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MATTER OF MARKOWITZ
Factual and Procedural Background
The Departmental Disciplinary Committee (DDC) for the First Judicial Department moved, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 603.4(e)(1)(i) and (iii), for an order suspending respondent Irving Markowitz from the practice of law immediately until disciplinary matters pending before the DDC were concluded. Respondent was admitted to practice by the Appellate Division, First Judicial Department on February 4, 1929, and maintained an office in that Department. On August 2, 1989 and August 21, 1989, respondent appeared before staff counsel of the DDC and, under oath, answered questions regarding two complaints alleging conversion of certain escrow moneys. During that testimony respondent made substantial admissions, and the record includes uncontroverted bank records which the court regarded as lending credence to allegations that respondent converted thousands of dollars from escrow accounts. The court considered these facts in deciding the DDC's motion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the court should enter an immediate interim suspension of respondent from the practice of law pursuant to 22 NYCRR 603.4(e)(1)(i) and (iii) pending the resolution of disciplinary proceedings.
- Whether respondent should be ordered to show cause within 90 days why a final order of suspension, censure, or disbarment should not be entered, and be directed to appear before the DDC for a hearing and recommendation.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| (Matter of Padilla, 67 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 447-448) | Cited as authority supporting interim suspension in disciplinary matters. | Referenced by the court to support the conclusion that suspension pending resolution of disciplinary proceedings was appropriate under the circumstances. |
| (Matter of Haley, 150 A.D.2d 119, 120 [1st Dept 1989]) | Cited as authority supporting interim suspension in disciplinary matters. | Used by the court as a precedent indicating suspension may be warranted where admissions and evidence lend credibility to allegations of misconduct. |
| (Matter of Wechsler, 141 A.D.2d 204, 205-206 [1st Dept 1988]) | Cited as authority supporting interim suspension in disciplinary matters. | Relied upon to justify an interim suspension pending final determination of disciplinary charges when factual admissions and records support the allegations. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded from the procedural request and the evidentiary record presented to staff counsel. The DDC moved under 22 NYCRR 603.4(e)(1)(i) and (iii) for immediate suspension pending disciplinary proceedings. The court emphasized that respondent had appeared twice before DDC staff counsel on August 2 and August 21, 1989, and, under oath, made substantial admissions regarding complaints that he converted escrow funds. The court observed that these admissions, together with uncontroverted bank records in the record, lent credence to allegations that respondent had converted thousands of dollars from escrow accounts. Citing prior disciplinary suspension authorities (Matter of Padilla; Matter of Haley; Matter of Wechsler), the court concluded that, under the circumstances presented, an interim suspension was appropriate to protect the public and the integrity of the profession while the disciplinary proceeding is resolved. The court therefore granted the DDC's motion and set procedures for further proceedings (show cause, hearing before the DDC, and report and recommendation).
Holding and Implications
The court granted the petitioner's motion and ordered that respondent be suspended from the practice of law forthwith, pending final determination of the disciplinary proceedings.
Direct consequences ordered by the court:
- Respondent is suspended from practice as an attorney and counselor-at-law in the State of New York effective immediately and until further order of the court.
- Respondent is ordered to show cause within 90 days of entry of the suspension order why a final order of suspension, censure, or disbarment should not be entered.
- Respondent is directed to show cause before the Departmental Disciplinary Committee, which shall hold a hearing, report, and recommend to the court whether a final order of censure, suspension, or disbarment should be made.
The opinion does not discuss broader legal implications or announce a new rule; its effect is the immediate interim suspension of respondent and the initiation of further disciplinary proceedings as described.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner, Departmental Disciplinary Committee (DDC) for the First Judicial Department, moves for an order, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 603.4 (e) (1) (i) and (iii), suspending respondent from the practice of law forthwith until such time as disciplinary matters pending before the DDC have been concluded.
Respondent, Irving Markowitz, was admitted to the practice of law by the Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, on February 4, 1929. At all times relevant herein, respondent has maintained an office for the practice of law in the First Department.
On August 2, 1989 and August 21, 1989, respondent appeared before staff counsel of the DDC to answer, under oath, questions regarding two complaints filed against him which alleged that he converted certain escrow moneys entrusted to him. In the course of his testimony, respondent made substantial admissions, which, along with uncontroverted evidence in the form of bank records, lends credence to the allegations that he converted thousands of dollars from escrow accounts. Under the circumstances herein presented, it is appropriate to suspend respondent pending the resolution of this disciplinary proceeding. (Matter of Padilla, 67 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 447-448; Matter of Haley, 150 A.D.2d 119, 120 [1st Dept 1989]; Matter of Wechsler, 141 A.D.2d 204, 205-206 [1st Dept 1988].)
Accordingly, petitioner's motion should be granted, and respondent suspended from the practice of law forthwith and ordered to show cause within 90 days of entry of this court's order of suspension why a final order of suspension, censure or disbarment should not be entered.
KUPFERMAN, J.P., CARRO, MILONAS, WALLACH and SMITH, JJ., concur.
Respondent is directed to show cause before the Departmental Disciplinary Committee, which shall hold a hearing, report and recommend to this court why a final order of censure, suspension or disbarment should not be made and, pending final determination of the petition, respondent is suspended from practice as an attorney and counselor-at-law in the State of New York, effective immediately, and until the further order of this court.
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