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CLARK v. STATE
Factual and Procedural Background
Ricky William Clark was convicted of felony murder in the shooting death of his wife, Rebecca Diane Clark, with aggravated assault as the underlying felony. [1] The shooting occurred on December 21, 1991. Clark was indicted on July 8, 1992, tried beginning February 7, 1994, and sentenced to life imprisonment after the February 11, 1994 verdict. His motion for new trial was denied, and he appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia. [2]
Viewed favorably to the verdict, the evidence showed that Clark’s wife was found shot in their motel room, Clark was holding her and stating, “I didn’t mean to shoot her,” and he pushed a rifle under a table. [3] Earlier evidence showed repeated domestic violence, including bruising and injuries to the victim. [4][5] Clark testified that the rifle discharged accidentally while he was attempting to secure it and pushing his wife away. [6]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the felony-murder conviction. [7]
- Whether evidence of two prior altercations between Clark and the victim was improperly admitted. [8][9]
- Whether the trial court erred in its jury instructions concerning involuntary manslaughter, voluntary manslaughter, intent, intoxication, and preservation of objections. [10][11][12][13][14][15]
- Whether two evidentiary rulings constituted reversible error. [16]
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- Clark contended that evidence of two prior altercations was erroneously admitted. [8]
- He challenged the trial court’s jury charges on misdemeanor-grade involuntary manslaughter, voluntary manslaughter, intent, voluntary intoxication, and other grounds. [10][11][12][17][15]
- He challenged two evidentiary rulings, asserting that a defense witness’s statement was improperly excluded as hearsay. [16]
- At trial, Clark maintained that the shooting was accidental. [6][9]
State's Arguments
- The State contended that evidence of provocation authorized a voluntary-manslaughter charge. [12]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) | Review of whether evidence permits a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. | The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction under this standard. [7] |
| Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640 (1991) | Admissibility of evidence of independent prior acts. | The prior difficulties had a sufficient probative connection to the charged crime. [18][9] |
| Stewart v. State, 263 Ga. 843 (1) (1994) | Admissibility of prior-act evidence. | The trial court properly admitted the evidence under the applicable standard. [18][9] |
| Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 73 (2) (1992) | Admissibility of prior-act evidence. | The prior difficulties were sufficiently connected to the charged offense to justify admission. [18][9] |
| Cooper v. State, 256 Ga. 234 (1) (1986) | Use of prior difficulties for an appropriate evidentiary purpose where the defendant claims the shooting was accidental. | The evidence was properly offered to show motive and the parties’ state of feeling, particularly in light of Clark’s accident defense. [9] |
| Bangs v. State, 198 Ga. App. 404 (1991) | Whether a requested involuntary-manslaughter instruction is adjusted to the evidence. | The requested misdemeanor-involuntary-manslaughter charge was properly denied because it was not supported by the evidence. [11] |
| Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439 (6) (c) (1991) | An erroneous charge on a lesser included offense is not reversible error unless it harms the defendant. | Even assuming error, Clark failed to show harm from the voluntary-manslaughter charge. [12] |
| Wood v. State, 258 Ga. 598 (2) (1988) | Use of an instruction permitting an inference of intent from the use of a deadly weapon, while recommending that such emphasis generally be avoided. | The instruction was upheld, but the Court reiterated that general intent and circumstantial-evidence charges ordinarily suffice. [19][20][21] |
| Thompson v. State, 257 Ga. 481 (6) (1987) | Validity of the challenged intent instruction. | The Court cited it as authority recognizing that the instruction had been upheld. [19] |
| Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865 (1992) | Rule implicated by objections to jury instructions. | Clark did not object on this ground and did not reserve the right to raise further objections, so review was waived. [15] |
| Wilson v. State, 262 Ga. 588 (2) (b) (1992) | Waiver of appellate review when objections to jury instructions are not properly preserved. | The Court applied the preservation rule to reject review of Clark’s claim. [15] |
| McCoy v. State, 262 Ga. 699, 701 (1993) | Waiver of unpreserved jury-charge objections. | The Court cited it together with Wilson in concluding that appellate review was waived. [15] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. The victim’s gunshot wound, Clark’s presence and statement at the scene, his attempt to conceal the rifle, the history of domestic violence, and the medical evidence supported a finding that Clark caused the death while committing aggravated assault. The evidence therefore permitted a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [3][4][5][7]
The Court upheld admission of the two prior altercations. A pretrial hearing was conducted under USCR 31.3, and the evidence established that Clark was the perpetrator of the prior acts. The evidence was offered to show motive and the parties’ state of feeling, and its probative connection was especially significant because Clark claimed the shooting was accidental. [18][22][23][9]
The requested misdemeanor-involuntary-manslaughter charge was properly denied. If the rifle discharged accidentally without criminal negligence, no crime was committed; otherwise, the evidence did not support treating the use of the deadly weapon as a lawful act performed unlawfully. [11]
The Court found no reversible error in the voluntary-manslaughter charge because Clark did not demonstrate harm. [12] The challenged intent instruction was also proper in context because the jury had to determine Clark’s intent in shooting the rifle, and the instruction accurately described permissible—not mandatory—inferences. [13] Although the Court reiterated that such emphasis on deadly weapons is strongly discouraged absent a special request, it found no error here. [19][20][21]
The voluntary-intoxication instruction was supported by the evidence, including testimony that Clark appeared intoxicated and evidence of a .13 percent blood-alcohol level three hours after the shooting. [14] Any separate challenge under Edge was waived because Clark neither made that specific objection nor reserved the right to assert additional objections. [15]
Of the two challenged evidentiary rulings, the first was not preserved by proper objection. The second involved exclusion of a defense witness’s statement, but the statement was properly excluded as irrelevant and immaterial rather than on hearsay grounds. [16]
Holding and Implications
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Clark’s felony-murder conviction and life sentence; all Justices concurred. [24]
The direct consequence was that the conviction and sentence remained in effect. The Court also strongly discouraged jury instructions that unnecessarily emphasize particular circumstances, such as use of a deadly weapon, when general instructions on intent and circumstantial evidence ordinarily suffice. [19][20][21]
THOMPSON, Justice.
This appeal follows Ricky William Clark's conviction of the offense of felony murder in the shooting death of his wife, Rebecca Diane Clark, with aggravated assault being the underlying felony.
The crime occurred on December 21, 1991. Clark was indicted on July 8, 1992. Trial began on February 7, 1994; a verdict was returned on February 11, 1994, and Clark was sentenced on the same day to life imprisonment. A motion for new trial was filed on February 14, 1994, amended on May 10, 1994, and denied on May 16, 1994. A notice of appeal was filed on May 24, 1994. The case was docketed in this Court on June 20, 1994, and oral argument was heard on October 11, 1994.
1. Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence showed that police were called to the Efficiency Lodge at 1:30 a.m. to investigate a shooting in room 110. The responding officer was flagged down by the resident manager who informed him that a tenant in room 110 had been shot by her husband. The officer found the victim on the floor of her room in a pool of blood. The defendant was sitting next to her, holding her shoulders, and exclaiming, "I didn't mean to shoot her." The officer observed the defendant push a long-barreled gun under a table with his foot. The weapon contained one empty cartridge casing and two live rounds of ammunition.
Earlier that evening, the victim appeared at the door of the resident manager; she was crying, her face was bruised, and she complained of a possible broken hand. The manager tried to console her and urged her not to return to her room. Based on the victim's statements, and other complaints about fights between the Clarks, the manager went to room 110, where she found the defendant on the bed in an apparently inebriated state. The dead-bolt lock had been removed from the door; the defendant admitted removing it because he was afraid his wife would lock him out. The manager told him that she would call the police if she had more trouble with him that night. She then returned to her own apartment. She stated that the victim was afraid to leave and remained there with her for about two hours; she ultimately departed at about midnight.
At about 1:00 a.m., the manager observed the defendant in the parking lot; he stated that he was telephoning 911 because his wife had been shot. The two returned to room 110 together where the manager observed the victim lying face down on the floor, bleeding from a wound in her back. The manager asked what had happened and the defendant replied that they had been wrestling with a gun when it discharged.
The defendant testified in his own defense that he picked up his rifle to secure it in its case after his wife threatened to pawn it. He described the shooting as follows: "I was holding onto [the rifle] with both hands, and I went to push her with my foot to get her off of me, and when I did she went back a little bit. I fell back against the wall and it went off."
An autopsy examination revealed that death had resulted from a single gunshot wound through the left upper chest, which traveled slightly upward and exited through the midline of the back. Considerable bruising and abrasions were present throughout the body; some a week or more old and some less than a day old. A severe sprain or hairline fracture of the left wrist was also present.
The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that while in the commission of an aggravated assault, defendant caused the death of his wife. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 ( 99 S.C. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979).
2. Defendant contends that evidence of two prior altercations between himself and the victim was erroneously admitted in evidence.
A pre-trial hearing was held pursuant to USCR 31.3, to determine admissibility under Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640 ( 409 S.E.2d 649) (1991); Stewart v. State, 263 Ga. 843 (1) ( 440 S.E.2d 452) (1994); and Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 73 (2) ( 414 S.E.2d 470) (1992).
With respect to the first incident, the victim's 17-year-old daughter testified that in April 1989, she witnessed a fight between her mother and the defendant (her stepfather), during which he held her mother by the throat and threatened to kill her. There was a rifle on the bed. The victim's sister described the victim's physical condition three days later as follows: "chunks of hair had been pulled out of her head; she had bruises, scratches, a black eye."
The second incident occurred six months prior to the shooting. A police officer testified that she responded to a family violence call at the Clark residence. Mrs. Clark told the officer that her husband had beaten her repeatedly in the course of an argument. Her eyes were blackened and swollen; she was bleeding and had a large cut on her forearm. Charges were brought against the defendant under the Family Violence Act.
The proffer was sufficient to establish that the defendant was the perpetrator of the independent acts. The trial court ruled the evidence admissible to show motive and state of feeling between the parties. We agree that the evidence was offered for an appropriate purpose, particularly in light of the defendant's defense at trial that the shooting was accidental. See Cooper v. State, 256 Ga. 234 (1) ( 347 S.E.2d 553) (1986). There was sufficient probative connection between the crime charged and the prior difficulties to justify admission of the evidence under Williams, supra; Maxwell, supra; and Stewart, supra.
3. The defendant takes issue with the trial court's charge to the jury in several respects.
(a) The trial court properly denied defendant's request to charge on misdemeanor grade involuntary manslaughter (lawful act — unlawful manner), OCGA § 16-5-3 (b). If the gun discharged accidentally in the absence of criminal negligence, then no crime was committed and, as the jury was instructed, acquittal was required. Use of the deadly weapon in any other manner consistent with the evidence negates the theory that a lawful act was committed. Thus, the requested charge was not adjusted to the evidence. See Bangs v. State, 198 Ga. App. 404 ( 401 S.E.2d 599) (1991).
This Code section provides:
A person commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner when he causes the death of another human being without any intention to do so, by the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm.
(b) Defendant asserts error in giving a charge on voluntary manslaughter over his objection. The State contends there was some evidence of provocation, and therefore the charge was authorized. Even assuming error, an erroneous charge on a lesser included offense does not constitute reversible error unless harmful to the defendant. Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439 (6) (c) ( 405 S.E.2d 660) (1991). Defendant has not demonstrated, nor do we conclude, that he was harmed by the pattern charge on voluntary manslaughter.
(c) Defendant challenges the following pattern jury instruction, on the ground that it was not adjusted to the evidence:
You may infer that a person of sound mind and discretion intends to accomplish the natural and probable consequences of that person's intentional acts, and if a person of sound mind and discretion, intentionally and without justification, uses a deadly weapon or instrumentality in the manner in which the weapon or instrumentality is ordinarily used, and thereby causes the death of a human being, you may infer the intent to kill. Whether or not you make any such inference is a matter solely within the discretion of the jury.
The basis for defendant's challenge is without merit, as the issue for determination by the jury was defendant's intent in shooting the rifle, and in the context of the charge as a whole, the instruction informed the jury of the legal inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.
Although we acknowledge that the foregoing charge has been upheld by the Court (see Wood v. State, 258 Ga. 598 (2) ( 373 S.E.2d 183) (1988); Thompson v. State, 257 Ga. 481 (6) ( 361 S.E.2d 154) (1987)), we take this opportunity to reiterate and to stress what was stated in Wood, supra at fn. 2:
While we find no error in this charge we suggest the better practice is, in the absence of some special request from the jury, not to emphasize particular circumstances such as the use of a deadly weapon and indicate what inferences may arise therefrom. General charges on intent and circumstantial evidence will ordinarily be sufficient.
Any other practice is strongly discouraged.
(d) The court did not err in charging on voluntary intoxication. Although the defendant admitted having consumed alcoholic beverages that night, he denied that he was intoxicated. However, the testimony of the resident manager was to the contrary, and evidence was introduced that defendant's blood alcohol level was .13 percent three hours after the shooting. The charge was adjusted to the evidence.
(e) Defendant stated specific objections to the charge, but articulated no objection that the charge violated Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865 ( 414 S.E.2d 463) (1992). Nor did he reserve the right to assert further objections. Appellate review of this claim has been waived. Wilson v. State, 262 Ga. 588 (2) (b) ( 422 S.E.2d 536) (1992); McCoy v. State, 262 Ga. 699, 701 ( 425 S.E.2d 646) (1993).
4. Defendant challenges two evidentiary rulings of the trial court. The first was not preserved by proper objection. With respect to the second, defendant asserts that the statement of a defense witness was improperly excluded on hearsay grounds; however, the statement was properly excluded as irrelevant and immaterial. There was no error.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED MARCH 13, 1995 — RECONSIDERATION DENIED MARCH 30, 1995.Alert