JONES v. STATE

Unpublished Opinion is below.

ALFONSO JONES, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below-Appellee. No. 104, 1999. Supreme Court of Delaware. Submitted: July 20, 1999. Decided: August 13, 1999.

Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County Cr. A. Nos. IN94-01-1098, IN94-03-0212, IN94-03-0218.

Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and HARTNETT, Justices.

This 13th day of August, 1999, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The defendant-appellant, Alfonso Jones ("Jones"), filed this appeal from an order of the Superior Court denying his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). We find no merit to the appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.

(2) On this appeal, Jones claims ineffective assistance of counsel on two grounds: first, that his attorney failed to conduct an independent investigation into his mental condition; and, second, that his attorney failed to advise him that the Superior Court is not bound by the Truth in Sentencing Guidelines. Jones contends that as a result of these unknown factors he did not enter a knowing and intelligent guilty plea. To the extent Jones has not argued other grounds to support a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that were raised in his postconviction motion, those grounds are deemed abandoned and will not be addressed by this Court.

(3) Jones entered guilty pleas to three counts of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse Third Degree. He was sentenced to a total of 27 years imprisonment at Level V to be followed by 2 1/2 years at Level IV and decreasing levels of probation. This Court affirmed the sentence on direct appeal.

(4) In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Jones must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a "strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable."

(5) Jones' first basis for alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel is the allegation that his attorney failed to investigate his mental condition. In his Rule 61 motion, Jones contends, in conclusory fashion, that there was a question concerning his mental condition at the time of sentencing. The record reflects that, after Jones' guilty pleas were accepted, but prior to the time of sentencing, Jones had undergone psychoforensic testing at the request of his attorney. The purpose of that testing was to investigate a possible neurological basis for Jones' conduct in committing the crimes to which he pleaded guilty. There is no suggestion in the record of any neurological problem that would have prevented Jones from entering a knowing and intelligent guilty plea. Jones also appears to contend that his trial attorney's failure to inquire into his mental condition prior to the entering of the plea was due to generally inadequate representation of indigent defendants on the part of the Public Defenders Office. Such conclusory and unsupported statements fail to overcome Strickland's presumption of "professionally reasonable" representation.

(6) Jones' second basis for alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel is an allegation that his attorney failed to advise him that the Superior Court is not bound by the Truth in Sentencing Guidelines. Jones contends that he could not knowingly and intelligently enter a plea of guilty without being aware of that fact. The transcript of the plea colloquy and the signed guilty plea form both reflect that Jones was fully aware, and acknowledged his understanding, that he could be sentenced to 10 years in prison on each of the three counts to which he pleaded guilty. Jones contends that, in spite of what he was told by his counsel and the Superior Court judge about the possible consequences of pleading guilty, he believed his sentence would fall within the SENTAC guidelines. However, Jones is bound by his representations on the plea form and during the plea colloquy. Jones' contention that he was unaware of the possible consequences of his plea because his counsel failed to so apprise him is not supported by the record.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

Randy J. Holland Justice