Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

IN RE JOEL T

Court of Appeal of California, Third District.
Feb 23, 1999
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

Epifania B., the mother of five minors aged between five months and nine years, was involved in juvenile court proceedings after the minors were detained in October 1996 based on allegations that she allowed Steven T., the father of the youngest child who had sexually molested the other children, into her home. Although Epifania B. acknowledged the molestations, she was fearful of Steven T. Initially, the minors were placed in a trial placement with Epifania B. pending jurisdictional hearings while she participated voluntarily in drug testing, counseling, housing, and parenting programs.

In January 1997, the court adjudged the minors dependents under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and found returning them to Epifania B. would be detrimental. The minors remained with her on a trial basis under a reunification plan including counseling, drug testing, stable housing, and parenting classes, with no contact allowed between Steven T. and the minors.

By March 1997, progress was noted, and the trial placement was extended. However, by January 1998, Epifania B. had ceased therapy and drug testing, leading the social worker to refer her to a new program, while still noting some parenting improvement. In February 1998, due to repeated violations of the no-contact order with Steven T., the court removed the minors from her custody pursuant to a supplemental petition.

In April 1998, the social worker reported that conditions had not improved sufficiently, recommending long-term foster care placement and denial of further services to Epifania B. The social worker also noted potential relative placements but observed minimal prior contact between the minors and these relatives. At the combined hearing on April 28, 1998, the court found the supplemental petition allegations true, denied reunification services, rejected relative placement requests, and ordered the minors placed in long-term foster care, concluding no probability existed for return to Epifania B.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the juvenile court erred in denying reunification services to the appellant following removal of the minors pursuant to the supplemental petition.
  2. Whether the juvenile court erred in failing to give preference to the minors' relatives when determining their placement.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The juvenile court erred in denying reunification services after the minors' removal on the supplemental petition.
  • The services previously received were family maintenance services, not reunification services, since the minors had not been removed from her custody prior to the supplemental petition.
  • The court should have given preference to placing the minors with relatives, specifically the maternal great-grandmother or Joshua's paternal grandmother.

Respondent's Arguments (DHHS)

  • Appellant had already received 18 months of court-ordered services and was not entitled to additional reunification services.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Carolyn R. v. Superior Court (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 159, 165-167 Requirement that reunification services be ordered when a minor is removed from parental custody unless specific exceptions apply under section 361.5(b). The court relied on this precedent to explain the statutory mandate that reunification services be provided upon first removal, emphasizing the distinction between family maintenance and reunification services.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the statutory framework governing reunification and family maintenance services under the Welfare and Institutions Code. It distinguished between services provided when minors remain in parental custody, which are not subject to the 18-month limitation, and reunification services required upon removal, which are limited to 18 months unless exceptions apply.

The court found that prior to the supplemental petition, the minors remained in appellant's custody under supervision, and thus, the services she received were family preservation rather than reunification services subject to statutory time limits. Consequently, the court held that the juvenile court erred in denying reunification services solely based on the prior 18 months of services, as the statutory limitations for reunification services did not apply before the minors' removal on the supplemental petition.

The court emphasized the subtle but important legal distinction between family maintenance services and reunification services, noting that the latter must be ordered upon removal unless specific statutory exceptions justify denial. Therefore, the court concluded that the juvenile court should have considered reunification services anew at the dispositional hearing following removal on the supplemental petition.

Regarding placement preferences, the opinion contains no detailed analysis or ruling on this issue beyond noting the appellant's contention and the court's rejection of the relative placement requests.

Holding and Implications

The dispositional orders of the juvenile court denying reunification services and ordering long-term foster care placement are reversed. The case is remanded with directions for the juvenile court to hold a new dispositional hearing on the supplemental petition.

The court's decision requires the juvenile court on remand to consider whether reunification services should be ordered under the appropriate statutory standards, including section 361.5, subdivision (b), based on the evidence. The ruling clarifies the distinction between family maintenance and reunification services and affirms that statutory time limits on reunification services do not apply to periods when the child remains in parental custody under supervision. No new precedent beyond application of existing statutory principles was established. The direct effect is to afford appellant another opportunity to receive reunification services and for the court to reconsider placement alternatives.

Show all summary ...

HULL, J. —

Epifania B., mother of the five minors, appeals from orders entered at a combined hearing for status review and disposition on a supplemental petition, denying her further services and placing the minors in long-term foster care. (Welf. Inst. Code, §§ 364, 387 [further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise designated].) Appellant contends the juvenile court erred in denying reunification services and in failing to give preference to the minors' relatives when determining their placement. We reverse the order denying appellant reunification services and remand the case for a new dispositional hearing.

FACTS

The five minors, ranging in age from five months to nine years, were detained in October 1996, based upon allegations that appellant permitted Steven T., father of the youngest child, into the appellant's home although Steven T. had sexually molested the other children. Appellant believed the molestations had occurred, but was afraid of Steven T. The court authorized a trial placement of the minors with appellant pending a hearing on jurisdiction since appellant was participating voluntarily in drug testing, counseling, a housing program and parenting classes.

At the combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing on January 23, 1997, the court found the minors came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (b), (d) and (j), adjudged the minors dependents, found that return of the minors to appellant's custody would be detrimental to the minors' best interests, and committed the minors to the department of health and human services (DHHS) for placement. The court allowed the minors to remain in the care and custody of appellant on a trial basis. The court ordered appellant to participate in a "reunification" plan which included counseling and drug testing, and ordered appellant to maintain a stable home and attend parenting classes. DHHS was to provide the relevant services. Finally, the court ordered that Steven T. was to have no contact with the minors.

By March 1997, appellant continued to make progress in parenting and providing a stable home and the social worker recommended extending the trial placement. The report for the six-month status review stated appellant continued to make positive progress on the plan although she had difficulty in establishing a firm routine for the children and at times her judgment was questionable. The court continued the trial placement and ordered DHHS to provide further services to appellant.

In January 1998, the social worker reported appellant had maintained her participation in the housing program, but had terminated her therapy and stopped drug testing in October 1997. Appellant's counselor had closed appellant's case for lack of meaningful participation by appellant. Believing appellant had shown some improvement in parenting skills, however, and being aware appellant could not successfully parent her children without assistance, the social worker referred her to a new program.

Because appellant had "on more than one occasion" allowed Steven T. into appellant's home in violation of the court's previous order, the court removed all five children from appellant's custody in February 1998 pursuant to a supplemental petition to modify the minors' placement. The social worker had warned appellant as recently as December 1997 not to permit such contact.

In April 1998, in a combined report for the hearing on the supplemental petition and for the 12-month dependency status review, the social worker stated again that appellant did well in her services until she stopped testing and counseling in October 1997. Nonetheless, the social worker felt conditions had not altered significantly from the time of the initial removal as appellant still permitted Steven T. access to minors he had molested and abused previously. The social worker further reported appellant had moved to San Francisco and had visited only twice since the minors' detention in February. The social worker recommended the minors be placed in long-term foster care and that no further services be provided to appellant. In an addendum, the social worker addressed the suggested relative placements, noting that Joshua's paternal grandmother was interested in adoption and the minors' maternal great-grandmother, with whom the maternal grandfather resided, was interested in having the minors placed with her. There is little indication that either of these relatives visited, or maintained, a relationship with the minors during the dependency period.

At the combined hearing on April 28, 1998, 18 months after the initial detention, the court that found the allegations of the supplemental petition were true. Appellant argued she should be provided further services or, alternatively, the minors should be placed with the maternal great-grandmother or, in Joshua's case, with the paternal grandmother. The court ordered the minors placed in long-term foster care and denied appellant's placement requests and her request for additional services, finding DHHS had provided 18 months of services to her already and there was no probability the minors could be returned to her.

DISCUSSION I Failure to Order Reunification Services

Appellant contends the juvenile court erred in failing to order reunification services following removal of the minors pursuant to the supplemental petition. Appellant contends the services she received previously were "family maintenance" services, not "reunification" services as the minors had not been removed from her custody and she was entitled to reunification services. DHHS asserts appellant received 18 months of services and is entitled to no more.

When a dependency is declared, the juvenile court must order child welfare services be provided to the parents whether or not the child remains in the parent's home (§§ 361.5, subd. (a), 362, subd. (b)) and must review the status of the case every six months (§§ 364, 366.21, 366.22). However, if the child remains in the parent's custody, at each six-month review, the court determines only whether the dependency should be terminated or whether further supervision is necessary. (§ 364; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 1460(e)(1), 1461(b)(2)(A), 1462(a)(2)(A).) Unlike the situation where the child is removed from the home and court-ordered services are statutorily limited to 18 months (§ 361.5, subd. (a)), nothing in the statutes or rules limits the time period for court supervision and services when the child remains in the home (§ 364; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 1460(e)(1), 1461(b)(2)(A), 1462(a)(2)(A)). If supervision is no longer required, the court simply terminates the dependency. Otherwise, the state may continue to provide supportive services and supervision to parents until the dependent minors reach their majority.

It is true that family maintenance services may be limited to a total of 12 months. (§§ 16501, subd. (g), 16506.) However, family preservation services are not so limited. (§ 16501, subd. (j).) As DHHS provided services to the family well past 12 months, we presume the services in this case were family preservation services.

However, if the social worker becomes aware of a change in circumstances which may trigger removal, a supplemental (§ 387) or subsequent (§ 342) petition may be filed. (§ 364, subd. (e).) In either case, the court must hold jurisdictional and dispositional hearings. (§ 342; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1431.) At the dispositional hearing on the supplemental petition, the court must again decide whether to leave the minors in the custody of their parents or remove them and provide or deny services. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1431(e).)

Here, the court ordered the minors removed from parental custody and denied reunification services solely because appellant had received court-ordered services for the 18 months following the minors' original detention. However, appellant had not received time-limited services prior to the minors' second detention on the supplemental petition as they were in her custody subject to the supervision of the juvenile court. Consequently, the court could not rely on the statutory limitations for services provided to parents whose children have been removed in denying services to appellant. This is not to say the court could not decline to order services under proper statutory authority. (See § 361.5, subd. (b).) The distinction between the services provided when the minors remain in parental custody and when the minors have been removed from parental custody is a subtle but important one. Services designed merely to support a family's functioning may or may not be the same as those designed to reunify a family even if the ultimate goal in each case is to ameliorate the problems which led to the dependency at the outset.

Accordingly, when the juvenile court removes a minor from parental custody for the first time, section 361.5, subdivision (a), requires the court to order reunification services except in the circumstances specified in subdivision (b) of that section. (Cf. Carolyn R. v. Superior Court (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 159, 165-167 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 669].)

The case must be remanded for a new dispositional hearing on the supplemental petition. At the hearing, the court should consider all applicable dispositional alternatives including denial of services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b), if justified by the evidence.

II Preferential Placement With Relatives

See footnote, ante, page 263.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .

DISPOSITION

The dispositional orders of the juvenile court are reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The matter is remanded with directions to the juvenile court to hold a new dispositional hearing on the supplemental petition.

Scotland, P.J., and Morrison, J., concurred.