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PEOPLE v. FERNANDEZ (ON REM)
People v. Fernandez (On Remand) — Summary of Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals and held that a mandatory life sentence is required on conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder under MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1). The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for briefing and decision on whether a person sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is eligible for parole consideration under MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4) and, if so, the proper retroactive effect of such a decision. On remand, the Court of Appeals (per curiam) addressed those questions and concluded that a person sentenced to life for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board after serving ten calendar years, and that this clarification should receive full retroactive effect. A separate opinion by Judge J.H. Gillis dissented, arguing that conspiracy to commit first-degree murder should be sentenced to mandatory, nonparolable life imprisonment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a person sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is eligible for parole consideration under MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4) after serving ten calendar years.
- If such a person is eligible for parole consideration, what is the proper retroactive effect of that determination.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| People v Fernandez, 143 Mich. App. 388; 372 N.W.2d 567 (1985) | Statement that the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that a mandatory life sentence is required on conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder; remanded for briefing on parole eligibility and retroactivity. | The Court of Appeals proceeded on remand to address parole eligibility under MCL 791.234(4) and the retroactive effect of any decision, as directed by the Supreme Court. |
| People v Johnson, 421 Mich. 494, 498; 364 N.W.2d 654 (1984) | Holds that Proposal B had no application to fixed or life sentences. | The court relied on this holding to conclude that Proposal B does not restrict application of the "lifer law" to a life sentence imposed for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. |
| People v Kamin, 405 Mich. 482, 494; 275 N.W.2d 777 (1979) | Authority cited in support of retroactive effect for a clarification or restatement of existing law. | Cited by the Court of Appeals to justify giving full retroactive effect to its clarification regarding parole eligibility. |
| People v Szymanski, 102 Mich. App. 745; 302 N.W.2d 316 (1981) | Authority cited in support of retroactive effect (and cited by the dissent for the same purpose). | Cited to support the conclusion that the decision should receive full retroactive effect. |
| People v Buckley, 302 Mich. 12, 21; 4 N.W.2d 448 (1942) | Principle that the Legislature is charged with knowledge of existing laws on the same subject when it enacts new laws. | Used in the dissent to argue the Legislature knew at the time it enacted the conspiracy statute that first-degree murder carried a mandatory, nonparolable life sentence. |
| PSB State Bank v Comerica Inc, 151 Mich. App. 452, 460; 391 N.W.2d 371 (1986) | Administrative agency interpretations of a statute are given great weight because of the agency's expertise. | Invoked in the dissent to give weight to the parole board's historical interpretation that conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is a mandatory, nonparolable life sentence. |
| Wayne Co v Auditor General, 250 Mich. 227, 237; 229 N.W. 911 (1930) | Legislature's reenactment of a statute interpreted in a particular manner gives rise to an inference that the Legislature approved that interpretation. | Used in the dissent to argue that the Legislature's failure to change the statutory language supports the parole board's interpretation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court of Appeals' per curiam opinion follows the Supreme Court's remand instruction and analyzes the interplay of the conspiracy statute, the first-degree murder statute, and the "lifer law" parole statute.
Key points from the court's analysis:
- The lifer law, MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4), places prisoners sentenced for life under the jurisdiction of the parole board after serving ten calendar years, except for prisoners sentenced for life for first-degree murder (and certain major controlled substance offenses), who are specifically excluded.
- The conspiracy statute, MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1), provides for punishment "equal to that which could be imposed if [the defendant] had been convicted of committing the crime he conspired to commit."
- The first-degree murder statute, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, prescribes punishment by imprisonment for life but does not itself state that such a life sentence is nonparolable; rather, the nonparolability of first-degree murder stems from its explicit exclusion in the lifer law statute.
- Because the lifer law does not specifically exclude persons convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder from parole consideration after ten years, the court concluded that persons sentenced to life for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder fall within the parole board's jurisdiction after ten years.
- The court also concluded that Proposal B does not prevent application of the lifer law to life sentences for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, relying on People v Johnson for the proposition that Proposal B has no application to fixed or life sentences.
- Finally, the court determined that this holding is essentially a restatement and clarification of existing law and should receive full retroactive effect, citing precedents that support retroactivity of such clarifications.
The dissenting opinion (J.H. Gillis, J.) applies alternative rules of statutory construction, emphasizing legislative knowledge of existing laws, the parole board's longstanding interpretation that conspiracy to commit first-degree murder carries a mandatory, nonparolable life sentence, and the inference arising from legislative reenactment. The dissent would hold conspiracy to commit first-degree murder to be nonparolable life and would affirm that result, also treating the decision as a restatement entitled to full retroactive effect.
Holding and Implications
The Court of Appeals held that a person sentenced to life for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board after serving ten calendar years, and that this clarification should receive full retroactive effect.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: A defendant sentenced to life for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is eligible for parole consideration after serving ten calendar years of the sentence.
- Retroactivity: The court characterized the ruling as a restatement and clarification of existing law and expressly granted full retroactive effect.
- Scope of precedent: The opinion frames the decision as a clarification rather than the creation of a new rule; it relies on existing statutory interpretation and precedent to reach its result.
ON REMAND
PER CURIAM.
On appeal, the Supreme Court has reversed the decision of this Court and held that a mandatory life sentence is required on conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder under MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1). The Supreme Court further provided as follows:
People v Fernandez, 143 Mich. App. 388; 372 N.W.2d 567 (1985).
We remand the case to the Court of Appeals for briefing and decision on whether a person sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is eligible for parole consideration under MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28. 2304(4) and, if so, the proper retroactive effect of such a decision.[ ]
The "lifer law" set forth in MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304 (4) provides as follows:
A prisoner under sentence for life or for a term of years, other than prisoners sentenced for life for murder in the first degree and prisoners sentenced for life or for a minimum term of imprisonment for a major controlled substance offense, who has served 10 calendar years of the sentence is subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board and may be released on parole by the parole board, subject to the following conditions. . . .
Both defendant and the prosecutor agree that after serving ten years defendant is eligible for parole consideration under MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4) where, as here, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The lifer law statute does not specifically exclude persons convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment from the jurisdiction of the parole board after serving ten calendar years of the sentence. The conspiracy statute, MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1), provides for punishment by penalty equal to that which could be imposed if defendant had been convicted of committing the crime he conspired to commit. The first-degree murder statute, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, provides that a person convicted of first-degree murder shall be punished by imprisonment for life. This statute does not, however, state that such a sentence of life imprisonment is nonparolable. What makes first-degree murder a nonparolable life offense is MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4). In other words, first-degree murder is nonparolable because it is specifically excluded from the above statute, while conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is not.
Furthermore, Proposal B does not preclude application of the lifer law to persons convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. In 1984, in People v Johnson, the Supreme Court held that Proposal B had no application to fixed or life sentences. Therefore, as the Supreme Court recognized in the within case:
421 Mich. 494, 498; 364 N.W.2d 654 (1984).
Thus, there is no apparent restriction arising from Proposal B on application of the "lifer law" to a life sentence imposed for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.[ ]
We agree with both defendant and the prosecutor and conclude that a person sentenced to life for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board after serving ten calendar years.
We further believe that this decision, which is essentially a restatement and clarification of existing law, should receive full retroactive effect.
See People v Kamin, 405 Mich. 482, 494; 275 N.W.2d 777 (1979); People v Szymanski, 102 Mich. App. 745; 302 N.W.2d 316 (1981).
J.H. GILLIS, J. (dissenting).
I dissent and I would hold that a person convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder must be sentenced to mandatory, nonparolable life in prison.
MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1) provides in part:
Any person who conspires together with 1 or more persons to commit an offense prohibited by law, or to commit a legal act in an illegal manner is guilty of the crime of conspiracy punishable as provided herein:
(a) except as provided in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) if commission of the offense prohibited by law is punishable by imprisonment for 1 year or more, the person convicted under this section shall be punished by a penalty equal to that which could be imposed if he had been convicted of committing the crime he conspired to commit and in the discretion of the court an additional penalty of a fine of $10,000.00 may be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4) provides:
A prisoner under sentence for life or for a term of years, other than prisoners sentenced for life for murder in the first degree and prisoners sentenced for life or for a minimum term of imprisonment for a major controlled substance offense, who has served 10 calendar years of the sentence is subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board and may be released on parole by the parole board, subject to the following conditions. . . . [Emphasis supplied.]
MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1) became effective on March 10, 1967. MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4), as it pertains to the nonparolability of those convicted of first-degree murder, has been in effect since 1948. Although MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4) has been amended since 1948, including 1978, this language has not been altered.
While the majority argues that MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4) is unambiguous, I believe other rules of statutory construction are more properly applied to this case. First, I note that the Legislature is charged with knowledge of the existing laws on the same subject when it promulgates new laws. See, e.g., People v Buckley, 302 Mich. 12, 21; 4 N.W.2d 448 (1942). Second, an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute is given great weight due to the expertise of the agency with respect to the subject under its jurisdiction. PSB State Bank v Comerica Inc, 151 Mich. App. 452, 460; 391 N.W.2d 371 (1986). Third, the Legislature's reenactment of a statute which was interpreted in a particular manner gives rise to an inference that the Legislature approved that interpretation. See, e.g., Wayne Co v Auditor General, 250 Mich. 227, 237; 229 N.W. 911 (1930). Fourth, the primary goal of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the Legislature; therefore, it is important to consider the general purpose sought to be accomplished by a statute in determining its meaning. PSB State Bank, supra, 460.
As defendant concedes, the present conspiracy statute was enacted following the Legislature's dissatisfaction with the lenient penalties previously provided. At the time MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1) was passed, the penalty for first-degree murder was mandatory, nonparolable life. The Legislature must be charged with knowledge of this penalty. See, e.g., Buckley, supra. Furthermore, the parole board has consistently interpreted the penalty for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder as mandatory, nonparolable life. In amending MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4), the Legislature did not specifically state that conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree was a parolable offense despite its chargeable knowledge of the parole board's interpretation. See, e.g., Buckley, supra; Wayne Co, supra. Finally, I believe that the Legislature intended to punish conspiracy to commit a felony at least as seriously as the commission of the felony itself. MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1). I note that conspiracy may be more severely punished because the defendant must plan the crime with another. Id. For these reasons, I believe that defendant is properly sentenced to mandatory, nonparolable life. I further note that I do not believe that defendant should benefit merely because the hit men he hired were unsuccessful.
I further believe that this decision is a restatement of existing law and, therefore, is entitled to full retroactive effect. People v Szymanski, 102 Mich. App. 745; 302 N.W.2d 316 (1981), lv den 411 Mich. 863 (1981). I would affirm.
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