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STATE v. PETERSON
Factual and Procedural Background
William Peterson was convicted of first-degree burglary following an incident at the victim's residence during the early morning hours. The victim testified that Peterson entered her home without consent and sexually attacked her in her bedroom after she awoke and found him there. Peterson was acquitted by the jury of first-degree assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct. The appeal arises from Peterson challenging his burglary conviction on the grounds that the jury did not convict him of the crime he was alleged to have intended to commit at the time of breaking and entering. The Court of Appeals of South Carolina affirmed the conviction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a defendant can be convicted of first-degree burglary when the jury fails to convict him of the substantive crime he was alleged to have intended to commit at the time of breaking and entering.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 13 Am.Jur. 2d Burglary § 25 (1964) | Burglary is complete upon entry with intent; consummation of the intended crime is not necessary. | Supported the principle that the failure to complete the intended crime does not invalidate a burglary conviction. |
| 12A C.J.S. Burglary §§ 41-42 (1980) | Intent at the time of entry controls; success or failure of the intended crime is immaterial. | Reinforced that the controlling intent is that at the time of entry and that the offense is complete upon entry with intent regardless of outcome. |
| Brown v. State, 429 So. 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) | Acquittal of substantive crimes does not preclude burglary conviction based on intent at entry. | Demonstrated that burglary conviction stands despite acquittal on related charges. |
| State v. Melton, 189 S.E.2d 757, 758 (N.C.App. 1972) | Acquittal of a substantive crime does not affect conviction for breaking and entering with intent. | Applied to uphold burglary conviction despite acquittal on felonious larceny. |
| State v. Amerson, 244 S.C. 374, 137 S.E.2d 284 (1964) | It is not essential to commit grand larceny for housebreaking conviction; intent to commit any crime suffices. | Supported the sufficiency of intent to commit any crime at the time of breaking and entering for conviction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court focused on the statutory elements of first-degree burglary, particularly the element requiring intent to commit a crime at the time of entry. It emphasized that the jury's failure to convict Peterson of the sexual assault charge does not undermine the burglary conviction because the crime of burglary is complete upon unlawful entry with criminal intent, regardless of whether the intended crime was consummated. The court cited authoritative legal treatises and precedents affirming that the success or failure of the intended crime is immaterial to the burglary charge. The evidence presented by the State sufficiently established Peterson's intent to commit a crime upon entry, including the victim's testimony describing his actions consistent with intent to commit a crime inside the dwelling.
Holding and Implications
Affirmed.
The court upheld Peterson’s conviction for first-degree burglary despite his acquittal on the related sexual assault charge. This decision confirms that a burglary conviction does not require proof that the intended crime was completed or that the defendant was convicted of that crime, only that the defendant had the requisite intent at the time of unlawful entry. The ruling directly affects the parties by sustaining the conviction but does not establish new precedent beyond reaffirming established principles.
GOOLSBY, J.:
William Peterson appeals his conviction of first-degree burglary after a jury found him not guilty of first-degree assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct. The sole question on appeal is whether Peterson could be convicted of burglary because the jury failed to convict him of the crime that the State offered proof he intended to commit at the time of breaking and entering. We affirm.
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rules 215 and 220 (b), SCACR.
The charges against Peterson arose out of an incident that allegedly occurred in the victim's residence during the early morning hours. The victim testified that Peterson entered her home without her consent and sexually attacked her in her bedroom after she awoke and found him there.
First-degree burglary consists of the following elements: (1) entry into a dwelling house; (2) without consent; (3) with the intent to commit a crime therein; and (4) at least one of a number of additional circumstances being present. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-311 (Cum. Supp. 1998). Here, the focus centers only upon the third element.
The fact that the jury failed to convict Peterson of the sexual assault charge does not affect the validity of the burglary charge. Indeed, that fact is immaterial. See 13 Am.Jur. 2d Burglary § 25, at 223 (1964) ("Except as modified by statute, consummation or execution of the intent to steal or commit some felony is not necessary to complete the crime of burglary"); 12A C.J.S. Burglary § 41, at 239 (1980) ("The controlling intent is that of the time when the burglarious entry was committed. . . ."); id. § 42, at 240 ("To constitute burglary it is not necessary that the intended crime shall be committed . . . as the offense is complete as soon as the premises are broken and entered or entered alone with the necessary intent, and the success or failure of the venture is immaterial"); see also Brown v. State, 429 So. 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (the defendant's acquittal on robbery and sexual battery charges was not inconsistent with his conviction of the charge of entering a dwelling with the intent to commit a robbery and a sexual battery); State v. Melton, 189 S.E.2d 757, 758 (N.C.App. 1972) (where the court sustained the defendant's conviction of felonious breaking and entering where the defendant was acquitted of the felonious larceny charge, stating, "It is immaterial that defendant was acquitted of larceny"); cf. State v. Amerson, 244 S.C. 374, 375, 137 S.E.2d 284, 286 (1964) (upholding the defendant's conviction for housebreaking notwithstanding his acquittal of grand larceny, stating "It is not essential to the crime of housebreaking that one commit grand larceny. It is sufficient that the one breaking and entering did so with the intent to commit any crime").
Here, the State offered proof of Peterson's intent at the time he broke and entered the victim's home. The victim testified that Peterson grabbed her and covered her mouth; that he was wearing gloves; that he threw her on her bed; that he choked her; that he was "humping" her; that he suggested she cooperate; that she screamed for help; that he told her to be quiet so that her child would not wake up; and that when the child did awaken and began crying, Peterson released the victim and ran away.
AFFIRMED.
CONNOR and HEARN, JJ., concur.
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