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MATTER OF BENESCH v. VILLAGE OF CLAYTON

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department.
Jul 14, 1992
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Factual and Procedural Background

Joseph Benesch appealed from a judgment of Supreme Court, Jefferson County, in a CPLR article 78 proceeding concerning the Village Board’s determination following a hearing conducted under Village Law § 8806. [1][2]

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Supreme Court improperly denied transfer of the article 78 proceeding to the Appellate Division because the proceeding presented a substantial-evidence question. [2]
  2. Whether the Village Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence. [2][3]
  3. Whether petitioner, as a probationary officer, was entitled to protection under McKinney’s Unconsolidated Laws of New York § 891; the court did not reach this issue. [3]

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Matter of Melvin v. Kelly, 126 A.D.2d 956 An article 78 proceeding presenting a substantial-evidence question should be transferred to the Appellate Division. The court cited it in concluding that transfer was required. [2]
Matter of Rivera v. Beekman, 86 A.D.2d 1 Transfer and review principles applicable to article 78 proceedings involving substantial evidence. The court relied on it both in finding that Supreme Court should have transferred the proceeding and in reviewing the matter de novo. [2]
Johnson v. Ward, 124 A.D.2d 466 The appellate court may consider the matter de novo as if it had been properly transferred. The court applied this principle to reach the merits despite the improper denial of transfer. [2]

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Because the proceeding presented a substantial-evidence question, CPLR 7804(g) required its transfer to the Appellate Division. Village Law § 8806 provides that review of a village police-force member’s conviction is to occur in the manner provided by CPLR article 78. Supreme Court therefore improperly denied transfer. [2]

The Appellate Division nevertheless reviewed the matter de novo, treating it as though it had been properly transferred. After reviewing the entire record, the court determined that the Village Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence. [2][3]

Because substantial evidence supported the determination, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether petitioner, as a probationary officer, was entitled to protection under McKinney’s Unconsolidated Laws of New York § 891. [3]

Holding and Implications

Judgment unanimously vacated; determination confirmed; petition dismissed. The court vacated the judgment, confirmed the Village Board’s determination, and dismissed the petition without costs. [2]

The direct effect was to uphold the Village Board’s determination despite Supreme Court’s procedural error in denying transfer. The court did not decide the statutory-protection issue concerning probationary officers. [2][3]

Show all summary ...

Judgment unanimously vacated, determination confirmed without costs and petition dismissed. Memorandum: Because petitioner's CPLR article 78 proceeding presented a substantial evidence question, it should have been transferred to this court (see, CPLR 7804 [g]; Matter of Melvin v. Kelly, 126 A.D.2d 956, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 609; Matter of Rivera v. Beekman, 86 A.D.2d 1). Village Law § 8806, pursuant to which the hearing was conducted, provides that the conviction of a member of a village police force shall be reviewed "in the manner provided by" CPLR article 78. Supreme Court, therefore, improperly denied transfer of the proceeding. However, we consider the matter de novo, as if it had been properly transferred (see, Johnson v. Ward, 124 A.D.2d 466; Matter of Rivera v. Beekman, supra).

Upon a review of the entire record we find that the Village Board's determination was supported by substantial evidence, making it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether petitioner, as a probationary officer, was entitled to the protection of McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of N Y § 891 (L 1940, ch 834).