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SAFER v. ESTATE OF PACK
Safer v. Estate of Pack (Appellate Division, Sept. 1, 1998) — Opinion Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a prior appellate decision (Safer v. Estate of Pack (I), 291 N.J. Super. 619) in which this Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint and held that plaintiffs had pleaded a viable cause of action and made an adequate prima facie showing to survive summary judgment. On remand the trial court considered a choice-of-law question, determined that New York substantive law governed, concluded that the action was time-barred under New York's statute of limitations (because New York lacks a discovery rule of the type relevant here), and dismissed the matter with prejudice. Plaintiffs appealed that dismissal. The opinion notes that the detailed factual background was set out in the prior opinion and is not repeated in full in this opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether New Jersey's flexible governmental interest analysis for choice of law requires application of New York law (which, as applied here, would bar the action under New York's statute of limitations because New York lacks a discovery rule applicable to this type of case) or New Jersey law (which, by application of New Jersey's discovery rule as described in Lopez v. Swyer, would toll New Jersey's statute of limitations).
- Whether differences in substantive law — specifically the scope of a physician's duty to non-patient family members — weigh in favor of applying New Jersey or New York law for the claims at issue.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Safer v. Estate of Pack (I), 291 N.J. Super. 619, 677 A.2d 1188 (App. Div.) | Prior appellate decision reversing dismissal and finding a viable cause of action and adequate prima facie showing to survive summary judgment. | Referenced as the prior opinion containing the detailed factual background and legal analysis of New Jersey law relevant to this case. |
| Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973) | New Jersey discovery rule that can toll the statute of limitations. | Identified as the authority for New Jersey's discovery rule, which, if applied, would toll the limitations period and avoid a statute-of-limitations bar. |
| Ellis v. Peter, 211 A.D.2d 353, 627 N.Y.S.2d 707 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 86 N.Y.2d 885 (1995) | Example of New York authorities related to scope of physician duty to non-patient family members. | Used as an instance indicating that New York may not apply as broad a rule of physician duty to non-patient family members as New Jersey does. |
| Conboy v. Mogeloff, 172 A.D.2d 912, 567 N.Y.S.2d 960 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 862 (1991) | Another example of New York authority on duty issues in similar contexts. | Compared to New Jersey law to show differences in substantive duty that bear on choice of law. |
| Sorgente v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 142 Misc.2d 870, 539 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1989) | Example of New York case law addressing related duty/risk issues. | Provided as an additional New York example for comparison of substantive rules. |
| Schum v. Bailey, 578 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1978) | Third Circuit application of New Jersey's interest-based choice-of-law approach in a diversity case with similar jurisdictional facts; concluded New Jersey law applied. | The court expressly adopts and applies the Schum analysis and result to this case as controlling guidance for choice-of-law, finding it correct and applicable. |
| Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973) | Adoption of New Jersey's "interest-based approach" to choice of law. | Identified as the New Jersey decision that instituted the interest-based approach which the court applies (as also applied in Schum). |
| Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 145, 146 (1971) | Principles influencing the interest-based choice-of-law methodology. | Noted as an influence on the interest-based approach cited in Schum and related authorities. |
| Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970) | Cited in relation to jurisdictional/domicile/residence considerations in choice-of-law analyses. | Referenced for comparison of domicile/residence facts between Schum and the present case. |
| Mueller v. Parke Davis, 252 N.J. Super. 347, 599 A.2d 950 (App. Div. 1991) | Similar comparative reference in choice-of-law and jurisdictional context. | Cited as an additional authority discussing analogous jurisdictional points. |
| Gantes v. Kason Corp., 145 N.J. 478, 679 A.2d 106 (1996) | Illustration of decisional growth under the flexible governmental interest analysis. | Identified as an example of subsequent decisions reflecting continued application and development of the interest-based approach since Schum. |
| Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 510 A.2d 1187 (1986) | Another example of New Jersey decisions applying interest-based choice-of-law principles. | Cited as part of the body of decisions showing application and development of the method. |
| Grossman v. Club Med Sales, Inc., 273 N.J. Super. 42, 640 A.2d 1194 (App. Div. 1994) | Further illustration of flexible governmental interest analysis in New Jersey jurisprudence. | Used to show decisional growth and continued application of the approach. |
| Polarome Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Commerce Ind. Ins. Co., 310 N.J. Super. 168, 708 A.2d 450 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 155 N.J. 590, 715 A.2d 993 (1998) | Recent illustration of the flexible governmental interest analysis applied to choice-of-law questions in contract actions. | Offered as a contemporary example of the approach's application and as support for the continued validity of the method. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds from the limited, singular issue presented on this appeal: which state's substantive law governs under New Jersey's flexible governmental interest analysis — New York or New Jersey — because that determination controls whether the plaintiffs' claims are time-barred.
Key steps in the court's reasoning (as stated in the opinion):
- The trial court, on remand, had ruled that New York substantive law governed and that the action was time-barred under New York's statute of limitations (New York lacking the discovery rule applicable here).
- The appellate court framed the central choice-of-law question as whether New Jersey's flexible governmental interest analysis requires application of New York law (with its statute-of-limitations result) or New Jersey law (which applies a discovery rule per Lopez v. Swyer).
- The court observed that New York appears not to apply as broad a physician duty to non-patient family members as New Jersey, a substantive difference relevant to the choice-of-law inquiry.
- Relying on Schum v. Bailey (3d Cir. 1978) — a diversity case with similar facts in which the Third Circuit gave due regard to New Jersey's interest-based approach and held that New Jersey law applied — the court adopted Schum's analysis and result for the present case.
- The court explained its adoption of Schum by stating that the Third Circuit's application of New Jersey's flexible governmental interest analysis was correct at the time and that there have been no essential modifications of that method since, apart from decisional growth.
- The court cited subsequent New Jersey decisions (Gantes, Veazey, Grossman, Polarome) as evidence of decisional growth but not of a fundamental change to the analytical method.
- Given the factual similarities to Schum and additional factual differences that weigh in plaintiffs' favor under the governmental interest analysis, the court concluded New Jersey law governs. Because the discovery rule may apply based on the record developed to date, a statute-of-limitations bar does not presently appear to preclude plaintiffs' claims.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Appellate Division held that New Jersey law governs the choice-of-law question in this case and reversed the trial court's March 21, 1997 order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. The matter is remanded for further proceedings.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The trial court's dismissal with prejudice is reversed and the case is remanded, so plaintiffs' claims proceed under New Jersey law rather than being barred under New York's statute of limitations as applied by the trial court.
- Statute-of-limitations consequence: Because New Jersey's discovery rule (per Lopez v. Swyer) may apply under the record developed to date, no statute-of-limitations bar presently appears to preclude the plaintiffs' claims.
- Precedential note: The court expressly adopted the analysis and result of Schum v. Bailey and applied New Jersey's flexible governmental interest approach; the opinion applies existing choice-of-law methodology and cites subsequent decisions as evidencing decisional growth rather than a fundamental change in approach.
KESTIN, J.A.D.
In a prior opinion, Safer v. Estate of Pack (I), 291 N.J. Super. 619, 677 A.2d 1188 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 146 N.J. 568, 683 A.2d 1163 (1996), we reversed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that plaintiffs had pleaded a viable cause of action and had made an adequate prima facie showing to survive defendants' motion for summary judgment. In remanding, we observed that a choice of law question might exist. That issue was subsequently raised in the trial court which determined that "this action is . . . governed by New York substantive law; and . . . is time-barred by the New York statute of limitations." The trial court accordingly ordered the matter dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The factual background of the matter was set out in detail in our prior opinion and we will not rehearse it here. The only question before us in this appeal is whether New Jersey's flexible governmental interest analysis approach to choice of law questions requires the application of New York law which, because it lacks a discovery rule applying to cases of this type, would bar the action under its statute of limitations; or New Jersey law which, by application of our discovery rule, see Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 , 300 A.2d 563 (1973), tolls the running of our statute of limitations. The choice of law analysis bears as well on differences in the substantive law that will govern, for as far as we are able to determine, New York does not apply as broad a rule of physician duty to non-patient family members as New Jersey does. Compare our analysis of New Jersey law in Safer v. Estate of Pack (I), supra, 291 N.J. Super. at 625-27, 677 A.2d 1188, with, e.g., Ellis v. Peter, 211 A.D.2d 353, 627 N.Y.S.2d 707 (App.Div.), appeal dismissed, 86 N.Y.2d 885, 635 N.Y.S.2d 950, 659 N.E.2d 773 (1995); Conboy v. Mogeloff, 172 A.D.2d 912, 567 N.Y.S.2d 960 (App.Div.), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 862, 576 N.Y.S.2d 220, 582 N.E.2d 603 (1991); Sorgente v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 142 Misc.2d 870, 539 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup.Ct. 1989).
Twenty years ago, in Schum v. Bailey, 578 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1978), the United States Court of Appeals, in a diversity case with similar jurisdictional facts, accorded due regard to New Jersey's "interest-based approach" to choice of law questions, id. at 495, adopted in Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973), influenced by principles enunciated in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 145, 146 (1971) and other authorities, and held that New Jersey law applied. In Schum, as here, all the medical services that were rendered were performed in New York by a physician who practiced there. As here, the physician was also licensed to practice in New Jersey and had hospital privileges in this State. One point of difference: although the plaintiff in Schum was a domiciliary of New Jersey at the time the alleged tort was committed and when the action was commenced, the defendant was a resident of New York; here, both plaintiff Donna Safer and defendant George Pack were residents of New Jersey when the alleged genetic tort was committed, and the action was commenced — albeit years later — against Dr. Pack's domestic estate. See Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511 , 524-25, 263 A.2d 129 (1970); Mueller v. Parke Davis, 252 N.J. Super. 347 , 599 A.2d 950 (App.Div. 199 1). Another point of difference may be found in the nature of the alleged torts in Schum and in this case, i.e., the difference between a medical malpractice case addressing medical services rendered elsewhere and one which implicates failure to warn/increased risk of harm considerations to a non-patient which may be seen to be a breach of duty in the jurisdiction in which the plaintiff resided at the time.
We adopt and apply the Schum analysis and result as applicable to this case because we view the Third Circuit's application of New Jersey's then relatively new flexible governmental interest analysis approach to have been correct at the time, and because there have been no essential modifications of that method in the intervening years, except for decisional growth. See, e.g., Gantes v. Kason Corp., 145 N.J. 478 , 485-94, 679 A.2d 106 (1996); reversing 276 N.J. Super. 586 , 648 A.2d 517 (App.Div. 1994); Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 248, 510 A.2d 1187 (1986); Grossman v. Club Med Sales, Inc., 273 N.J. Super. 42 , 48-49, 640 A.2d 1194 (App.Div. 199 4). See also Polarome Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Commerce Ind. Ins. Co., 310 N.J. Super. 168 , 172-73, 708 A.2d 450 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 155 N.J. 590 , 715 A.2d 993 (1998), as a recent illustration of the application of flexible governmental interest analysis to choice of law questions in contract actions.
Given the similarities between this case and Schum, as well as the differences which can only be seen to add weight to plaintiffs' side of the governmental interest analysis balance, we hold that New Jersey law governs. Insofar as the discovery rule can be seen to apply based upon the record developed to date, no statute of limitations bar appears presently to preclude plaintiffs' claims.
The trial court's order of March 21, 1997, dismissing the complaint with prejudice is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.
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