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MIMS v. MILLER
Factual and Procedural Background
Eva Maree Whidden died leaving two wills. The first will, executed on November 3, 1983, named appellee William Alexander Miller as personal representative and residuary beneficiary, with appellee Sybel A. Husband also as a residuary beneficiary. The second will, executed on September 26, 1984, revoked the first will and devised specific amounts to Miller, Husband, Julia Sanders, and a charitable organization, with the remainder of the estate devised to appellant Angela B. Mims. Robert S. Hobbs was nominated personal representative under the second will.
Miller and Hobbs petitioned for probate of their respective wills, declaring the proceedings adversarial and serving all interested parties, including Mims. Hobbs denied that the first will was the last will, but Mims failed to respond. Miller obtained a default against Mims on July 22, 1985. Appellees responded to Hobbs’ petition denying the validity of the second will and alleged it was procured by undue influence and overreaching by Mims.
Appellees moved for entry of partial final judgment against Mims based on the default, seeking either to substitute the residuary clause of the first will for that of the second will or to have the residuary estate pass intestate. Mims first learned of the default at the hearing on the motion and moved ore tenus to vacate the default. She subsequently filed responsive pleadings. The trial court denied the motion to vacate, prompting this appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the default entered against appellant Angela B. Mims should be vacated based on excusable neglect, existence of a meritorious defense, and reasonable diligence in seeking relief.
- Whether the default operates as an admission that the residuary clause of the second will was procured by undue influence or overreaching, thereby affecting the validity of the residuary clause and disposition of the estate.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Mims contended her failure to respond was due to excusable neglect because she believed the personal representative was protecting her interests.
- She asserted a meritorious defense exists as the validity of the second will, which revoked the first will, was contested on grounds of undue influence.
- Mims argued she acted with diligence by promptly moving to vacate the default upon learning of it.
Appellees' Arguments
- Appellees argued they were entitled to partial final judgment due to the default, treating it as an admission that the residuary clause of the second will was procured by undue influence.
- They contended this would either validate the residuary clause of the first will as a substitute or cause the residuary estate to pass intestate.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bland v. Viking Fire Protection, Inc. of the Southeast, 454 So.2d 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) | Criteria for setting aside defaults: excusable neglect, meritorious defense, and reasonable diligence in seeking relief. | Used as the controlling standard to determine that the default against Mims should have been vacated. |
| In re Blankenship's Estate, 136 So.2d 21 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961) | Duties of a personal representative to defend the will and settle the estate according to the will and Probate Code. | Supported the reasonableness of Mims’ belief that the personal representative was protecting her interests, justifying excusable neglect. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court applied the well-established legal standard for vacating defaults, requiring a showing of excusable neglect, a meritorious defense, and reasonable diligence. It found that Mims, an elderly woman, reasonably believed the personal representative was acting on her behalf, constituting excusable neglect. The pleadings raised a genuine issue concerning undue influence affecting the validity of the second will, thus establishing a meritorious defense. Lastly, Mims promptly moved to vacate the default upon learning of it, demonstrating diligence.
The court rejected appellees’ argument that the default constituted an admission that the residuary clause of the second will was void and that the residuary clause of the first will should substitute or that intestacy should apply. Because the second will expressly revoked the first will, if the second will is valid, the residuary clause passes to Mims regardless of the default. The default against Mims does not resolve the contested issues regarding the validity of the second will.
Holding and Implications
The order denying the motion to vacate the default is reversed.
The direct effect of this decision is that the default entered against appellant Angela B. Mims is set aside, allowing the case to proceed on the merits concerning the validity of the second will and related claims. No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of existing standards for vacating defaults.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Associate Judge.
This is an appeal from a nonfinal order denying a motion to vacate a default.
Eva Maree Whidden died leaving two wills. Under the first will, executed on November 3, 1983, appellee Miller was named personal representative and was a residuary beneficiary. Appellee Sybel A. Husband was the other residuary beneficiary.
On September 26, 1984, Whidden executed a second will. This will specifically revoked the first will. In the second will, Whidden devised $1,000 to Miller, $1,000 to Husband, $5,000 to Julia Sanders, $5,000 to Angels Unaware, Inc., a charitable organization, and the rest, residue and remainder of the estate was devised and bequeathed to appellant Angela B. Mims. Robert S. Hobbs was nominated personal representative.
Miller and Hobbs petitioned for probate of their respective wills. Both filed declarations that the proceedings were adversarial and served their declarations on all interested parties, including Mims.
Hobbs filed a response which in general denied that the first will was the last will and testament. Mims failed to file a response. Miller subsequently obtained a default which was entered by the clerk on July 22, 1985.
Appellees filed responses to the Hobbs petition for probate of the second will. They denied that the second will was the last will and testament and alleged the second will was procured by Mims as a result of overreaching and undue influence.
On March 5, 1986, appellees filed a motion for entry of partial final judgment as to Mims based on the default. Appellees contended they were entitled to an order adjudging that the residuary clause of the second will was procured as a result of undue influence. They maintain this rendered the residuary clause void and that the residuary clause of the first will should be substituted for the residuary clause of the second will. In the alternative, appellees sought an order that the assets which comprised the residue of Whidden's estate under the second will pass intestate to Whidden's heirs at law.
Mims first learned that a default had been entered against her at the hearing on the motion for partial final judgment. When Mims learned of the default, she moved ore tenus to vacate and to continue the hearing. The trial court continued the hearing and granted additional time to file a motion to vacate. In her motion to vacate, Mims asserted that she had been in contact with either Hobbs or his attorney during the pendency of the proceeding and believed they were representing her interests in both the Miller petition and the Hobbs petition. Attached to the motion to vacate was Mims' answer to the Miller petition. She also simultaneously filed an answer to the Hobbs petition and responses to the defenses contained in appellees' answer to the Hobbs petition. Appellees filed a response to the motion to vacate default, and after a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the motion.
It is well settled that courts should liberally set aside defaults so that lawsuits may be determined on their merits. A party seeking to vacate a default must demonstrate that the failure to file responsive pleadings was the result of excusable neglect, that there existed a meritorious defense, and that the party was reasonably diligent in seeking to vacate the default after he learned a default had been entered. Bland v. Viking Fire Protection, Inc. of the Southeast, 454 So.2d 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). We find that these elements have been demonstrated in this case and hence the default against Mims should have been vacated.
First, Mims established that her failure to file a response was the result of excusable neglect. The record reflects that Mims is an eighty-year old woman. She believed that the personal representative was protecting her interest and knew that he had offered for probate the first will under which she would have an interest. There is a reasonable basis for this belief because the personal representative has a duty to defend the will. In re Blankenship's Estate, 136 So.2d 21 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961). The personal representative is under a duty to settle and distribute the estate in accordance with the terms of the will and the Probate Code. § 733.602(1), Fla. Stat. (1985).
Mims also established a meritorious defense. An examination of the pleadings reflects that the first will cannot prevail if the second will is valid because the second will specifically revokes the first will. The issue as to whether the second will was procured by undue influence or overreaching was clearly raised by the pleadings, even without the answer of Mims. Appellees argue that the default against Mims is in essence an admission or acquiescence that the will, at least the part in which she has an interest, namely the residuary clause, was procured by undue influence or overreaching. The effect of this, they contend, would be to give effect to the residuary clause of the first will, thereby substituting it in the second will, or in the alternative, that the residuary clause will be void and the residuary estate would pass by intestacy. We cannot accept the logic of either alternative.
The first will shall be revoked in toto if the second will is the valid will. The petition for probate of the second will filed by Hobbs alleges that it is the last will and testament of Whidden. The answer of appellees placed that in issue. The default of Mims will not affect that result and, if the second will is in fact determined to be the last will of Whidden, the residuary clause will still be in effect to pass to Mims the residuary bequest.
Finally, Mims was diligent in seeking to vacate the default. Mims learned of the default on March 10, 1986, and on March 19, filed her motion to vacate.
The order denying the motion to vacate default is reversed.
FRANK, A.C.J., and HALL, J., concur.
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