PEOPLE v. TAYLOR

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant maintains that he was subjected to an improper course of cross-examination and was thereby deprived of a fair trial. We disagree. It is well settled that trial courts have broad discretion in determining the extent to which the prosecution should be permitted to impeach the credibility of a testifying defendant through use of his prior convictions or bad acts (People v Mayrant, 43 N.Y.2d 236; People v Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371). We perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling that inquiry could be made of the defendant regarding a 1973 conviction for criminal trespass. While the lapse of time may to some extent affect the materiality of a prior conviction (People v Williams, 56 N.Y.2d 236, 239; People v Sandoval, supra, at 376), the fact that a conviction is temporally remote does not, by itself, mandate preclusion of cross-examination with respect thereto (see, People v Emmons, 123 A.D.2d 475, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 827; People v Scott, 118 A.D.2d 881, lv denied 67 N.Y.2d 1056; People v Crandall, 108 A.D.2d 413).

Nor was the questioning of the defendant regarding a series of uncharged assaults improper. The general rule is that where a witness denies having committed a prior wrongful act, the cross-examiner may not undertake to refute the denial by proving contradictory facts. The cross-examiner is not, however, thereby prohibited from continuing with his inquiry in an effort to induce the witness to change his testimony (People v Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198; People v Simpson, 109 A.D.2d 461, appeal dismissed 67 N.Y.2d 1026; Richardson, Evidence § 491 [Prince 10th ed]). The prosecutor questioned the defendant in good faith and upon a reasonable basis in fact (see, People v Duffy, 36 N.Y.2d 258, mot to amend remittitur granted 36 N.Y.2d 857, cert denied 423 U.S. 861; People v Simpson, supra) and his continued cross-examination did not transcend the bounds of propriety.

While the defendant was subjected to an improper line of questioning regarding prior traffic infractions (see, People v Dickman, 42 N.Y.2d 294, 298; People v Griffin, 116 Misc.2d 751, 758; Vehicle and Traffic Law § 155), we view this error, arising in the context of a bench trial, to have been harmless (see, People v Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230; People v Brown, 24 N.Y.2d 168; People v Murdocca, 120 A.D.2d 682, lv denied 68 N.Y.2d 815; People v Reyes, 116 A.D.2d 602, lv denied 67 N.Y.2d 949).

Finally, the sentence imposed was neither inconsistent with sound sentencing principles nor inappropriate (see, People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Bracken, J.P., Kunzeman, Spatt and Harwood, JJ., concur.