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IN RE SAYLOR
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Phillip Quarre, as Trustee of the Quarre Marital Trust, initiated a lawsuit in July 1990 against Vergil Saylor and Saylor Supply Corporation for breach of a lease agreement (the "Original Action"). Shortly thereafter, Saylor Supply Corporation filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In December 1990, Vergil and Roberta Saylor transferred three parcels of real property to William and Frances Lyon, receiving only a life estate in one parcel as consideration. In July 1991, the Superior Court entered judgment in favor of Quarre against Vergil Saylor for $284,683.02.
Quarre then filed a second lawsuit against the Lyons and the Saylors alleging a fraudulent transfer under California law (the "Fraudulent Transfer Action"). On the eve of Quarre's summary judgment motion in that action, the Saylors filed their Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in July 1993. Quarre subsequently filed an adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of the Saylors' debt. The Saylors defaulted, and Quarre submitted evidence in support of default judgment.
The bankruptcy court ruled that neither 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A) nor 523(a)(6) provided a basis for default judgment, found Quarre lacked standing due to no interest in the transferred property, and dismissed the complaint. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP") upheld this ruling, concluding Quarre failed to show an injury that would preclude discharge and lacked standing to prosecute the fraudulent transfer claim. Quarre appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff, Phillip Quarre, as a judgment lien creditor, has standing to challenge the dischargeability of the Saylors' debt based on claims arising from alleged fraudulent transfer of property.
- Whether the debt arising from the alleged fraudulent transfer falls within the nondischargeable exceptions of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a), specifically subsection (a)(6) concerning "willful and malicious injury."
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Quarre contends that his claim is not merely to the three parcels of real estate but to a property interest in the remedies afforded by state fraudulent transfer law, which were violated when the Saylors transferred the properties to avoid paying the debt arising from the breach of contract.
- He argues that this property interest should prevent discharge of the debt under the Bankruptcy Code's exceptions.
- Quarre also implies that the bankruptcy trustee’s announcement of the case as a "no asset" matter constituted a de facto abandonment of the property represented by his claim.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of appellees' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| In re Apte, 96 F.3d 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) | Standard of review: de novo review of legal conclusions and clear error review of factual findings by bankruptcy court. | Used to justify independent review of the bankruptcy court’s decision. |
| In re Cecchini, 780 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986) | Definition of "willful and malicious" injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). | Clarified that an act is "willful and malicious" if done intentionally and necessarily produces harm without just cause or excuse, even without specific intent to injure. |
| In re Zelis, 66 F.3d 205 (9th Cir. 1995) | Application of § 523(a)(6) exceptions to discharge. | Referenced as part of the legal framework for nondischargeability analysis. |
| In re Riso, 978 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir. 1992) | Purpose of § 523(a)(6) to preclude discharge of debts arising from tortious misconduct causing harm to person or property. | Supported the narrow construction of exceptions to dischargeability. |
| In re Rahm, 641 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1981) | General principle that exceptions to discharge are to be narrowly construed. | Reinforced the court’s approach to interpreting § 523(a)(6) narrowly. |
| Sierra Switchboard Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 789 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986) | Requirements for formal abandonment of property in bankruptcy. | Used to reject Quarre’s argument that the trustee’s announcement constituted de facto abandonment without formal notice and hearing. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by reviewing the relevant bankruptcy statutes, emphasizing that the bankruptcy estate consists of all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property at the commencement of the case (11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)). Discharge relieves the debtor from debts arising before the order for relief, except as provided by exceptions such as § 523(a).
Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge debts for "willful and malicious injury" by the debtor. The court explained that such injury requires intentional acts that necessarily produce harm without just cause or excuse, citing In re Cecchini.
Applying these principles, the court found that on the petition date, the Saylors no longer had any legal or equitable interest in the three parcels of real property, having transferred them nearly three years prior. Quarre’s argument that his claim is to a property interest in the fraudulent transfer remedies rather than the real estate itself was rejected because such a claim does not fit within the statutory definitions of "debt" or "property" for purposes of § 523(a)(6).
The court emphasized that exceptions to discharge are narrowly construed and noted Quarre had no security interest in the property at the time of transfer, and his claim had not been reduced to judgment when the transfer occurred. Furthermore, Quarre’s failure to seek formal abandonment of the property represented by his claim undermined his position.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the BAP’s decision upholding the bankruptcy court’s ruling in favor of the debtors.
Holding and Implications
The court’s final decision is AFFIRMED.
The direct effect of this decision is that the appellant, Phillip Quarre, lacks standing to challenge the dischargeability of the debt based on the fraudulent transfer claim and cannot prevent discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). No new legal precedent was established; the ruling reinforces the narrow construction of discharge exceptions and clarifies that claims to state law fraudulent transfer remedies do not constitute "property" or "debt" for nondischargeability purposes when no interest in the transferred property exists at petition date.
LEAVY, Circuit Judge:
A judgment lien creditor appeals from a decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP") upholding the bankruptcy court's ruling in favor of the debtors. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), and we affirm.
FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGSThe BAP summarized the relevant facts as follows:
On 24 July 1990, Plaintiff Phillip Quarre, as Trustee of the Quarre Marital Trust, ("Quarre") filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Orange County against Vergil Saylor and the Saylor Supply Corporation for breach of a lease agreement (the "Original Action"). Approximately one month later, the Saylor Supply Corporation filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
On 5 December 1990, Vergil and Roberta Saylor transferred three parcels of real property to William and Frances Lyon. The only consideration the Saylors received for the transfer was a life estate in one of the three properties transferred. On 18 July 1991, the Superior court entered judgment in favor of Quarre against Vergil Saylor in the amount of $284,683.02.
Seeking to satisfy his judgment in the Original Action, plaintiff filed a second complaint against the Lyons and the Saylors in Los Angeles Superior Court alleging a violation of the California Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the "Fraudulent Transfer Action"). Vergil and Roberta Saylor filed their chapter 7 petition on the eve of Quarre's summary judgment motion in the Fraudulent Transfer Action, on 16 July 1993.
Quarre thereafter filed this adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of Saylors' debt. Saylors defaulted, and the trial court directed Quarre to submit evidence of a prima facie case in support of default judgment. Quarre submitted a memorandum of points and authorities and supporting evidence, consisting of a declaration of counsel attaching redacted copies of discovery material and an evidentiary stipulation with the Lyons in the Fraudulent Transfer Action, and a declaration of Mr. Lyons in opposition to Quarre's motion for summary judgment in that action.
The trial court ruled that neither [11 U.S.C.] § 523(a)(2)(A) nor § 523(a)(6) provided the basis for an award of default judgment, found Quarre had no interest in the transferred property and therefore lacked standing, and dismissed the complaint. Quarre timely appealed.
In re Saylor, 178 B.R. 209, 211-12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995). The BAP held, among other things, that because Quarre had failed to show an injury to his person or property that would preclude a discharge of the debtors, he lacked standing to prosecute an action for fraudulent transfer. Quarre challenges that decision on appeal.
ANALYSIS [8] Standard of Review
Because we are in as good a position as the BAP to review bankruptcy court rulings, we independently examine the bankruptcy court's decision by reviewing de novo its conclusions of law and examining for clear error its factual findings. See In re Apte, 96 F.3d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1996).
Discussion
The filing of a petition in bankruptcy creates an estate consisting of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Against the property of this estate are arrayed those obligations from which the debtor seeks to be discharged. 11 U.S.C. § 727. A discharge in bankruptcy relieves "the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of the order for relief[.]" 11 U.S.C. § 727(b). A debt is a "liability on a claim", see 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), i.e., a "right to payment" or a "right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment[.]" 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B).
An exception to this general rule of discharge is set forth at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy shall not discharge an individual debtor from certain kinds of obligations. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). Subsection (a)(6), in particular, states that a debtor is not entitled to discharge of prepetition debts for "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity." Id. We have held that an act is "willful and malicious" when done intentionally and the act necessarily produces harm and is without just cause or excuse. In re Cecchini, 780 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986). The act may be "willful and malicious" even absent proof of specific intent to injure. Id.
In re Zelis, 66 F.3d 205, 208 (9th Cir. 1995).
[1] Boiled down to its essence, section 523(a)(6)'s "willful and malicious" exception to nondischargeability serves to preclude a debtor from obtaining a discharge of an obligation based on a claim arising out of the debtor's tortious misconduct, when that misconduct results in harm to another's person or property. In re Riso, 978 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 1992).
[2] On the date they filed their petition in bankruptcy, the Saylors no longer had any apparent legal or equitable interest in the property represented by the three parcels of real estate, because they had transferred that property to the Lyons nearly three years earlier. Quarre argues that the property in question is not simply these three parcels of real estate; rather, it is the claim that his state fraudulent transfer rights were violated when the Saylors transferred the three parcels of real estate to the Lyons in order to avoid having to pay the debt which resulted from the Saylors having breached their contract with Quarre.
It is largely due to this three-year time lapse that neither section 548 nor section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code applies to the instant appeal. Section 548(a)(1) permits a bankruptcy trustee to avoid a debtor's transfer of property made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor, if the transfer occurred within one year of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Similarly, section 727(a)(2)(A) prohibits a bankruptcy court from discharging a debtor who transferred property with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor, if that transfer occurred within one year of filing the petition in bankruptcy.
While not central to our holding, it is important to understand what Quarre does not argue. He does not contend that discharge should have been denied because the three parcels of real estate still belong to the Saylors, nor does he claim that discharge was improper because the transfer occurred within one year of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Moreover, as the Lyons are not parties to the adversary proceeding in bankruptcy, Quarre does not seek to have the bankruptcy court set aside the transfer.
[3] We reject this argument for the reasons set forth in the BAP's opinion. In re Saylor, 178 B.R. at 212-15. Quarre's claim that he possesses a property interest in the fraudulent transfer remedies provided by state law does not fit within the definitions of either "debt" or "property" for purposes of section 523(a)(6), and runs counter to the long-standing principle that exceptions to dischargeability are to be narrowly construed. See id. at 214 (citing In re Riso, 978 F.2d at 1154, and In re Rahm, 641 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1981)). Quarre's claim had not been reduced to judgment at the time the three parcels of real estate were transferred, and he had no security interest in the property represented thereby.
We note in passing that the bankruptcy court's dismissal followed the bankruptcy trustee's announcement that the case was a "no asset" matter, which Quarre argues constituted a de facto abandonment of the property represented by his claim. Abandonment requires formal notice and a hearing, see 11 U.S.C. § 544(a); Bankr. R. 6007(a), and any interested party can request such by filing and serving a motion asking the trustee to do so. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b); Bankr. R. 6007(b). Quarre failed to do so. See Sierra Switchboard Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 789 F.2d 705, 709-10 (9th Cir. 1986).
Because we find no merit to Quarre's arguments, the decision of the BAP upholding the bankruptcy court's ruling in favor of the debtors is
AFFIRMED.
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