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EX PARTE PATTERSON
Factual and Procedural Background
Calvin Patterson sustained personal injuries while employed by Opelika Foundry Company, Inc. He filed a complaint in Lee County Circuit Court seeking compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. After an ore tenus hearing, the trial court found that Patterson's injuries were not caused by an accident arising out of his employment and denied his claim. Patterson appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted Patterson's petition for a writ of certiorari and reversed and remanded the case.
At the time of injury, Patterson was 47 years old, had worked at the Foundry for approximately 11 years, and had an excellent attendance record. His job involved controlling an overhead conveyor belt transporting heavy iron pieces. Patterson was injured while standing beneath a steel grill platform; he was knocked unconscious and suffered head, hand, and back injuries. There were no eyewitnesses, and Patterson did not know what caused his injuries. Two fellow employees were nearby, performing their duties. Patterson was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Patterson's injuries were caused by an accident that arose out of his employment within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
- Whether the trial court erred in finding that Patterson failed to carry his burden of proving causation between the injury and his employment.
- Whether Patterson's injuries were excluded from compensation because they might have resulted from an assault for personal reasons or idiopathic factors.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent's (Opelika Foundry Company, Inc.) Arguments
- Patterson failed to prove that his injuries were caused by an accident arising out of his employment.
- Patterson did not exclude the possibility that he was assaulted for personal reasons by a fellow employee or someone unaffiliated with the Foundry, which would preclude compensation under Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-1(9).
- The injuries might have resulted from idiopathic factors—preexisting physical weaknesses or disease unrelated to employment.
Petitioner's (Calvin Patterson) Arguments
- Although he did not prove the exact cause or instrumentality of the injury, Patterson argued that his injuries were the result of an accident arising out of his employment.
- The trial court's denial of compensation was erroneous because the evidence sufficiently connected the injury to his employment.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Martin, 417 So.2d 199 (Ala. 1981) | Burden of proof in workmen's compensation cases. | Trial court cited this case in finding Patterson failed to carry his burden of proof. |
| Ex parte Neal, 423 So.2d 850 (Ala. 1982) | Standard of appellate review in workmen's compensation cases. | Supreme Court stated review is limited to whether any legal evidence supports trial court's findings. |
| Massey v. United States Steel Corp., 264 Ala. 227, 86 So.2d 375 (1955) | Definition and causal connection required for "arising out of" employment. | Cited to explain that injury must be causally connected to employment. |
| Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Wynn, 266 Ala. 327, 96 So.2d 159 (1957) | Claimant's burden to prove injury arose out of employment. | Reaffirmed claimant's burden of proof. |
| Ex parte Price, 555 So.2d 1060 (Ala. 1989) | Medical causation element in workmen's compensation cases. | Referenced in recent discussion supporting causal connection of injury to employment. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court acknowledged that Patterson's injuries occurred in the course of his employment, which is undisputed. The central issue was whether the injuries arose out of employment, requiring a causal connection between the injury and the employment.
The Court analyzed the evidence, noting Patterson's good health, long employment, and absence of evidence that the injury resulted from an assault or idiopathic factors. While Patterson did not identify the exact cause or instrumentality of the injury, the Court found that the nature of the injuries and the circumstances did not support an inference that they were unrelated to employment.
The Court concluded that the only reasonable view of the evidence was that Patterson's injuries were causally connected to his employment, despite the unexplained circumstances of the accident. The trial court's finding to the contrary was not supported by the evidence.
Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this analysis.
Holding and Implications
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the trial court's judgment denying Patterson's claim was not supported by the evidence because Patterson's injuries were caused by an accident arising out of his employment. The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The direct effect is that Patterson's claim for workmen's compensation must be reconsidered under the correct legal standard. The opinion does not establish new precedent beyond clarifying the application of existing legal principles to the facts of this case.
HOUSTON, Justice.
Calvin Patterson sustained personal injuries while employed by Opelika Foundry Company, Inc. ("the Foundry"). He subsequently filed a complaint in Lee County Circuit Court, seeking compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-1 et seq. After hearing ore tenus evidence, the trial court found that Patterson's injuries were not caused by an accident that arose out of his employment and entered a judgment denying his claim. Patterson appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which affirmed the judgment. See Patterson v. Opelika Foundry Co., 561 So.2d 234 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989). We granted Patterson's petition for a writ of certiorari, pursuant to Rule 39, A.R.App.P. We reverse and remand.
The record reveals that at the time he sustained his injuries, Patterson was 47 years old and had been employed by the Foundry for approximately 11 years. He appeared to be in good physical condition and had an excellent job attendance record, having missed only one week during his term of employment at the Foundry; that was due to the "flu." Patterson's job primarily involved pushing a button that controlled an overhead conveyor belt that transported pieces of iron, each weighing between 150 and 200 pounds, to a container where they were melted. Patterson, wearing a hard hat, was standing beneath a steel grill platform doing his job when he was knocked unconscious, suffering head, hand, and back injuries. Patterson testified that he did not know what happened to him. He stated that he remembered being on the job and later waking up in the hospital. Patterson also testified that there were only two people close to him at the time he was injured and that both of them were fellow employees who were performing their respective duties. He further testified that at the time he was injured, he was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. There were no eyewitnesses to the incident.
The trial court's judgment reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
"This is a Workmen's Compensation case. Plaintiff, Calvin Patterson, was injured while on the job at Opelika Foundry Co., Inc., Defendant.
"The Court has heard sworn testimony and considered evidence submitted by the parties. Evidence showed that the Plaintiff, while at work on August 25, 1987, sustained injuries including a broken jaw, loss of part of a finger and back injuries.
"There were no witnesses to the incident causing the injuries. The Plaintiff does not know what happened. No evidence or testimony was presented to show the condition of the work place before or after the injuries to Plaintiff.
"There was speculation by Plaintiff that iron had fallen on him. However, there was no evidence that any overhead moving of material was taking place. No testimony was presented that material was strewn in the area where the injury occurred so as to warrant a conclusion that anything had fallen on him. In short, the only evidence before the Court is that Plaintiff was injured. In no way is it shown to be related to his employment.
"The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of proof. Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Martin, 417 So.2d 199 (Ala. 1981)."
Our review in workmen's compensation cases is limited to a determination of whether there was any legal evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact. If any reasonable view of the evidence supports the findings of the trial court, this Court may then determine whether the correct legal conclusions have been drawn therefrom. Ex parte Neal, 423 So.2d 850 (Ala. 1982).
For Patterson's injuries to be compensable, they had to be "caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment." Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-51. As the Court of Civil Appeals acknowledged in its opinion, and as reflected in the trial court's findings, it is undisputed that Patterson's injuries occurred in the course of his employment. For a good definition of the phrase "in the course of," see Massey v. United States Steel Corp., 264 Ala. 227, 86 So.2d 375 (1955). The sole issue is whether Patterson's injuries were caused by an accident that arose out of his employment.
"Accident" is defined in Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-1(8), as follows:
"Such term, as used in the phrases 'personal injuries due to accident' or 'injuries or death caused by accident' shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen event, happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time injury to the physical structure of the body or damage to an artificial member of the body by accidental means."
The phrase "arising out of . . . employment" refers to the employment as being the source and cause of the accident. This Court has held that the rational mind must be able to causally connect the resulting injury to the employment. Massey v. United States Steel Corp., supra. The claimant bears the burden of proving that his injury arose out of his employment. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Wynn, 266 Ala. 327, 96 So.2d 159 (1957).
The Foundry contends that Patterson failed to prove that his injuries were caused by an accident that arose out of his employment and, therefore, that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed. As part of this contention, it argues that Patterson failed to show that he had not been assaulted for personal reasons either by a fellow employee or by someone not affiliated with the Foundry; therefore, it argues, compensation would be precluded under Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-1(9). The Foundry also maintains that Patterson's injuries are not compensable because they could have been the result of an accident that was caused by idiopathic factors.
Section 25-5-1(9) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
"INJURIES BY AN ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. Without otherwise affecting either the meaning or interpretation of such clause, such clause . . . shall not include any injury caused by the act of a third person or fellow employee intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal to him and not directed against him as an employee or because of his employment. . . ."
We use the word "idiopathic" as it is used by Professor Larson, to mean "peculiar to the individual" and not "arising from an unknown cause." Idiopathic refers to an employee's preexisting physical weakness or disease. 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 12.00.
Conceding that he did not prove what instrumentality in the workplace actually caused his injuries, Patterson maintains, nonetheless, that he proved that his injuries were the result of an accident that arose out of his employment and that the trial court's judgment denying his claim is, therefore, due to be reversed. We agree.
The trial court found, in essence, that the rational mind could not causally connect Patterson's injuries to his employment. The court stated in its judgment: "In short, the only evidence before the Court is that Plaintiff was injured. In no way is it shown to be related to his employment." The record shows, as the trial court found, that Patterson suffered a broken jaw, the loss of part of a finger, and back injuries while performing the duties of his employment, and we note that these injuries are the kind that normally occur suddenly and traumatically. However, the evidence shows more. Patterson testified that there were only two people close to him at the time he was injured and that both of them were fellow employees who were performing their respective duties. No evidence was presented by the Foundry tending to show that Patterson had been the victim of an assault. Likewise, Patterson testified that prior to suffering his injuries he was in good physical shape and that he had been absent from work only one week, due to a minor illness, during his 11 years of employment at the Foundry. This evidence was sufficient to show, at least prima facie, that there was no basis upon which to reasonably infer that idiopathic factors played a role in the accident, and, again, the Foundry presented no evidence to the contrary. It appears to us that the only reasonable view of the evidence requires a finding that Patterson's injuries were the result of an accident that was causally connected to his employment, notwithstanding the fact that the circumstances surrounding the accident itself remain largely unexplained. For a recent discussion of the element of medical causation in a workmen's compensation context, see Ex parte Price, 555 So.2d 1060 (Ala. 1989).
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court's judgment is not supported by the evidence and, therefore, cannot be upheld. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is hereby reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, SHORES, ADAMS, STEAGALL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
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