- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
WECHSLER v. WECHSLER
Factual and Procedural Background
Lawrence D. Wechsler (Appellant) appealed from a decision of the Supreme Court, New York County (Phyllis Gangel-Jacob, J.). The appellate decision, dated December 7, 1993 (Appellate Division, First Department), addresses the award of interim counsel fees in the parties' marital litigation. The court noted factors including the long duration of the marriage, the respondent's unemployment and limited job skills, and the appellant's well‑paying employment as a musician with a major opera company plus additional income from residuals, concerts, and investments. The opinion records concurrence by Ellerin, J.P., Wallach, Kupferman and Rubin, JJ.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the award of interim counsel fees was a proper exercise of the court's discretion.
- Whether any inequity in an interim counsel‑fee award should be remedied by a speedy trial and a later credit.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879, 881 | Supports that the award of interim counsel fees is committed to the court's discretion. | Relied upon to conclude that the interim counsel‑fee award was a proper exercise of discretion given the parties' circumstances. |
| Jancu v Jancu, 174 A.D.2d 428 | Supports remedial measures for any inequity in interim awards (speedy trial and later credit). | Invoked to state that any inequity in the interim award should be remedied by a speedy trial and a subsequent credit. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court held that the interim counsel‑fee award was a proper exercise of discretion, citing DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete. In applying that discretionary standard the court relied on the marriage's long duration, the respondent's unemployment and limited job skills, and the appellant's substantial and diversified income (employment with a major opera company, residuals, concerts, and investments). The court further stated that any inequity resulting from the interim award can be corrected by a speedy trial and a later credit, citing Jancu v Jancu.
Holding and Implications
The award of interim counsel fees was upheld as a proper exercise of the court's discretion.
Direct effect: the interim fee award stands; the court directed that any resulting inequity may be remedied through a speedy trial and a subsequent credit. The opinion does not announce or discuss any broader new precedent beyond its application of existing authorities.
The award of interim counsel fees was a proper exercise of discretion (see, DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879, 881), in view of the long duration of the marriage, defendant's unemployment and few job skills, and plaintiff's well-paying employment as a musician with a major opera company, additional income from residuals and concerts, and investments. Any inequity in the interim award should be remedied by a speedy trial (Jancu v Jancu, 174 A.D.2d 428) and a later credit.
Concur — Ellerin, J.P., Wallach, Kupferman and Rubin, JJ.
Alert