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McCRAW v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department.
Jul 19, 1999
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DECISION ORDER

ORDERED that the appeal from the order dated April 14, 1998, is dismissed, as that order was superseded by the order dated September 29, 1998, made upon reargument; and it is further,

ORDERED that the order dated September 29, 1998, is reversed insofar as appealed from, and, upon reargument, those branches of the motion and cross motion which were to dismiss the plaintiffs' cause of action based on Labor Law § 241 Lab.(6) are denied, and so much of the order dated April 14, 1998, as granted those branches of the motion and cross motion is vacated; and it is further,

ORDERED that the plaintiffs are awarded one bill of costs.

The plaintiff Bruce McCraw (hereinafter McCraw) was injured while inside of a building owned by the defendant United Parcel Service. The building was under construction when McCraw was dispatched to the site to repair a leaky hydraulic lift which was being utilized in the construction process. During the process of his repair duties, McCraw slipped upon a puddle which was a mixture of water and hydraulic fluid, thereby sustaining personal injuries. Thereafter the plaintiffs commenced the instant action, asserting, inter alia, a cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 241 Lab.(6) alleging that the respondents violated 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d), by permitting a slippery condition to exist on the work surface upon which he fell.

Contrary to the respondents' contention, the provisions of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) do not require that the slippery surface in question be elevated ( see, Rizzuto v. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 N.Y.2d 343). Further, the alleged injury occurred in an area in which construction, excavation, or demolition work was being performed ( see, Jock v. Fien, 80 N.Y.2d 965). This placed the alleged injury within the construction context as anticipated under Labor Law § 241 Lab.(6) ( see, Jock v. Fien, supra; Houchang Haghighi v. Bailer, 240 A.D.2d 368; Bermel v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 231 A.D.2d 663). Therefore, the Supreme Court improperly granted summary judgment to the United Parcel Service dismissing the plaintiffs' cause of action based on Labor Law § 241 Lab.(6) ( see, Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320; Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557).