PEOPLE v. DANIEL

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant's contentions, we conclude that his motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds (see, CPL 30.30) was properly denied. After subtracting a reasonable time for the People to arrange for the defendant's arraignment (see, People v Lopez, 149 A.D.2d 735) and deducting delays resulting from adjournments consented to, or requested by, the defendant, the total time chargeable to the People is within the permitted six-calendar-month time limit (see, People v Jones, 105 A.D.2d 179, affd 66 N.Y.2d 529).

Moreover, the hearing court properly determined that the defendant lacked standing to contest the propriety of the search (see, People v Wesley, 73 N.Y.2d 351; People v Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160). At bar, the defendant informed the police that he did not reside in the apartment in which the drugs were found, that he did not possess a key to the apartment, and that he kept no property therein. Since, by virtue of the foregoing, the defendant failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises, he was without standing to contest the validity of the search (see, People v Wesley, supra; People v Ponder, supra; People v Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759; People v Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, cert denied 400 U.S. 851; People v Torres, 97 A.D.2d 802).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15). Kunzeman, J.P., Kooper, Harwood and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.