TORINO v. KLM CONSTRUCTION, INC

Plaintiff was properly granted summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) claim because the scaffold from which he fell, basically a makeshift platform without any safety features that was owned and assembled by third-party defendant, his employer, failed in its "core objective" to prevent plaintiff from falling off it to the stairs below ( Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 501; Yu Xiu Deng v. A.J. Contr. Co., 255 A.D.2d 202; Aragon v. 233 W. 21st St., 201 A.D.2d 353, 354). The foregoing renders plaintiffs' alternative theories of liability against defendant academic, and we do not address them. Defendant's motion for summary judgment on its common-law indemnity claim against plaintiff's employer should have been granted, there being no issues of fact as to the employer's actual responsibility for the accident ( see, Aragon v. 233 W. 21st St., supra). That defendant had a representative observing the progress and method of the work "does not bespeak supervision of the kind which would render a property owner liable at common law" for work site injuries ( supra, at 354). "[A]uthority to enforce general safety standards does not equate with supervision or control of [plaintiff's] work" ( Moutray v. Baron, 244 A.D.2d 618, 619, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 808).

Concur — Williams, J.P., Lerner, Rubin and Saxe, JJ.