear that he cannot amend his complaint to show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d at 1111.
The order of dismissal is therefore reversed, and the matter remanded to the district court to give Noll an opportunity to amend his complaint after notifying him of its defects.
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