- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
IN RE M. E. J
Factual and Procedural Background
M. E. J., a juvenile, was charged with three counts of murder. The state served M. E. J. with notice of its intent to transfer the case to superior court under OCGA § 15-11-39 on June 15, 1990; M. E. J.'s mother was served with notice on June 18, 1990. M. E. J. appeared with counsel in juvenile court on June 21, 1990, for a hearing concerning transfer. At the first hearing the juvenile's attorney, apparently unaware of the state's motion to transfer, attempted to admit the crimes for the purpose of sentencing. The juvenile court refused to accept that admission for sentencing or to receive evidence, stating the hearing was to determine transfer, not the merits, and then terminated the hearing after instructing the state to give written notice to the juvenile's attorney and scheduled a second transfer hearing. At the second hearing defense counsel argued that the prior admission had placed the juvenile in jeopardy and that transferring the case would violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVIII of the Georgia Constitution. The juvenile court concluded the admission at the first hearing was limited to determining whether there were reasonable grounds to transfer under OCGA § 15-11-39(a)(3)(A), found jeopardy had not attached because no evidence on the merits had been received, and ordered the case transferred to Fulton Superior Court. This Court reviewed that transfer order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the juvenile's attempted admission at the initial transfer hearing constituted attachment of jeopardy such that transfer to superior court would violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Georgia Constitution.
- Whether the juvenile court's handling of the admission violated Juvenile Court Rule 10.4 by failing to conduct an adjudicatory (merits) hearing on the admission.
- Whether an admission made at a transfer hearing constitutes a "hearing on the merits" that would bar transfer under OCGA § 15-11-39(a).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (juvenile's) arguments
- Because the juvenile admitted the charges at the first hearing, jeopardy attached; transferring the case to superior court would therefore violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Georgia Constitution (Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVIII).
- Implicitly, the juvenile argued the admission was an adjudicatory act that triggered protections against subsequent prosecution in superior court.
Appellee's (state's) arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellee's legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Lincoln v. State, 138 Ga. App. 234 (225 S.E.2d 708) (1976) | Held that a juvenile could not be bound over to superior court after his guilty plea had been accepted and he had been sentenced in juvenile court. | The Court distinguished Lincoln on the ground that, unlike Lincoln where a guilty plea was accepted and the juvenile was sentenced, here the juvenile court refused to accept the admission for sentencing and heard no evidence on the merits; therefore Lincoln did not control. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court concluded that jeopardy had not attached from the juvenile's attempted admission at the first hearing because the juvenile court expressly refused to accept the admission for sentencing and did not receive any evidence on the merits. The Court emphasized the limited purpose of the transfer hearing: to determine whether there were reasonable grounds to believe the child committed the alleged delinquent acts for purposes of transfer under OCGA § 15-11-39(a)(3)(A). The record showed the juvenile court inquired whether the juvenile admitted the crimes solely for the limited purpose of determining transfer and accepted any admission only for that limited transfer-purpose.
The Court rejected the juvenile's reliance on Lincoln v. State because Lincoln involved an accepted guilty plea and sentencing in juvenile court, which created an adjudication on the merits. By contrast, in this case no adjudicatory hearing on the merits occurred and the court had refused to accept the admission for sentencing or otherwise decide the merits. The Court further held that the juvenile court did not violate Juvenile Court Rule 10.4: under Rule 10.4 the juvenile court has discretion to accept or refuse an admission on the merits, and here the court did not accept the admission within the meaning of Rule 10.4.
The opinion also notes that statements made by a child at a transfer hearing "are not admissible against him over objection in the criminal proceedings following the transfer," citing OCGA § 15-11-39(d) (effective July 1, 1991) and OCGA § 15-11-39(e).
Holding and Implications
Judgment affirmed.
Holding: The Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's transfer of the offense for prosecution to Fulton Superior Court, concluding that the juvenile's attempted admission at the initial transfer hearing did not constitute jeopardy nor an adjudication on the merits that would bar transfer under OCGA § 15-11-39(a).
Implications: The direct effect is that the juvenile court's order transferring the case to Fulton Superior Court stands. The opinion does not announce broader legal holdings beyond its application to the facts presented; it distinguishes prior authority (Lincoln) but does not purport to establish a new rule beyond the conclusion that a limited-purpose admission at a transfer hearing that is neither accepted for sentencing nor accompanied by adjudicatory proceedings does not bar transfer.
FLETCHER, Justice.
M. E. J., a juvenile, was charged with three counts of murder. There is evidence that on June 15, 1990, the state served M. E. J. with notice of its intent to transfer his case to superior court under OCGA § 15-11-39. The record indicates that M. E. J.'s mother was served with this notice on June 18, 1990. M. E. J. appeared with counsel for a hearing in Juvenile Court on June 21, 1990.
M. E. J.'s attorney apparently was not aware of the state's motion to transfer. When the associate juvenile court judge asked if M. E. J. admitted or denied those paragraphs of the delinquency petition charging him with murder, M. E. J.'s attorney attempted to admit the crimes for the purpose of sentencing. The court refused to accept the admission for that purpose or to receive any evidence, noting that the hearing was to determine whether the offense should be transferred for prosecution, not to determine the merits of the case. When M. E. J.'s attorney complained that notice of the hearing was defective, the court instructed the state to give M. E. J.'s attorney written notice of its intent to transfer. The court then terminated the hearing and scheduled a second hearing on the motion to transfer.
Under OCGA § 15-11-39 (a) (2), the state is not required to give notice to the attorney of the juvenile.
At the second hearing M. E. J.'s attorney argued that because M. E. J. admitted the charges against him at the first hearing, he was placed in jeopardy, and therefore a transfer of his case to superior court would violate the double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVIII of the Georgia Constitution. The juvenile court found that M. E. J.'s admission of the crimes went only to the issue of whether there were "reasonable grounds to believe that ... the child committed the delinquent act alleged," OCGA § 15-11-39 (a) (3) (A), in order to transfer the case to superior court. The juvenile court also found that the two hearings were for the sole purpose of determining whether the case should be transferred to superior court, and as no evidence on the merits of the charges against the juvenile had been admitted, jeopardy had not attached. The juvenile court then ordered that the offense for prosecution be transferred to Fulton Superior Court.
We note that any statements made by the child at a transfer hearing "are not admissible against him over objection in the criminal proceedings following the transfer." OCGA § 15-11-39 (d), effective July 1, 1991; OCGA § 15-11-39 (e).
We agree with the juvenile court that jeopardy did not attach in this case when M. E. J. attempted to admit the crimes for the purpose of sentencing. The record clearly shows that the juvenile court refused to accept the admission for this purpose and heard no evidence on the merits of the case. This case is distinguishable from Lincoln v. State, 138 Ga. App. 234 ( 225 S.E.2d 708) (1976), relied on by M. E. J., where it was held that a juvenile could not be bound over to superior court after his guilty plea had been accepted and he had been sentenced in juvenile court.
In the circumstances of this case, M. E. J.'s admission of the crimes did not constitute a "hearing on the merits" which would prevent the juvenile court from transferring the case under OCGA § 15-11-39 (a). Further, the juvenile court did not violate Juvenile Court Rule 10.4 by failing to conduct an adjudicatory hearing on M. E. J.'s admission. The record shows that the juvenile court inquired whether M. E. J. admitted the crimes for the limited purpose of determining whether his case should be transferred to superior court, and the court accepted M. E. J.'s admission for that same limited purpose. Under Rule 10.4 the juvenile court has the discretion to accept or refuse to accept the juvenile's admission on the merits of the case. It is clear that the court did not accept M. E. J.'s admission within the meaning of Rule 10.4.
The juvenile court did not err in transferring the offense for prosecution to Fulton Superior Court.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED FEBRUARY 21, 1991.Alert