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PEOPLE v. LYNCH
Summary of Opinion: People v. Lynch, Docket No. 151129 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 1993)
Factual and Procedural Background
The defendant pleaded guilty to fleeing and eluding a police officer, second offense (MCL 750.479a(4); MSA 28.747(1)(4)), and to being an habitual offender, third offense (MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083). He had been convicted of misdemeanor fleeing and eluding approximately four years before the instant offense and had two other unrelated felony convictions. At sentencing the trial court treated the usual four-year maximum for the fleeing-and-eluding second-offense felony as subject to enhancement under the habitual-offender statute, resulting in a sentence of four to eight years' imprisonment. The defendant appealed as of right. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a sentence for fleeing and eluding, second offense (a felony under MCL 750.479a(4); MSA 28.747(1)(4)), may be further enhanced under the habitual offender statutes (MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083).
- Whether the sentence imposed violates the proportionality principle articulated in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich. 630; 461 N.W.2d 1 (1990).
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- The trial court erred in allowing the sentence for fleeing and eluding, second offense, to be enhanced under the habitual offender statutes.
- The resulting sentence violated the proportionality principle set forth in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich. 630; 461 N.W.2d 1 (1990).
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the people's (prosecutor's) separate sentencing arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| People v Eilola, 179 Mich. App. 315; 445 N.W.2d 490 (1989) | Held that the habitual offender statutes could be used to enhance a sentence already subject to enhancement under the first-degree retail fraud statute, MCL 750.356c; MSA 28.588(3). | The court relied on Eilola's reasoning as applicable support for permitting habitual-offender enhancement of a sentence for a second fleeing-and-eluding conviction. |
| People v Brown, 186 Mich. App. 350; 463 N.W.2d 491 (1990) | Presented as a similar supporting authority to Eilola. | Cited as additional support for the proposition that habitual-offender statutes may be used to enhance sentences already subject to statutory enhancement. |
| People v Bewersdorf, 438 Mich. 55; 475 N.W.2d 231 (1991), cert den sub nom Johnson v Michigan, ___ US ___; 112 S Ct 1214; 117 L Ed 2d 452 (1992) | Held that the habitual offender statutes could be used to enhance a sentence already subject to enhancement under MCL 257.625(6); MSA 9.2325(6) (operating while intoxicated, third offense elevated to a felony). The court reasoned that sentencing enhancement for repeated offenses aligns with legislative purpose of deterring repeated criminal acts by providing escalating punishment. | The Court of Appeals found Bewersdorf's reasoning equally applicable and adopted its rationale to permit habitual-offender enhancement of the fleeing-and-eluding second-offense sentence. |
| People v Tucker, 177 Mich. App. 174; 441 N.W.2d 59 (1989) | The Tucker holding was earlier contrary to the approach adopted in Bewersdorf; the opinion notes Tucker was rejected by the Supreme Court in Bewersdorf. | Judges Hood and Mackenzie acknowledged their prior participation in Tucker and stated they no longer adhere to that position to the extent Bewersdorf implicitly reversed Tucker. |
| People v Milbourn, 435 Mich. 630; 461 N.W.2d 1 (1990) | Articulates the principle of proportionality in sentencing. | The defendant invoked Milbourn to challenge proportionality; the Court of Appeals rejected that challenge, finding the sentence proportionate given the circumstances of the offense and offender. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first outlined the statutory scheme for fleeing and eluding: a first conviction is a misdemeanor punishable by up to one year (MCL 750.479a(1); MSA 28.747(1)(1)), while a second conviction within five years is an elevated felony punishable by up to four years (MCL 750.479a(4); MSA 28.747(1)(4)). The record showed the defendant's prior misdemeanor fleeing-and-eluding conviction occurred approximately four years before the instant offense, and the defendant had two unrelated felony convictions.
The trial court had treated the four-year statutory maximum for the second-offense fleeing-and-eluding felony as subject to enhancement under the habitual-offender statute and imposed a sentence of four to eight years. The defendant contended that using the habitual-offender statute to enhance an already-enhanced offense was improper.
The Court of Appeals disagreed, relying on prior decisions—particularly People v Eilola and People v Bewersdorf—that had upheld use of habitual-offender statutes to further enhance sentences already subject to statutory elevation. The court emphasized the reasoning in Eilola and Bewersdorf that escalating punishment for repeated offenses is consistent with the legislative purpose of deterring repeat criminal conduct. Applying that reasoning to the present case, the court held that a sentence for fleeing and eluding, second offense, may be enhanced under the habitual-offender statutes.
The court also considered the defendant's proportionality challenge under People v Milbourn and, based on the circumstances of this offense and offender as presented in the opinion, concluded the sentence did not violate Milbourn's proportionality principle.
Holding and Implications
Affirmed.
Direct effect: The trial court's sentence of four to eight years' imprisonment (reflecting habitual-offender enhancement of the fleeing-and-eluding, second-offense conviction) was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The opinion upholds the proposition, consistent with cited precedent, that habitual-offender statutes may be used to enhance a sentence already elevated by another statutory enhancement.
The opinion does not elaborate broader implications beyond the affirmation in this case.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted on his pleas of guilty of fleeing and eluding a police officer, second offense, MCL 750.479a(4); MSA 28.747(1)(4), and of being an habitual offender, third offense, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083. He was sentenced to four to eight years' imprisonment. Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm.
MCL 750.479a(1); MSA 28.747(1)(1) provides that a person convicted of fleeing and eluding is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by no more than one year's imprisonment. However, the statute also contains an enhancement provision. Under that provision, a person who commits a second fleeing and eluding offense within five years of a prior fleeing and eluding conviction is guilty of a felony punishable by up to four years' imprisonment. MCL 750.479a(4); MSA 28.747(1)(4).
In this case, defendant had been convicted of misdemeanor fleeing and eluding approximately four years before the instant fleeing and eluding offense. Defendant also had been convicted of two other, unrelated felonies. In sentencing defendant, the trial court explained that the usual four-year maximum sentence for fleeing and eluding, second offense, would be doubled because of defendant's habitual offender conviction. The trial court then sentenced defendant to a term of four to eight years.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in allowing his sentence for fleeing and eluding, second offense, to be enhanced under the habitual offender statutes. We disagree.
In People v Eilola, 179 Mich. App. 315; 445 N.W.2d 490 (1989), this Court held that the habitual offender statutes could be used to enhance a sentence already subject to enhancement under the first-degree retail fraud statute, MCL 750.356c; MSA 28.588(3). See also People v Brown, 186 Mich. App. 350; 463 N.W.2d 491 (1990). Similarly, in People v Bewersdorf, 438 Mich. 55; 475 N.W.2d 231 (1991), cert den sub nom Johnson v Michigan, ___ US ___; 112 S Ct 1214; 117 L Ed 2d 452 (1992), our Supreme Court held that the habitual offender statutes could be used to enhance a sentence already subject to enhancement under MCL 257.625(6); MSA 9.2325(6), which elevates operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, third offense, to a felony. Both the Eilola and the Bewersdorf Courts reasoned that such sentencing enhancement for repeated offenses is consistent with the legislative purpose of deterring repeated criminal acts by providing escalating punishment. See Bewersdorf, supra, p 70; Eilola, supra, pp 322-324.
We find the reasoning of the Eilola and Bewersdorf Courts equally applicable here. Accordingly, we hold that the sentence imposed upon a conviction for fleeing and eluding, second offense, may be enhanced under the habitual offender statutes.
Judges HOOD and MacKENZIE acknowledge that they were on the panel in People v Tucker, 177 Mich. App. 174; 441 N.W.2d 59 (1989), the holding of which was rejected by the Supreme Court in Bewersdorf. See 438 Mich. 69. To the extent that Bewersdorf impliedly reverses the Tucker decision, they no longer adhere to their position in that case.
Defendant also asserts that his sentence violates the principle of proportionality established in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich. 630; 461 N.W.2d 1 (1990). Given the circumstances of this offense and this offender, we disagree.
Affirmed.
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