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JAMAR v. PATTERSON
Factual and Procedural Background
This case arises from a judgment entered after a jury trial in favor of Gayle Patterson against Hewell Jamar, dated October 16, 1992. Jamar's counsel tendered a motion for new trial to the district clerk on November 12, 1992, but the clerk did not accept it for filing because the $15.00 statutory filing fee was unpaid. The motion was later file-stamped on November 30, 1992, upon payment of the fee. Jamar subsequently filed an appeal bond, which was timely if the motion for new trial was considered timely filed, but untimely if the filing date was the date of the file stamp. The court of appeals dismissed Jamar's appeal, holding the motion was filed on November 30, 1992. This appeal followed, challenging the proper date of filing for appellate timetable purposes.
Legal Issues Presented
- What constitutes "filing" a motion for new trial for purposes of calculating the appellate timetable?
- Whether payment of the statutory filing fee is a condition precedent to the date of filing for appellate deadline calculation.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mr. Penguin Tuxedo Rental Sales, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 787 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1990) | Defines "filed" as when a document is tendered to or placed under the custody of the clerk. | Supported the court's holding that the date of tender, not the file-stamp or fee payment, controls the filing date for appellate purposes. |
| Biffle v. Morton Rubber Indus., Inc., 785 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1990) | Reinforces the principle that filing occurs upon delivery to the clerk. | Used to affirm the established meaning of "filing" as tender to the clerk. |
| Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. LaCoke, 585 S.W.2d 678, 681 (Tex. 1979) | Similar principle regarding the timing of filing documents. | Further supported the court's interpretation of filing date. |
| McRoberts v. Ryals, 863 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tex. 1993) | Policy to construe procedural rules liberally to preserve the right to appeal. | Guided the court to adopt a liberal construction of "filing" to avoid losing appellate rights. |
| Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 632-33 (Tex. 1986) | Supports liberal construction of procedural rules. | Used to justify a reasonable interpretation of filing rules favoring appellants. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the issue by referring to a longstanding line of Texas cases establishing that a document is considered "filed" when it is tendered to the clerk or placed under the clerk's custody or control. The court rejected the notion that the file stamp or payment of the filing fee determines the filing date for appellate timetable purposes. Although the filing fee must be paid to complete the filing, this payment does not affect the initial filing date. The court emphasized a liberal and reasonable construction of procedural rules to avoid forfeiting appellate rights on technical grounds. Accordingly, the court held that the motion for new trial was "conditionally filed" on the date it was tendered (November 12, 1992), and the filing was completed upon payment of the fee on November 30, 1992. This conditional filing date governs the calculation of appellate deadlines.
Holding and Implications
The court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The holding establishes that for purposes of appellate deadlines, the date a motion for new trial is tendered to the clerk controls the filing date, not the date of fee payment or file-stamping. The fee payment is necessary to complete the filing but does not delay the initial filing date. This interpretation prevents appellants from losing appellate rights due to technicalities related to fee payment timing. No new precedent beyond this clarification was set, and the decision directly affects the parties by reinstating Jamar's timely appeal.
PER CURIAM.
This case presents the issue of what constitutes "filing" a motion for new trial for purposes of calculating the appellate timetable. After a jury trial the trial judge signed a judgment for Gayle Patterson, individually and as next friend of Brandi Istre (Patterson), against Hewell Jamar. The judgment is dated October 16, 1992. On November 12, 1992, counsel for Jamar tendered his motion to the district clerk, who did not "accept" the motion for filing because Jamar had not paid the requisite $15.00 statutory filing fee. Despite its other deficiencies, the clerk file-stamped the motion on November 30, 1992, when the $15.00 filing fee was received.
TEX.GOV'T CODE ยง 51.317(b).
The motion also failed to conform to the county's local rules because it did not include a proposed order or a submission date, but such local rule requirements may not impose additional restrictions on what constitutes a "filing" under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure or Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Jamar then filed an appeal bond which was timely if his motion for new trial were timely filed to extend the appellate deadline, but untimely if he were limited to thirty days after judgment. See TEX.R.APP.P. 41(a). The court of appeals, in a two-paragraph unpublished opinion, stated that Jamar's motion was "filed" on November 30, 1992, when it was file-stamped, and dismissed his appeal. The court of appeals did not state either that the file-stamp was controlling or that payment of the filing fee was a requirement for filing, but presumably it impliedly made one or the other of those holdings.
In a long line of cases, this court has held that a document is "filed" when it is tendered to the clerk, or otherwise put under the custody or control of the clerk. Mr. Penguin Tuxedo Rental Sales, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 787 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1990); Biffle v. Morton Rubber Indus., Inc., 785 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1990); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. LaCoke, 585 S.W.2d 678, 681 (Tex. 1979). We therefore assume the court of appeals did not mean the file stamp was controlling. That means the court held that payment of the filing fee controlled when the document was "filed" for appellate timetable purposes.
TEX.R.CIV.P. 329b(a) provides that "[a] motion for new trial, if filed, shall be filed prior to or within thirty days after the judgment or other order complained of is signed." The rule does not define "filed." It is our policy to construe rules reasonably but liberally, when possible, so that the right to appeal is not lost by creating a requirement not absolutely necessary from the literal words of the rule. See McRoberts v. Ryals, 863 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tex. 1993); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 632-33 (Tex. 1986). Consistent with that rule and our prior holdings that the date of filing is when the document is first tendered to the clerk, we hold that Jamar's motion for new trial was conditionally filed on November 12, 1992, when he tendered it to the clerk. That date controls for appellate purposes. The filing was completed, as the trial court clerk implicitly recognized, when Jamar paid the filing fee.
The filing is not completed until the fee is paid, and absent emergency or other rare circumstances, the court should not consider it before then.
Without hearing argument, a majority of the court grants the application for writ of error, holds that the date of original tender of the motion for new trial governs for appellate time calculation purposes, reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and remands the cause to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. TEX.R.APP.P. 170.
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