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LOIACONO v. GOLDBERG

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department.
Jun 9, 1997
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Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Joseph Loiacono, entered into a mortgage agreement with defendants Morris Goldberg and Janice Goldberg. The original mortgage and note provided that acceleration of the mortgage debt upon default was at the mortgagee's option. Subsequently, the parties executed a modification agreement stipulating that the mortgage debt "shall become immediately due and payable" if the mortgagors defaulted for ten days, but also preserving the mortgagee's rights under the original mortgage, including the option to renew, extend, or modify the amount due without notice.

The mortgagors defaulted again in October 1988. The plaintiff initiated a foreclosure action in 1990, which was dismissed in 1992 for failure to timely seek leave to enter a default judgment. A second action was commenced but dismissed in 1993 due to improper service. After re-serving the defendants, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment that was vacated in July 1995 for failure to obtain a new index number. The present action was commenced in 1995, and the defendants moved to dismiss it as time-barred, arguing that under the modification agreement the entire mortgage debt became due upon default in 1988, more than six years earlier.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the mortgage debt was accelerated upon the mortgagors' default in 1988, thereby triggering the statute of limitations for the entire debt.
  2. Whether the plaintiff's recovery of installments due after October 1989 is barred by the statute of limitations.
  3. Whether service of process on defendant Morris Goldberg was properly effected.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pagano v. Smith, 201 A.D.2d 632, 633 Separate causes of action accrue for each installment; statute of limitations runs from each installment's due date unless debt is accelerated. Used to establish that recovery of installments due within six years is not time-barred absent acceleration.
Khoury v. Alger, 174 A.D.2d 918 Supports the principle of separate causes of action for each installment. Reinforces the application of installment-based statute of limitations.
Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Mebane, 208 A.D.2d 892, 894 Once mortgage debt is accelerated, statute of limitations runs on entire debt. Clarifies the effect of acceleration on statute of limitations timing.
Batchelder v. Council Grove Water Co., 131 N.Y. 42 Acceleration clause in mortgage is exercisable at mortgagee's option. Supports the court’s finding that acceleration was discretionary, not automatic.
Golden v. Ramapo Improvement Corp., 78 A.D.2d 648 Confirms mortgagee’s option to accelerate mortgage debt. Used to interpret the mortgagee’s rights under the mortgage and modification agreement.
Libeson v Copy Realty Corp., 167 A.D.2d 376, 377 Pure questions of law apparent on the record may be considered on appeal even if raised for the first time. Permitted the court to consider the statute of limitations issue despite it being raised initially on appeal.
Bossak v. Steinberg, 58 N.Y.2d 916, 918 Proper service of process requirements. Confirmed that service on Morris Goldberg was properly effected.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the mortgage and modification agreement provisions regarding acceleration. Although the modification agreement stated that the mortgage debt "shall become immediately due and payable" after a ten-day default, it also preserved the mortgagee’s original rights, including the option to accelerate, renew, or extend the debt without notice. The court held that acceleration was discretionary, not automatic. Therefore, the statute of limitations for each installment runs separately unless acceleration is exercised. Because the mortgagee had the option but did not necessarily accelerate the entire debt in 1988, recovery of installments due within six years of the 1995 action was not time-barred.

The court also found that service of process on Morris Goldberg was properly effected, citing precedent. Other contentions raised by the appellant were found to lack merit. The court considered the statute of limitations issue despite it being raised for the first time on appeal because it involved a pure question of law evident from the record.

Holding and Implications

The court modified and affirmed the lower court’s order by deleting the provision dismissing the plaintiff’s causes of action to recover installments due after October 1989 and denying that branch of the motion. Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The direct effect of this decision is that the plaintiff may recover installments due within six years of the commencement of the action, as the mortgage debt was not automatically accelerated in 1988. No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of existing law regarding acceleration clauses and statute of limitations for installment mortgages.

Show all summary ...

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof which granted that branch of the motion which was to dismiss the plaintiff's causes of action to recover installments due after October 1989 and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, with costs to the plaintiff.

The original mortgage and note between the plaintiff and the defendants Morris Goldberg and Janice Goldberg provided that payment of the mortgage debt could be accelerated on default only upon the option of the mortgagee. Thereafter, when the mortgagors defaulted, the parties entered into a modification agreement which provided that the mortgage debt "shall become immediately due and payable" if the mortgagors' default continued for a period of 10 days. However, that agreement further provided that "this Agreement does not in any way impair any of the rights of the [mortgagee] under [the mortgage]", and that the mortgagee had the right to renew, extend, or modify the amount due without notice to the mortgagors.

The mortgagors again defaulted in October 1988. The plaintiff commenced a foreclosure action in 1990, which was dismissed in 1992 when it failed to timely seek leave to enter a default judgment. A second action was then commenced, which was dismissed in 1993, on the ground of improper service. The plaintiff then re-served the defendants and obtained a judgment on default, which was vacated in July 1995 because the plaintiff had not obtained a new index number. The instant action was commenced in 1995, and the defendants moved to dismiss it on the ground, inter alia, that it was time-barred, since, according to the modification agreement, the entire mortgage debt became due and payable upon their default in 1988, more than six years earlier.

The law is well settled that with respect to a mortgage payable in installments, there are "separate causes of action for each installment accrued, and the Statute of Limitations [begins] to run, on the date each installment [becomes] due" unless the mortgage debt is accelerated (Pagano v. Smith, 201 A.D.2d 632, 633; see, Khoury v. Alger, 174 A.D.2d 918). Once the mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount is due and the Statute of Limitations begins to run on the entire mortgage debt (see, Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Mebane, 208 A.D.2d 892, 894).

In the instant case, although the modification agreement provided for automatic acceleration of the mortgage debt upon a default of 10 days, that agreement further provided that the amount due could be extended without notice to the mortgagors, and further that the modification agreement did not impair the mortgagee's rights under the mortgage. The mortgage gave the mortgagee the option to exercise the acceleration clause (see, Batchelder v. Council Grove Water Co., 131 N.Y. 42; Golden v. Ramapo Improvement Corp., 78 A.D.2d 648). Accordingly, we find that acceleration of the mortgage debt was at the option of the mortgagee, and recovery of installments due within six years of the commencement of the instant action is not time-barred (see, Pagano v. Smith, supra). Although this contention is raised for the first time on appeal, it involves a pure question of law which appeared on the face of the record and therefore may be considered at this juncture (see, Libeson v Copy Realty Corp., 167 A.D.2d 376, 377).

Moreover, service of process upon the defendant Morris Goldberg was properly effected (see, Bossak v. Steinberg, 58 N.Y.2d 916, 918).

The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit.

Miller, J.P., Joy, Goldstein and Florio, JJ., concur.